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I. 
INTRODUCTION 
Beginning in the late 1990s, the United States experienced a tidal wave of 
accounting fraud.  Many of these frauds were on a massive scale.  WorldCom Inc. (now 
MCI) was embroiled in a $10.6 billion accounting fraud, the largest in U.S. history,1 and 
other scandals at major corporations also involved billions of dollars.2 Some of these 
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1 Ken Belson, et al., A Guilty Verdict: The Overview; Ex-Chief of WorldCom Is Found Guilty in $11 Billion 
Fraud, N.Y. Times, March 16, 2005, at A1; Christine Nuzum, Executives on Trial: WorldCom Ex-
Controller Traces Improper Accounting Back to 1997, Wall St. J., Feb. 2, 2005, at C6.  MCI agreed to a 
$750 million settlement with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), after the company’s 
accounting scandal erased more than $180 billion in shareholder value.  The class action litigation 
produced a settlement that exceeded $4 billion, making it the largest in history.  Stephen Taub, WorldCom 
Settlement Tops Cendant’s, CFO Magazine, March 11, 2005 (available at http://www.cfo.com). 
 
2 See Craig M. Boise, Playing with “Monopoly Money”: Phony Profits, Fraud Penalties and Equity, 90 
MINN. L. REV. 144, 146 (2005) (since implosion of Enron in 2001, Wall Street has experienced 
unprecedented string of accounting fraud scandals involving publicly traded corporations); Lawrence A. 
Cunningham, Sharing Accounting’s Burden: Business Lawyers in Enron’s Dark Shadows, 57 BUS. LAW.
1421, 1425-26 (2002) (“By the late 1990s, the frequency of corporate accounting scandals had multiplied.  
They include corporations that are much larger and prominent than in scandals past, including such 
household names as Aurora Foods, Cendant (CUC International), HBOC (McKesson), Leslie Fay, Rite 
Aid, Sunbeam, Waste Management, Xerox, and on and on.”).   In 2000, Cendant paid $2.85 billion to settle 
shareholder suits stemming from its accounting fraud.  Cendant Case Ends in Split Verdict, Wall St. J., Jan. 
5, 2005, at B3.  The accounting fraud at McKesson ultimately led to a $960 million settlement, after the 
stock’s collapse shaved $9 billion from the company’s market capitalization.  Stephen Taub, McKesson 
Settles Suits for $960 Million, CFO Magazine, Jan. 14, 2005 (available at http://www.cfo.com.)  The 
accounting scandals at Rite Aid Corp. and Xerox Corp. involved $1.6 billion and $6.4 billion, respectively.  
Executives on Trial: Scandal Scorecard, Wall St. J., Oct. 3, 2003, at B1.  In 2005, KPMG agreed to pay 
$22.5 million to settle SEC charges related to its audit of Xerox.  This was the largest payment made to the 
SEC by an audit firm, to that point.  Stephen Taub, KPMG Settles Xerox Charges with SEC, CFO 
Magazine, Apr. 21, 2005 (available at http://www.cfo.com).  Later in 2005, Deloitte & Touche agreed to 
pay $50 million to settle SEC charges stemming from its 2000 audit of Adelphia Communications Corp.  
Stephen Taub, PCAOB Probing Deloitte Audit, CFO Magazine, July 8, 2005.  Available at 
http://www.cfo.com. Other massive scandals enveloped HealthSouth Corp. ($3-4 billion of fraudulent 
accounting), Freddie Mac (the second-biggest mortgage finance company in the U.S., with $5 billion of 
improper accounting), and Enron Corp.  See, e.g., Dave Cook & Helen Shaw, Scrushy Acquitted on All 
Counts, CFO Magazine, June 28, 2005 (available at http://www.cfo.com); Stephen Taub, Trial Watch: 
Tyco, WorldCom, HealthSouth, Parmalat, CFO Magazine, Jan. 31, 2005 (available at http://www.cfo.com).  
2frauds were undertaken in conjunction with the external auditors of the companies 
involved.  Investors seeking redress for their losses have pursued the auditors in class 
action suits filed under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA),3 which 
was adopted in 1995 in response to perceived abuses of the class action process.4 This 
Article examines the application to external auditors of the PSLRA’s strict pleading 
requirement concerning scienter.  The issue is important, because most dismissals of 
securities class action suits against accountants are for failure to adequately allege 
scienter.5
Part II of this Article considers the significance of accounting allegations and 
auditors as defendants in securities class action suits.  Part III examines sources and 
limitations of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and auditing standards 
 
3 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).  The 
PSLRA was followed three years later by the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act, Pub. L. No. 
105-353, 109 Stat. 737 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).  The Uniform Standards Act 
was adopted by Congress to bar plaintiffs from circumventing the PSLRA by filing class actions in state 
court.   That path is now barred, because the statute mandates exclusive federal court jurisdiction for all 
private securities class actions.  See, e.g., In re Livent, Inc. Noteholders Sec. Litig., 151 F. Supp.2d 371, 
442-43 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 
4 See, e.g., Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 191 (1st Cir. 1999) (“The enactment of the 
PSLRA in 1995 marked a bipartisan effort to curb abuse in private securities lawsuits, particularly the filing 
of strike suits.”); In re Electronic Data Systems Corp. Sec. and “ERISA” Litig., 2004 WL 52088, *9 (E.D. 
Tex., Jan. 13, 2004) (PSLRA was enacted in part to compensate for perceived inability of Rule 9(b) of 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “to prevent abusive, frivolous strike suits.”).  The PSLRA, described as 
the most sweeping reform of the federal securities laws in 60 years, received widespread support from the 
auditing industry.  The legislation included several provisions that minimized accountants’ liability for 
securities fraud -- stricter pleading standards, the imposition of discovery stays pending resolution of 
motions to dismiss, and the replacement of joint and several liability with proportionate liability.  Daniel J. 
Kramer & James McBride, Section 10A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Auditors’ Duty to Detect 
and Disclose Fraud Under the Federal Securities Laws, 1309 PLI/Corp 307, 309 (May-June 2002); Robert 
S. Greenberger, Questioning the Books: Panel, in Enron’s Wake, To Review Lawsuit Curbs, Wall St. J., 
Feb. 6, 2002, at A8 (PSLRA had strong backing of accounting industry).  Some aspects of the PSLRA 
benefit auditors substantially more than they protect most corporate defendants.  John C. Coffee, Jr., 
Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeeper, Stupid,” 57 BUS. LAW. 1403, 1410 (2002).   
 
5 Richard P. Swanson & Richard Y. Roberts, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: A 
Review of the Law and Recent Developments, SH057 ALI-ABA 415, 426 (Feb. 2003). 
 
3(historically known as Generally Accepted Auditing Standards -- GAAS).  As will be 
seen, the current financial reporting and auditing models are poor tools for measuring 
accounting fraud and assessing the liability of auditors.  Moreover, various aspects of 
GAAP and GAAS serve to encourage such fraud.  Six specific weaknesses of the 
reporting model used in the U.S. are discussed: accounting for stock options, pensions, 
off balance-sheet liabilities, and intangible assets; general use of a rules-based accounting 
system; and pro forma reporting of financial results.   
Part IV briefly considers the conflicting interpretations by the federal circuits of 
the PSLRA’s scienter requirement.  The clear circuit split, unresolved by the Supreme 
Court, centers on whether allegations of motive and opportunity to commit fraud suffice 
to allege scienter.  Part V examines three key issues involving the group-published or 
group pleading doctrine, which permits a plaintiff in a securities fraud action to treat an 
individual defendant as part of a group for pleading purposes.  The issues discussed 
herein are whether the doctrine survives post-PSLRA, applies generally to the scienter of 
defendants, and applies specifically to the conduct of external auditors.    
Part VI analyzes how federal courts have applied the scienter standard to external 
auditors, in the context of GAAP and GAAS violations.  The impact of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (Sarbanes-Oxley),6 signed into federal law7 in 2002 in direct response to the 
 
6 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 
U.S.C.).  Sarbanes-Oxley has been described as “the most radical reform of corporate governance since the 
Great Depression of the 1930s.”  A Trying Year, Economist, Jan. 12, 2004.  Available at 
http://www.economist.com.
7 The legislative response to accounting fraud has not been exclusively federal.  By mid-2003, 35 states 
had approved or were considering legislation to regulate corporate accounting and other related behavior.  
Michael Schroeder, Corporate Reform: The First Year: Cleaner Living, No Easy Riches, Wall St. J., July 
22, 2003, at C1.  A summary of state legislative activity can be found at the Website of the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA).  See http://www.aicpa.org/statelegis/index.asp. The 
AICPA, the national professional organization representing more than 330,000 CPAs, has issued a White 
4recent wave of corporate accounting scandals, is examined.8 Part VI concludes that in 
numerous cases federal courts have been over-zealous in their efforts to shield external 
auditors from liability for fraud.   Numerous federal courts have reached the unwarranted 
conclusion that auditors, behaving as rational economic actors, will not sacrifice their 
professional reputations in order to derive additional audit revenue from participating in 
the fraud of their clients.  Such a conclusion, which effectively bars plaintiffs from 
successfully pleading motive to commit fraud, is completely unwarranted.  As will be 
seen, auditors have powerful economic incentives to deliver aggressive and even 
fraudulent audit reports, stemming from their desire to obtain lucrative non-audit work in 
the form of consulting or tax services.  In recent years such services have out-paced audit 
services as profit centers for multinational accounting firms.  Other key factors include 
the lack of competition in the audit industry, the absence of audit firm rotation, and the 
revolving-door phenomenon, whereby auditors ultimately work directly for their former 
clients.  Other courts, focusing on recklessness rather than motive and opportunity, have 
determined with no justification that the bar for pleading scienter of auditors should be 
set higher than it is for other defendants. 
 This Article concludes that the judiciary should adopt a new approach to assess 
the scienter of auditors in federal securities fraud actions.  Rather than applying an 
 
Paper arguing against the application of Sarbanes-Oxley’s reforms to private companies at the state level.  
According to the AICPA, the auditing of such companies is adequately regulated.  See id. As will be seen 
infra, the accounting industry has often successfully lobbied against reform measures.  See also J. Robert 
Brown, Jr., The Irrelevance of State Corporate Law in the Governance of Public Companies, 38 U. RICH.
L. REV. 317 (2004); Stephen Taub, Big Four Look to Limit Liability, CFO Magazine, Dec. 13, 2005 (Big 
Four accounting firms seek to minimize exposure by including in their audit contracts punitive damages 
and jury trial waivers).  Available at http://www.cfo.com.
8 Sarbanes-Oxley did not alter the PSLRA’s strict pleading requirements regarding scienter.  Lorna G. 
Schofield, The Impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Litigation Against Major Accounting Firms, SH097 
ALI-ABA 319, 328 (Dec. 2002).  But Sarbanes-Oxley did impact the auditing industry, as described in 
various sections of this Article, infra. 
5elevated test for successful pleading of scienter on the part of auditors, federal courts 
should apply the same standards that they apply to other defendants. 
II.   
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ACCOUNTING ALLEGATIONS AND AUDITORS  
AS DEFENDANTS 
 
Securities class action filings have remained at a high level since the PSLRA was 
enacted in 1995.  The number of suits filed in federal court increased from 110 in 1996 to 
212 in 2004.9 On average, 190 suits were filed annually during the period 1996 - 2003.10 
In general, the recent wave of filings is driven by allegations of accounting-related 
fraud.11 In 2004, GAAP violations were alleged in 48 percent of securities class filings.12 
Improper revenue recognition is the most commonly alleged accounting abuse.  In 2004, 
60 percent of securities class action suits with alleged GAAP violations included a claim 
of improper revenue recognition.13 This figure is consistent with the comparable 
numbers for SEC enforcement actions.14 
9 Securities Class Action Case Filings 2004: A Year in Review, Stanford Securities Class Action 
Clearinghouse (Jan. 2005) at 2-3 (hereafter 2004: A Year in Review).  Available at 
http://www.securities.stanford.edu. The filing statistics for 2001-03 exclude a large number of non-
traditional filings in three categories: (1) “IPO Allocation” filings in 2001, which contained allegations 
pertaining to the allocation of shares in initial public offerings; (2) “Analyst” filings in 2002, which 
contained allegations that defendants, primarily investment banks and analysts at these banks, issued 
research reports and ratings that were neither independent nor objective; and (3) “Mutual Fund” filings in 
2003, which contained allegations relating to market timing, lack of disclosure, and breach of fiduciary 
duty by mutual fund companies and other financial intermediaries. These suits are excluded because they 
have characteristics unlike those of traditional securities class action cases.  Id. at 3.  
 
10 2004: A Year in Review, supra note 9, at 3.  See also Elaine Buckley, et al., Recent Trends in Securities 
Class Action Litigation: Will Enron and Sarbanes-Oxley Change the Tides? (June 2003) at 2 (hereafter 
Recent Trends).  Available at http://www.nera.com.wwt/publications/6143.pdf.
11 Lingling Wei, Many Companies Were Sued by Shareholders in ’02, Wall St. J., March 18, 2003, at D3 
(quoting Prof. Joseph Grundfest). 
 
12 2004: A Year in Review, supra note 9, at 16.   
 
13 2004: A Year in Review, supra note 9, at 16. The second most common accounting allegation, 
overstatement of accounts receivable, was found in 17 percent of all cases with alleged GAAP violations.  
Id.  Improper revenue recognition practices come in a wide variety of flavors.  For a good description of 16 
6Cases with auditors as defendants represent only a subset of all cases with 
accounting allegations.  Nevertheless, that subset is significant and may expand in the 
aftermath of Sarbanes-Oxley.  During the period 1998-2002, auditors were named as 
defendants in at least 84 securities class action suits15 and approximately 15 percent of all 
post-PSLRA cases settled by December 2002 included accountants as named 
defendants.16 Auditors were named as defendants in an additional 18 class action suits 
filed during 2003 and 2004.17 Moreover, the presence of an auditor as a defendant has 
 
types of such practices, see Manning Gilbert Warren III, Revenue Recognition and Corporate Counsel, 56 
SMU L. REV. 885, 909-922 (2003).  See also Matthew S. Mokwa, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley, and the End of 
Earnings Management, 39 TEX. J. BUS. L. 325, 337-48 (2003).  The abundance of accounting standards has 
contributed to the revenue recognition problem.  At least 180 different standards have been used to 
recognize revenue.  Stephen Taub, Setting Revenue Recognition Standards, CFO Magazine, May 17, 2004.  
Available at http://www.cfo.com.
14 During the period July 31, 1997 – July 30, 2002, the SEC filed 515 enforcement actions for financial 
reporting and disclosure violations, arising out of 227 investigations.  Of these 227 investigations, 126 
involved improper revenue recognition, including the fraudulent reporting of fictitious sales, improper 
timing of revenue recognition, and improper valuation of revenue.  Auditors were charged in administrative 
or federal injunctive actions in 57 of the 227 investigations. Of the 57 enforcement matters, 16 involved 
one of the Big Five public accounting firms and 41 involved smaller firms.  Report Pursuant To Section 
704 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Securities and Exchange Commission 1-2, 37, 39 (2003) (hereafter 
Section 704 Report).  Available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/sox704report.pdf. More recently, in 
fiscal year 2005, the SEC brought more than 600 enforcement actions.  Approximately 29% of these 
actions involved financial fraud, with revenue recognition cases heading the list.  Stephen Taub, SEC 
Enforcement Aims High, CFO Magazine, Dec. 8, 2005 (available at http://www.cfo.com).  But cf. John C. 
Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and Economic History of the 1990s, 89 CORNELL L. 
REV. 269, 290 (2004) (“[F]rom some point in the 1980s until the late 1990s, the SEC shifted its 
enforcement focus away from actions against the Big Five accounting firms. . . .”); Cassell Bryan-Low, 
SEC May Take Tougher Stance on Accountants in Audit Failures, Wall St. J., Dec. 13, 2002, at A2 (in the 
quarter-century prior to 2003, the SEC sued large accounting firms less than ten times for audit failures); 
and Jay M. Feinman, Liability of Accountants for Negligent Auditing: Doctrine, Policy, and Ideology, 31 
FLA. ST. L. REV. 17, 60 (2003) (while SEC has formal authority to discipline accountants, that authority is 
rarely exercised).   
 
15 PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 2002 Securities Litigation Study (2003) at 7, 9 (hereafter PWC 2002 
Study).  Available at http://pwcgobal.com.
16 Post-Reform Act Securities Case Settlements: Cases Reported Through December 2002, Stanford 
Securities Class Action Clearinghouse 10 (2003) (hereafter Settlements).  Available at 
http://www.securities.stanford.edu.
17 2004: A Year in Review, supra note 9, at 16.  See also Edward P. Leibensperger & Lauren M. 
Papenhausen, Auditor Liability for Securities Fraud After the PSLRA and Sarbanes-Oxley, SHO83 ALI-
ABA 543, 562 (May 2003) (inevitable result of Sarbanes-Oxley’s focus on external auditors is increased 
likelihood of claims against them).  In late 2004 it was estimated that there were $50 billion in claims 
7great significance for the settlement value of securities class action cases.  Cases 
involving major accounting firms almost always settle.18 One comprehensive study of 
securities class action litigation during the period January 1996 – December 2004 found 
that the naming of an accounting firm as a co-defendant increases settlements by more 
than two-thirds, controlling for all other characteristics of the case.19 Other recent studies 
have reached similar conclusions.20 
outstanding against the Big Four accounting firms.  Called to Account – The Future of Auditing,
Economist, Nov. 19, 2004.  Available at http://www.economist.com.
18 Mukesh Bajaj, Sumon Mazumdar & Atulya Sarin, Securities Class Action Settlements: An Empirical 
Analysis, Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse (2000) at 10 (hereafter Empirical Analysis).  
Available at http://www.securities.stanford.edu. Federal securities class actions almost always settle, 
whether or not they involve auditors.  During the period 1996 to mid-2005, just four federal securities class 
actions involving post-PSLRA claims concluded in a trial verdict.  Michael C. Tu, Ten Years After the 
Reform Act: Trends in Securities Class Action Trials, 19 SECURITIES REFORM ACT LITIG. RPTR. 475, 475-
76 (July 2005). 
 
19 Elaine Buckberg, et al., Recent Trends in Shareholder Class Action Litigation: Bear Market Cases Bring 
Big Settlements (Feb. 2005) at 7.   Available at http://www.nera.com. The total value of settlements in 
U.S. private securities class actions was approximately $5.4 billion in 2004, the highest amount on record.  
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 2004 Securities Litigation Study (2005) at 7 (hereafter PWC 2004 Study).  
Available at http://pwcgobal.com. The average settlement amount in a post-PSLRA securities class action 
case has been almost $25 million, while the median amount has been less than $6 million.  The disparity 
between these two figures represents the effect of a small number of settlements in excess of $100 million.  
Almost 65 percent of post-PSLRA cases have settled for less than $10 million.  Settlements, supra note 16, 
at 3.    
 
20 See Laura E. Simmons & Ellen M. Ryan, Post-Reform Act Securities Settlements: Updated Through 
December 2004 (2005) at 7 (study of 620 securities class action settlements during period 1997 – 2004 
finds that settlements as percentage of estimated damages increased from 3.4 % to 5.3% when accountant 
was named as defendant); Empirical Analysis, supra note 18, at 10 (study of 1,203 federal securities class 
action filings from 1988 to 1999 finds that mean and median settlements for cases involving accounting 
firms as co-defendants were much greater than mean and median for sample as a whole); Sherrie R. Savett, 
Securities Class Actions Since the 1995 Reform Act: A Plaintiff’s Perspective, 1505 PLI/Corp 17, 33 (Sept. 
2005) (approximately 14% of all post-PSLRA settlements have involved the issuer’s accountant as a 
defendant, and these cases have produced significantly higher settlements).  Prior to 2005 the largest 
settlement paid by a U.S. audit firm in a securities fraud class action suit was the $335 million that Ernst & 
Young paid in 1999 in connection with its audit of Cendant Corp.  In 2002 Arthur Andersen offered to pay 
$750 million over a five-year period to settle litigation prompted by its audits of Enron Corp., but that offer 
was rejected.   Andersen later collapsed.  David Reilly, Jonathan Weil & Allesandra Galloni, The Fall of 
Parmalat: Grant Thornton Is Likely To Face Skepticism It Was Ever a Victim, Wall St. J., Dec. 29, 2003, at 
A2.   
 
8III.   
CURRENT WEAKNESSES IN GAAP AND GAAS 
 
GAAP and GAAS are the primary sets of standards that govern the reporting and 
auditing of financial results in the United States.  An understanding of the standards and 
their sources thus is critical to an understanding of the scienter pleading requirement 
applicable to auditors.  Equally critical is an understanding of the numerous limitations of 
both GAAP and GAAS.  As will be seen, these limitations render the standards poor tools 
for measuring the conduct of auditors.  Moreover, in numerous respects GAAP -- and to a 
lesser degree, GAAS -- have facilitated and even encouraged the recent accounting 
scandals.  The next section of this Article discusses those topics.       
A.  The FASB and the PCAOB  
 The SEC is the primary federal agency that oversees the setting of accounting and 
auditing standards applicable to companies that are publicly traded in the United States.  
The SEC had delegated much of this responsibility prior to the enactment of Sarbanes-
Oxley.  The task of promulgating auditing standards was assumed by the Auditing 
Standards Board of the AICPA.21 Responsibility for promulgating accounting standards 
was primarily delegated to the seven-member Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB), created under the auspices of the Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF).22 
21 The Accounting Profession -- Major Issues: Progress and Concerns, Report by U.S. General Accounting 
Office to House Comm. on Commerce 27 (Sept. 1996) (GAO/AIMD-96-98) (hereinafter Accounting 
Profession). 
 
22 The FAF has 16 trustees, 11 of whom are nominated by such constituent organizations as accounting 
companies and five of whom are elected “at-large” by the FAF’s trustees.   Findings and Recommendations 
-- Part 2 (Corporate Governance) and Part 3 (Audit and Accounting), Conference Board Commission on 
Public Trust and Private Enterprise 40 n.49 (2003) (hereafter Conference Board Commission, Parts 2 and 
3).  Available at http://www.conference-board.org/pdf_free/757.pdf. The primary tasks of the FAF trustees 
are to raise funds to cover operating expenses and to appoint members of FASB.  Paul B. W. Miller, 
Rodney J. Redding & Paul R. Bahnson, The FASB: The People, the Process and the Politics 20 (4th ed. 
1998) (hereafter The FASB).  See generally J. Richard Williams, Funding FASB: Public Money, Public 
Domain, CPA J., May 2004 (available at http://www.nysscpa.org); Tracy N. Tucker, It Really Is Just 
9Since its creation in 1973, most authoritative accounting standards have been issued by 
the FASB.23 The SEC can adopt its own rules when the FASB is silent or when the SEC 
concludes that other principles will be more useful, but the SEC has rarely exercised this 
power.  It officially overruled the FASB only once between 1973 and 2003.24 
Prior to the creation of the FASB, accounting standards were issued by 
predecessor organizations.  From 1939 to 1959, standards were issued by the American 
Institute of Accountants’ (AIA) Committee on Accounting Procedure (CAP) in the form 
of Accounting Research Bulletins (ARBs).  The 51 ARBs issued by CAP merely 
suggested accounting practices, rather than mandating them, and alternative methods 
were permitted.  Subsequently, during the period 1959 to 1972, standards were issued by 
the AICPA’s (the successor to the AIA) Accounting Principles Board (APB).25 The APB 
issued a few dozen Opinions, many of which have since been superseded.  The 
accomplishments of both CAP (controlled by practicing accountants) and the APB 
 
Trying to Help: The History of FASB and Its Role in Modern Accounting Practice, 28 N.C. J. INT’L LAW &
COM. REG. 1023 (2003). 
 
23 See Robert E. Litan, Policy Brief No. 97 -- The Enron Failure and the State of Corporate Disclosure 5 
(2002) (“The SEC has effectively contracted out the setting of accounting standards to the FASB. . . .”)  
Available at http://www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/comm/policybriefs/pb97.pdf. Additional sources of GAAP 
are the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (created in 1984 to set standards for state and municipal 
entities) and the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board (created in 1990 to set standards for federal 
government accounting).  See Pierre L. Titard & Dean W. DiGregorio, The Changing Landscape of 
Accounting Standards Setting, CPA J., Nov. 2003.  Available at http://www.cpajournal.com.
24 The one example involved the FASB’s drafting of rules in the 1970s for oil and gas exploration and 
development costs.  Craig Schneider, Who Rules Accounting? Congress Muscles in on FASB – Again, CFO 
Magazine, Aug. 1, 2003.  Available at http://www.cfo.com.
25 Study Pursuant to Section 108(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on the Adoption by the United 
States Financial Reporting System of a Principles-Based Accounting System, Securities and Exchange 
Commission 20-21 (2003) (hereafter Section 108(b) Study).   
 
10
(controlled by accountants and business representatives) were minimal.26 After the APB 
was disbanded, the FASB became the primary standard-setter. 
The FASB retains authority to promulgate GAAP even under Sarbanes-Oxley,27 
but the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) -- created pursuant to the 
legislation to regulate and discipline the accounting industry – has become the ultimate 
arbiter of accounting standards.28 The PCAOB replaced the ineffective Public Oversight 
Board (POB), which was established in 1977 and terminated in May 2002.29 The POB 
was a captive of the auditing industry.  It was funded by membership dues of the 
AICPA’s SEC Practice Section (SECPS), and its charter provided for the POB to submit 
its budget to the SECPS Executive Committee and (if the AICPA Board of Directors so 
requested) the AICPA Board, for consultation.  The Charter also capped the POB’s 
annual budget, at the direction of the AICPA.30 The POB had no subpoena power and 
 
26 See, e.g., George Mundstock, The Trouble with FASB, 28 N.C. J. INT’L LAW & COM. REG. 813, 829 
(2003) (“If . . . the CAP was structured to assure that it would make little progress in prescribing 
accounting principles, the APB was structured to do even less. . . .”); Section 108(b) Study, supra note 25, 
at 21 (both CAP and APB were unsuccessful in setting standards). 
 
27 Jerry W. Markham, Accountants Make Miserable Policemen: Rethinking the Federal Securities Laws,
28 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 725, 790 (2003).  Accord Harold S. Bloomenthal, Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 
Perspective 41 (2002) (Sarbanes-Oxley clearly intends for the FASB to continue to be standard-setting 
board).   In 2003, the SEC issued a Policy Statement reaffirming the role of FASB as the principal 
standard-setter in the U.S.  See Testimony of Robert H. Herz  (FASB chairman) Before House Subcomm. 
on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises 2, June 3, 2003.  Available at 
http://www.fasb.org/news/06-03-03_testimony.pdf. Cf. Stephen Taub, Take the Lead, Says SEC to 
PCAOB, CFO Magazine, July 16, 2004 (SEC expects PCAOB to become primary standard-setter).  
Available at http://www.cfo.com.
28 Neil H. Aronson, Preventing Future Enrons: Implementing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 8 STAN.
J.L. BUS. & FIN. 127, 133 (2002). 
 
29 See http://publicoversightboard.org/about.htm.
30 The Accounting Profession: Status of Panel on Audit Effectiveness Recommendations to Enhance the 
Self-Regulatory System, Report by U.S. General Accounting Office to House Comm. on Energy and 
Commerce 15 (May 2002) (GAO-02-411).  Available at http://www.gao.gov.
11
little ability to impose penalties.31 The POB ultimately voted to terminate its existence in 
protest of efforts by the AICPA and the major accounting firms to further marginalize its 
oversight role.32 In the 25 years prior to this vote the POB never sanctioned a major 
accounting firm, even when peer reviews uncovered serious shortcomings in audit 
procedures.33 
The successor PCAOB consists of five members appointed by the SEC.  A 
majority of its members are non-CPAs and its Chair cannot have practiced public 
accounting for at least five years prior to assuming the position.  PCAOB members serve 
full-time five-year terms (with a two-term limit) and are subject to removal for cause by 
the SEC.  In addition to appointing PCAOB members, the SEC must approve the 
PCAOB’s annual budget, support fees, rules, and professional standards.  The SEC also 
acts as an appellate authority for PCAOB disciplinary actions and disputes related to 
inspection reports about accounting firms.34 
31 Steve Liesman, Jonathan Weil & Michael Schroeder, Dirty Books? Accounting Debacles Spark Calls for 
Change: Here’s the Rundown, Wall St. J., Feb. 6, 2002, at A1. 
 
32 Thomas W. Morris, The Accounting Credibility Crisis, CPA J., May 2003 (quoting former POB 
chairman Charles Bowsher) (available at http://www.cpajournal.com); Scot J. Paltrow & Jonathan Weil, 
Accounting Industry Review Board Votes To End Its Existence in Protest, Wall St. J., Jan. 23, 2002, at A2.   
This vote took place after the AICPA ended the POB’s funding, in response to the POB’s agreement with 
the SEC’s request to examine the Big Five’s compliance with standards for auditor independence.   Donna 
M. Nagy, Playing Peekaboo with Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and Its Public/Private Status, 80 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 975, 994-95 (2005).  
 
33 Barbara Roper, Investor Protection Lessons from the Enron Collapse and an Agenda for Reform – 
Report of Consumer Federation of America 10, Feb. 11, 2002.  Available at 
http://www.consumerfed.org/enron_auditor_rpt.pdf.
34 Testimony of William H. Donaldson (SEC chairman) Before House Comm. on Financial Services, Sept. 
17, 2003.  Available at http://sec.gov/news/testimony/091703tswhd.htm. See also Daniel Goelzer, et al., 
The Work of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, SK017 ALI-ABA 415 (Oct. 2004); Cassell 
Bryan-Low, Accounting Panel Plans Inspections of Big Four Firms, Wall St. J., May 2, 2003, at C9.  The 
PCAOB planned to inspect hundreds of small accounting firms in 2005, compared with only 91 such 
inspections in 2004.  Craig Schneider, PCAOB Prepares to Ramp Up Inspections, CFO Magazine, March 
22, 2005.  Available at http://www.cfo.com.
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The PCAOB differs from the POB in several important respects, including source 
of funding.  The PCAOB’s annual budget is funded by 5,000 or so public companies, 
3,000 or so open-end mutual funds, and other investment companies, with fees based on 
average monthly market capitalization.  The 1,000 largest companies in the U.S. shoulder 
most of the burden, contributing about 87 percent of the total budget.  Accounting firms 
contributed only $2 million of the PCAOB’s $103 million budget in 2004.35 The 
foregoing split is designed to reinforce the PCAOB’s independence from the accounting 
profession.36 The PCAOB is clearly more independent than was the predecessor POB.  
Whereas the POB engaged in virtually no disciplinary action, in 2005, two years after it 
was created, the PCAOB censured several public accounting firms, by revoking their 
registrations.37 
B.  Sources of GAAP 
 The meaning of the term “GAAP” has varied over time.  Originally, GAAP 
referred to accounting policies and procedures that were widely used in practice by 
accountants.  Later, the term came to refer more to the pronouncements issued by 
accounting bodies such as the FASB.  Today, many different sources of authoritative 
 
35 See Nagy, supra note 32, at 1021; Accounting Board Votes To Lift Budget 51% To $103 Million, Wall 
St. J., Nov. 26, 2003; and Judith Burns, Bills Come Due To Cover the Cost of Oversight Panel, Wall St. J., 
Aug. 6, 2003, at C9.   
 
36 But see Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It 
Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 944 (2003) (suggesting that these measures are more structure 
than substance). 
 
37 Stephen Taub, PCAOB Revokes Two Registrations, CFO Magazine, Dec. 2, 2005 (available at 
http://www.cfo.com); Stephen Taub, PCAOB Brings First Action, CFO Magazine, May 25, 2005 (available 
at http://www.cfo.com).  Also in 2005, the PCAOB launched its first formal probe of a Big Four accounting 
firm.  Deloitte & Touche was investigated in connection with its 2003 audit of Navistar International Corp.  
Stephen Taub, PCAOB Probing Deloitte Audit, CFO Magazine, July 8, 2005 (available at 
http://www.cfo.com).  
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literature exist,38 some of which are still in effect but are no longer being issued.39 These 
authoritative sources are organized unto a hierarchy of five categories, which was 
established in 1975 by AICPA’s Statement on Auditing Standards No. 69.  Conflicts that 
exist between authoritative sources are supposed to be resolved according to the relative 
placement of the authority in the chain.  When multiple sources of GAAP within a given 
level of the hierarchy conflict, the approach that better portrays the substance of the 
transaction should be followed.40 
The current GAAP hierarchy is organized as follows: Level A -- FASB’s 
Statements of Financial Accounting Standards (FAS) and Interpretations, APB Opinions, 
and ARBs; Level B -- FASB Technical Bulletins, and AICPA Industry Audit and 
Accounting Guides and Statements of Position; Level C -- Emerging Issues Task Force 
(EITF) Consensuses and AICPA Practice Bulletins; and Level D -- AICPA accounting 
interpretations, FASB staff Q&As, and industry practice.  Other literature that may be 
consulted by accountants include AICPA Issues Papers, textbooks, and articles in 
professional journals.41 The foregoing constitutes the fifth level.  In total, there are 
probably thousands of rules and interpretations that comprise GAAP.42 
38 The Supreme Court has observed that “[f]ar from a single-source accounting rulebook, GAAP 
encompasses the conventions, rules, and procedures that define accepted accounting practices at a 
particular point in time.”  Shalala v. Guernsey Mem. Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 101 (1995). 
 
39 Examples include APB Opinions and ARBs.  Jan R. Williams, Miller GAAP Guide -- Restatement and 
Analysis of Current FASB Standards, at xiii (2005).   
 
40 Id. 
 
41 Section 108(b) Study, supra note 25, at 41.  See Matthew A. Melone, United States Accounting 
Standards – Rules or Principles?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1161, 1173-74 (2004). 
 
42 George J. Benston, The Regulation of Accountants and Public Accounting Before and After Enron, 52 
EMORY L.J. 1325, 1334 (2003).   In 2005, the FASB proposed to adopt its own GAAP hierarchy that would 
be directed toward companies and reporting entities, in place of the current AICPA standard, which is 
14
 Currently, much of GAAP is compiled in a three-volume set of Original 
Pronouncements (FASB FASs, AICPA Pronouncements, FASB Interpretations, FASB 
Concepts Statements, and FASB Technical Bulletins) that encompasses over 4,500 
pages.43 By 2005, 153 FASs -- the primary source of GAAP -- had been issued.  Thirty-
three of these standards had been rescinded or superseded.44 The FASB takes years to 
issue new standards.  While specific standards typically take two years to issue, many 
take much longer.  The initial derivatives standard (FAS No. 133) took more than a 
decade.45 
Some GAAP rules are extremely complex.  The standard on derivatives (FAS No. 
133 -- “Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities”) encompasses 
800 or so pages,46 following carve-outs for hedging deals, forward contracts for 
 
directed toward auditors.  Craig Schneider, FASB Reexamines GAAP Hierarchy, CFO Magazine, Aug. 29, 
2005.  Available at http://www.cfo.com.
43 Original Pronouncements, Vols. I, II, and III, Financial Accounting Standards Board (2002).  See also 
Dana A. Basney, Selected Case Studies of Financial Statement Fraud, 1406 PLI/Corp 323, 334 (Jan. – Feb. 
2004) (accounting and auditing rules include 192 Ethics Interpretations, 150 FASB Pronouncements, 102 
Staff Accounting Bulletins, 100 Statements on Auditing Standards, 46 FASB Interpretations, 43 
Accounting Research Bulletins, 31 Opinions, 30 Auditing Interpretations, and 14 ACSEC Practice 
Bulletins): Walter Wriston, The Solution to Scandals?  Simpler Rules, Wall St. J., Aug. 5, 2002, at A10 
(arguing that 4,530 complex pages of GAAP have contributed to recent accounting scandals in the United 
States).  Cf. Mike McNamee & Kerry Capell, FASB: Rewriting the Book on Bookkeeping, BusinessWeek 
Online, May 20, 2002 (GAAP consists of 100,000-plus pages of rules).  Available at 
http://www.businessweek.com. This much higher estimate no doubt includes sources from all five levels of 
GAAP. 
 
44 All 153 FASs are available on the FASB’s Web site.  See http://www.fasb.org.
45 Accounting Profession, supra note 21, at 102.  See also David C. Cates, Time for New Metrics: 
Sarbanes-Oxley Is Part of the Solution, But a Management/Analyst-Led Shift To Non-GAAP Metrics Could 
Lead To True Transparency, 95 A.B.A. BANKING J. 45 (Apr. 1, 2003) (rule-making process of GAAP-
based accountancy moves at glacial pace). 
 
46 Steve Liesman, Jonathan Weil & Michael Schroder, Dirty Books? Accounting Debacles Spark Calls for 
Change: Here’s the Rundown, Wall St. J., Feb. 6, 2002, at A1.  FAS No. 133 was amended by FAS No. 
149 in April 2003.  The latter standard is effective for contracts entered into or modified after June 30, 
2003.  See http://www.fasb.org/st/summary/stsum149.shtml. Earlier, FAS No. 137 delayed application of 
No. 133 by one year, and FAS No. 138 clarified No. 133. 
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materials, insurance policies, and other special cases.47 Leases are covered by 16 FASB 
Statements and Interpretations, nine Technical Bulletins, and more than 30 EITF Issues.48 
This dispersion of authority is not unique to accounting for leases.  The accounting 
profession does not have a single, searchable database containing all of the authoritative 
guidance pertaining to many kinds of transactions.49 
C.  Limits of GAAP 
 A common assertion by the SEC is that United States GAAP is superior to all 
other sets of accounting standards in the world,50 but there is a “dearth of empirical 
evidence to support the assertion.”51 U.S. GAAP has numerous limitations that show it is 
far removed from an ideal measuring rod against which alleged accounting violations in 
securities fraud actions can be tested.  Indeed, certain aspects of GAAP have facilitated or 
encouraged the recent wave of accounting fraud.   The next section of this Article 
considers GAAP limitations in five areas: (1) accounting for stock options; (2) 
accounting for pension liabilities; (3) accounting for off-balance sheet liabilities; (4) 
accounting for intangible assets; and (5) general use of a rules-based system.  As will be 
seen, GAAP does a remarkably poor job in each of these five subject areas, and 
 
47 McNamee & Capell, supra note 43. 
 
48 Section 108(b) Study, supra note 25, at 24. 
 
49 Id. at 44. 
 
50 See, e.g., id. at 5.  Accord 2002 Annual Report, Securities and Exchange Commission 98 (“U.S. GAAP 
has long been recognized as the most comprehensive and robust body of accounting guidance in the 
world.”).  Available at http://www.sec.gov.pdf/annrep02/ar02full.pdf. See also Kenji Taneda, Sarbanes-
Oxley, Foreign Issuers and United States Securities Regulation, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 715, 751 
(“Americans generally take it for granted that U.S. GAAP is the world’s most stringent. . . .”). 
 
51 Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 28 (2003).  
See also Christian Luez, IAS v. U.S. GAAP: Information Asymmetry-Based Evidence from Germany’s New 
Market, 41 J. ACCT. RES. 445, 469 (2003) (U.S. GAAP does not does not produce financial statements of 
higher informational quality than do international accounting standards). 
 
16
Sarbanes-Oxley does nothing to improve performance.52 A sixth significant area of 
weakness in the U.S. financial reporting model -- the widespread use of misleading pro 
forma reports -- also is examined.  Numerous other limitations of the U.S. model, 
including GAAP’s inability to adequately account for revenue recognition, are beyond 
the scope of this Article. 
(1) Stock Options 
 GAAP’s treatment of stock options dates back at least to 1972, when the APB 
(FASB’s predecessor) issued APB Opinion 25.  That rule (“Accounting for Stock Issued 
to Employees”) specified that the cost of options at the grant date53 should be measured 
by their intrinsic value -- the difference between the current fair market value of the stock 
and the exercise price of the option.  No cost was assigned to options when their exercise 
price was set at the current market price.  The APB approach became obsolete a year 
later, as a result of two events.  The first was the publication of the Black-Scholes option-
pricing model, which correlates the current price of a stock, its price volatility, the risk-
free interest rate, the strike price of the option, and its time to expiration.54 The 
 
52 Benston, supra note 42, at 1347-48 (Sarbanes-Oxley is not concerned with reform of GAAP or the 
GAAP-related reasons that gave rise to recent accounting scandals); Andrew F. Kirkendall, Comment, 
Filling in the GAAP: Will the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Protect Investors from Corporate Malfeasance and 
Restore Confidence in the Securities Market?, 56 SMU L. Rev. 2303, 2323 (2003) (Sarbanes-Oxley does 
little to remedy the problems caused by GAAP). 
 
53 The grant date is the date that a company awards a stock option to an employee.  Understanding the 
Stock Option Debate, Report by the Joint Economic Comm. 1 (2002).  Available at 
http://www.jec.senate.gov/stock_options.pdf. See generally Melissa A. Chiprich & Phillip J. Long, Is 
Midnight Nearing for Cinderella? Corporate America Faces Reality with Stock Option Accountability, 39 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1033 (2004). 
 
54 See Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. Pol. Econ. 
637 (1973); Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Valuation of Option Contracts and a Test of Market 
Efficiency, 27 J. FIN. 399 (1972).  See generally Joseph Blasi, Douglas Kruse & Aaron Bernstein, In the 
Company of Owners: The Truth About Stock Options (and Why Every Employee Should Have Them) 71 
(2003) (hereafter Truth About Stock Options).   
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publication of this model enabled investors and employees to effectively price options for 
the first time, and this ability sparked a booming market for publicly-traded options.  The 
second event was the opening of the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) by the 
Chicago Board of Trade.  Previously, options had been traded over the counter.  By 
providing an open market, the CBOE turned options into a mainstream investment.55 
APB 25 was widely criticized, but FASB did not undertake a project to reconsider 
the issue until 1984.  It took almost another decade before FASB issued an Exposure 
Draft of a new standard that would have required expensing of stock options.56 This draft 
of FAS No. 123, issued in 1993, was greeted with severe criticism from Congress and the 
high-technology industry.57 The Big Six public accounting firms also unanimously 
opposed the FASB’s plan.58 The FASB backed down when confronted with such 
tremendous pressure, and its Exposure Draft was revised to eliminate expensing.  In 1995 
the FASB issued the final version of FAS No. 123.   This new rule (“Accounting for 
Stock-Based Compensation”) only required footnote disclosures of fair values of fixed 
 
55 See Zvi Brodie, Robert S. Kaplan & Robert C. Merton, For the Last Time: Stock Options Are an 
Expense, HARV. BUS. REV. 62, 63 (March 2003).   
 
56 See generally Joyce Strawser, Accounting for Stock-Based Compensation: The FASB’s Proposal, 63 
C.P.A. J. 44 (1993). 
 
57 Legislation was introduced by Sen. Joseph Lieberman that would have prohibited public companies from 
following any final FASB rule requiring expensing.  This bill would have nullified the effect of proposed 
FAS No. 123 and effectively put the FASB out of business.  See Craig Schneider, Who Rules Accounting? 
Congress Muscles in on FASB – Again, CFO Magazine, Aug. 1, 2003 (Senate ultimately voted 88 to 9 in 
favor of non-binding resolution urging FASB not to require expensing) (available at http://www.cfo.com).  
Accord Pat McConnell & Janet Pegg, Bear Stearns Equity Research – Employee Stock Option Expense: Is 
the Time Right for Change? 8-9 (July 2002) (Congress threatened to abolish FASB if the board did not 
back down).  Available at http://www.bearstearns.com.
58 The FASB, supra note 22, at 139. 
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plan employee stock options.  It did not require that stock-based compensation be 
reported as an expense in determining an enterprise’s net income.59 
Following the issuance of FAS No. 123, virtually no corporations elected to adopt 
the fair value method of reporting employee stock options as an expense in their income 
statements.  By May 2002, only two companies (Boeing Co. and Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc.) 
in the S&P 500 reported options as an expense.60 This was true even though stock option 
programs had become the standard practice of the vast majority of S&P 500 companies.61 
Moreover, such programs were not restricted to the S&P 500.  By 2002, the 1,500 largest 
public companies in the U.S. had issued at least 12 billion options, with an estimated 
value of $820 billion.  This accounted for ten percent of the value of all outstanding 
shares in the 1,500 companies, which in turn represented the bulk of the value of all 
publicly traded shares in this country.62 
In October 2003, the FASB circled back to the position it originally took in 1993 
and again proposed expensing of options.  An Exposure Draft reflecting this decision was 
issued by the FASB in the first quarter of 2004.  A final rule -- FAS 123R -- was issued 
 
59 Steven Balsam, Haim A. Mozes & Harry A. Newman, Managing Pro Forma Stock Option Expense 
Under SFAS No. 123, 17 ACCT. HORIZONS 31, 33 (2003).  See also Abraham J. Brilof, Accounting for 
Stock Options, CPA J., Dec. 2003 (FAS 123 has been universally condemned).  Available at 
http://www.cpajournal.com.
60 David M. Blitzer, Robert E. Friedman & Howard J. Silverblatt, Measures of Corporate Earnings 4 
(2002).  Available at http://www.standardandpoors.com.
61 McConnell & Pegg, supra note 57, at 8. 
 
62 Truth About Stock Options, supra note 54, at 186.  Another estimate is that S&P 500 companies granted 
about 24.9 billion stock options during the period 1998-2001.  The total value of these options increased 
from $43 billion to $105 billion during the same time period.  McConnell & Pegg, supra note 57, at 11-12.  
Some options payouts have been staggering -- $706 million for Larry Ellison of Oracle Corp., $233 million 
for Michael Dell of Dell Computer, $200 million for Sanford Weill at Citigroup, and $174 million for 
Thomas Siebel of Siebel Systems.  Matt Murray, Options Frenzy: What Went Wrong?, Wall St. J., Dec. 17, 
2002, at B1.   
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in late 2004, with mandatory expensing to first be reflected for many companies in profits 
reported for first quarter 2006.63 In the interim, voluntary expensing, while increasingly 
common, was the clear exception.  By December 2005, 65% of public companies still 
had not begun to comply with 123R, including 86% of health care companies and 76% of 
technology companies – traditionally the biggest issuers of stock options.64 Moreover, 
many companies that did expense switched from stock options to restricted stock,65 and 
then issued pro forma earnings reports that excluded the cost of such stock.66 
The effect on earnings of the failure to expense options historically has been 
significant.  If options had been expensed in 2002 by all companies in the S&P 500, 23 
percent of the earnings of these corporations would have been erased.67 The more recent 
effect has been less pronounced, partly because corporate profits have grown faster than 
expected (thereby reducing the relative importance of option costs), and the value of 
 
63 Stephen Taub, Staggered Start for Options Expensing, CFO Magazine, June 1, 2005 (available at 
http://www.cfo.com); Stephen Taub & Dave Cook, SEC Postpones Options-Expensing Rule, CFO 
Magazine, Apr. 18, 2005 (available at http://www.cfo.com); and Louis Lavalle, Time to Start Weighing the 
Options; New FASB Rules Make Stock Options An Expense.  How Will Companies Cope?, BusinessWeek, 
Jan. 17, 2005, at 32.  The International Accounting Standards Board announced in 2004 that companies 
using international accounting standards must expense stock options beginning January 1, 2005.  This 
decision will affect about 7,000 publicly traded companies in 90 countries, excluding the United States.  
Stephen Taub, This Year’s Leap: Expensing Options, CFO Magazine, March 1, 2004.  Available at 
http://www.cfo.com.
64 Stephen Taub, Companies Slow to Expense Options, CFO Magazine, Dec. 12, 2005.  Available at 
http://www.cfo.com.
65 “Restricted stock” refers to shares issued to employees that can be sold only in the future.  Typically, 
employees forfeit their shares if they leave the company before the stock vests.  At some companies, an 
employee forfeits the shares if certain financial targets are not met.  Ruth Simon, The Employee Guide to 
Restricted Stock, Wall St. J., July 10, 2003, at D1.  A 2005 survey of 115 companies found that 43% of the 
companies had moved portions of their long-term incentive compensation from stock options to restricted 
stock.  Stephen Taub, Survey Finds Shift from Stock Options, CFO Magazine, May 24, 2005 (available at 
http://www.cfo.com).  
 
66 See, e.g., Craig Schneider, Stock Options, Meet Pro Formas, CFO Magazine, Oct. 31, 2005 (available at 
http://www.cfo.com); Stephen Taub, FAS 123R Reining in Tech Options, CFO Magazine, July 21, 2005 
(available at http://www.cfo.com).  
 
67 Nanette Burns, Beyond Options, BusinessWeek, July 28, 2003, at 36.    
 
20
options granted has sharply declined.68 Recent estimates are that expensing would reduce 
earnings of the S&P 500 by five percent in 200569 and by three percent in 2006.70 The 
most significant impact will be in the high-technology industry.  A Merrill Lynch study 
projected that expensing stock options would result in a decline of approximately 70 
percent in earnings per share in that industry, compared with declines of 12 percent in the 
telecom industry, nine percent in the consumer and materials industries, and from two to 
seven percent in other industries.71 
Moreover, stock option awards that were excluded from income statements made 
a major contribution to the accounting scandals that began to unfold in the late 1990s.  
Executives with significant options that are linked to corporate performance have 
powerful incentives both to maintain the market price of their stock by inflating reported 
net income and to pressure their external auditors to approve improper accounting.72 
68 No Compensation Without Costs, Economist, Oct. 27, 2005 (available at http://www.cfo.com).  
 
69 Lavelle, supra note 63, at 36 (expensing will reduce S&P 500 earnings by $3 to $4 per share in 2005 -- 
roughly a five percent slice off estimated average earnings of $65 per share).      
 
70 No Compensation Without Cost, Economist, Oct. 27, 2005 (available at http://www.economist.com).   
 
71 See Finding and Recommendations -- Part 1: Executive Compensation, The Conference Board 
Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprise 5 n.6 (Sept. 17, 2002).  Accord Now for Plan B: The 
Battle to Fend Off Sensible Accounting, Economist, March 13, 2003 (expensing options under the Black-
Scholes method would cut technology firms’ reported profits by 70 percent).  Available at 
http://www.economist.com. But cf. Stephen Taub, Options Expenses Now A Factor in S&P 500, CFO 
Magazine, Nov. 21, 2005 (expensing in 2005 will decrease earnings by 18% for companies in information 
technology sector)  (available at www.cfo.com); No Compensation Without Cost, Economist, Oct. 27, 2005 
(expensing in 2006 will reduce consensus profit estimate by 23% for semiconductors and semiconductor 
equipment sector) (available at http://www.economist.com).   
 
72 See, e.g., Arthur Levitt, Jr., Reclaiming the Profession’s Heritage, CPA J., Feb. 2004 (accounting 
standards -- especially as they relate to to expensing of stock options -- were a catalyst to recent accounting 
scandals) (available at http://www.cpajournal.com); Matt Murray, Corporate Governance  (A Special 
Report), Wall St. J., Oct. 27, 2003, at R10 (abuses in executive compensation can lead to executives 
applying undue pressure on accounting firms to overlook certain accounting treatments in order to keep 
stock prices high) (statement of Peter C. Chapman, senior vice president at TIAA-CREF); Craig Schneider, 
Who Rules Accounting?  Congress Muscles in On FASB – Again, CFO Magazine, Aug. 1, 2003 
(widespread use of non-expensed stock options had led to inflated stock-market valuations and accounting 
frauds) (available at http://www.cfo.com). 
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These incentives to engage in fraudulent conduct are not purely hypothetical.  A study of 
71 companies subject to SEC enforcement actions for accounting violations found that 
the CEOs of such companies had much larger stock option holdings than CEOs of 
companies not involved in accounting irregularities.73 While the prevailing built-in 
incentives to engage in fraudulent behavior could be minimized by indexing options to 
alternate measures such as the performance of peer companies, an industry, or the 
economy in general,74 to date few corporations have chosen that path.  The situation is 
not likely to change.75 
(2) Pensions 
GAAP’s treatment of pensions has been as deeply flawed as its treatment of 
options.  Currently, accounting for pensions primarily takes place pursuant to FAS No. 87 
(“Employers’ Accounting for Pensions”), which was issued in December 1985.  This 
standard was issued 11 years after the Employee Retirement Income Security Act76 was 
enacted.77 The fundamental flaw in FAS No. 87 is that it permits the use of various 
accounting techniques that fall under the rubric of “smoothing.”  The techniques include: 
(1) reporting expected return on assets, rather than actual gains or losses, and (2) placing 
certain assets and obligations off the balance sheet and amortizing them over time as 
 
73 Joanne S. Lublin, Deals and Deal Makers: Study Blames Accounting Fraud on Takeover Fever, Age of 
Officers, Wall St. J., July 3, 2003, at C4. 
 
74 Marie Leone, Stronger Than Dirt, CFO Magazine, Oct. 17, 2003.  Available at http://www.cfo.com.
75 See, e.g., Marie Leone, Compensation and Cash Flow, CFO Magazine, Jan. 16, 2004 (20% of largest 
U.S.-based, publicly-held companies use a cash-flow metric to calculate short-term compensation, and the 
number of such companies is rising) (available at http://www.cfo.com). 
 
76 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001, et seq. (2000). 
 
77 David Zion & Bill Carache, Credit Suisse First Boston Equity Research -- The Magic of Pension 
Accounting 37 (Sept. 27, 2002).  Available at http://www.csfb.com.
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income or expenses.78 The permitted use of these techniques led one comprehensive 
study to describe pension accounting under GAAP as “convoluted, complicated, [and] 
misleading.”79 
With respect to the first factor, GAAP provides little guidance for setting the 
assumed return, and the assumptions used vary widely.80 The median expected rate of 
return used by companies in the S&P 500 was 9.2 percent in 1997 and remained at that 
level until 2002.81 Yet, the actual rate of return has been much lower.82 The net effect on 
S&P 500 earnings of the disparity between expected and actual rates of return for pension 
plans has been substantial.  If actual rates of return had been used, the aggregate earnings 
of the S&P 500 would have plunged by 67 percent (more than $100 billion) in 2001 and 
2002.83 More recent data is less dramatic, but still compelling.  From 2000-2003, the 
 
78 Arden Dale, Audit Watchdog Targets Pensions, Wall St. J., Dec. 11, 2002, at B5.   
 
79 Zion & Carcache, supra note 74, at 4.  See also Mary Williams Walsh, Pension Reserve: What’s 
Enough?, N.Y. Times, June 22, 2003, at 3:1 (“Accounting is a dismal science, pension accounting even 
more so.”). 
 
80 Scott Sprinzen, Pitfalls of U.S. Pension Accounting and Disclosure 5 (March 3, 2003).  Available at 
http://www.standardandpoors.com. See also America’s Corporate Pensions Need Reform, Not Tinkering,
Economist, Sept. 11, 2003 (reported pension fund income is whatever a company says it expects it to be) 
(available at http://www.economist.com). 
 
81 Zion & Carache, supra note 77, at 82.   
 
82 For example, the actual rate of return on pension plan assets for the S&P 500 was –7.5 percent in 2001 
and only 4.94 percent in 2000.  The vast majority of plans lost value in 2001.   Zion & Carache, supra note 
77, at 86-87.  See also Thomas T. Amlie, Finding the True Cost of Pension Plans, CPA J., Jan. 2004 
(“Over the past few years, most businesses have suffered losses on their pension plan assets while 
continuing to use positive expected rates of return in computing periodic pension costs.”) (available at 
http://www.cpajournal.com); Elizabeth McDonald, Pension Panic, Forbes.com, Dec. 10, 2002 (while S&P 
500 companies expected their pension plans to return on average 9.2% in 2001, such plans had an actual 
average loss of 6.9%) (available at http://www.forbes.com). 
 
83 Mary Williams Walsh, New Scrutiny on Auditing of Pensions, N.Y. Times, June 23, 2005, at C1.  Cf. 
Joseph McCafferty, Pension Accounting a Sham, CFO Magazine, Jan. 2003 (study by actuarial firm 
Milliman USA shows that 50 of the largest U.S. companies counted roughly $54 billion of pension fund 
gains as profits in 2002, when they actually lost almost $36 billion).  Available at http://www.cfo.com. See 
also Judith Burns, Pension Plan Gains Inflated S&P 500 Stocks -- Fed Study, Aug. 19, 2003 (pension 
accounting distortions inflated stock prices for S&P 500 firms by 10% on average, while prices for dozens 
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pension plans of 100 of the largest U.S. companies earned, on average, an annual 
investment return of only 1.3 percent, while the plans used average expected rates of 
return that did not dip below nine percent until 2003.84 If actual return rates had been 
used during this time period, aggregate earnings would have markedly declined.85 
The second smoothing technique permitted by GAAP is the placement of certain 
pension plan assets and obligations off the balance sheet and the amortization of them 
over time as income or expenses.  For example, S&P 500 companies carried an estimated 
$992 billion in off-balance sheet liabilities and $900 billion in off-balance sheet assets at 
the end of 2001.   If the total off-balance sheet pension liability for S&P 500 companies 
were treated as debt, aggregate debt for the S&P 500 would have increased by 16 percent 
in 2001.  Debt would have more than doubled for 71 companies and more than tripled for 
 
of firms were inflated by 20%) (available at 
http://news.morningstar.com/news/DJ/M08/D19/1061321463918.html0); David Henry, Tripping Over 
Pension Shortfalls, BusinessWeek Online, May 14, 2003 (magic of pension accounting boosts corporate 
profits) (available at http://www.businessweek.com). 
 
84 Data reported at http://www.milliman.com/eb/pension-fund-survey/. See also Elizabeth McDonald, 
Pension Pangs, Forbes.com, June 9, 2003 (S&P 500 companies were using a median expected return rate 
of 8.8% in 2003).  Available at http://www.forbes.com. A separate survey of 100 large U.S. corporations 
found a median expected rate of return of 8.55% in 2003 (data available at 
http://www.milliman.com/eb/pension-fund-survey); Craig Schneider, One Giant Leap for Pension Returns,
CFO Magazine, Apr. 16, 2004.  Available at http://www.cfo.com.
85 Boeing Co. lost $3.3 billion on pension investments in 2002, but reported a $404 million pension gain 
based on its assumed 9% rate of return.  This was 82% of its net income for the year.  More generally, it is 
estimated that $2 of the $55 earnings per share for companies in the S&P 500 in 2003 came from 
aggressived pension return assumptions.  Pumped Up Pension Plays?, BusinessWeek Online, Oct. 25, 
2004.  Available at http://www.businessweek.com. But see Alix Nyberg Stuart, Death to Smoothing, CFO 
Magazine, Feb. 22, 2005 (recent sudy shows that actual median annualized asset return for large corporate 
pension funds was 9.4% during period 1993-2003, compared with average assumed rate of return of 8.8%).  
Available at http://www.cfo.com.
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36 companies.86 More recently, an SEC study released in June 2005 suggests that U.S. 
companies are still carrying $414 billion in pension liabilities off-balance sheet.87 
In sum, the smoothing permitted by FAS No. 87 renders financial statements 
misleading, because it removes pension plan volatility, thereby distorting both the 
balance sheet and the income statement.88 These distortions give firms the flexibility to 
manipulate earnings.  A 2004 study of 3,247 company pension plans during the period 
1991-2002 found that firms tended to hike pension-return assumptions the year before 
buying a company, or before their chief executive exercised his stock options.89 The 
distortions also tend to mask the true extent of pension plan underfunding, which 
increased from $39 billion in 2000 to at least $450 billion in 2004.90 While the FASB 
ultimately may attempt to resolve these issues, by December 2005 it had simply tweaked 
the accounting standard applicable to the reporting of pension obligations, without 
 
86 Zion & Carache, supra note 77, at 5.  See also Time to End A Scandal, Economist, Oct. 28, 2004 (if they 
had properly accounted for their pension obligations, many large companies might be bankrupt) (available 
at http://www.economist.com).   
 
87 See Lisa Yoon, Rethink Off-Balance-Sheet Reporting: SEC, CFO Magazine, June 18, 2005 (available at 
http://www.cfo.com).  
 
88 Zion & Carache, supra note 77, at 45.  See also Funded Status of Defined Benefit Pension Plans 
Continued To Decline in 2002, FTI Consulting (June 2003) (smoothing permitted by GAAP has resulted in 
pervasive and sometimes massive distortions between net pension pre-paid asset or accrued liability of  
companies and the actual funding deficit or surplus of their plans) (available at 
http://www.fticonsulting.com/press_releases/FTI_Pension_Fund_Analysis.pdf); Jonathan Weil, Pension-
Plan Accounting Rules Led To Overvalued Stock, Wall St. J., March 28, 2003, at C7 (study by Federal 
Reserve Board shows that stocks of companies reporting substantial earnings from their pension plans were 
systematically overvalued in recent years, as a result of application of GAAP). 
 
89 Murk in the Gloom: An SEC Investigation Will Shine Much-Needed Light on the Sorry State of 
Accounting for Retiree Benefits, Economist, Oct. 28, 2004.  Available at http://www.economist.com.
90 Private Pensions: Recent Experiences of Large Defined Benefit Plans Illustrate Weaknesses in Funding 
Rules, U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO-05-294 (May 2005) at 9, 11.  The S&P 500 represents only a 
share of this funding gap.  At the end of 2004, the 369 S&P 500 companies that offered defined-benefit 
plans were underfunded by a total of $164 billion.  Stephen Taub, Pension Funding Holding Steady, CFO 
Magazine, July 18, 2005.  Available at http://www.cfo.com.
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making substantive changes to FAS No. 87.91 This tweaking, which has had little 
effect,92 followed assertions by the FASB in both 1966 and 1985 that accounting for 
pension costs was “in a transitional stage.”93 Apparently the transition continues, at a 
snail’s pace.   
(3) Off-Balance Sheet Liabilities 
 A third area where GAAP has historically failed concerns off-balance sheet 
liabilities.  This arcane area of accounting first came to the public’s general attention in 
connection with the implosion of Enron Corp.  Enron, a conservative natural gas drilling 
and pipeline company in the 1980s, transformed into an aggressive energy trader in the 
1990s.  At the beginning of 2001, Enron enjoyed a market capitalization that exceeded 
$60 billion and ranked as the seventh largest corporation in the world by revenue.94 
Enron achieved this lofty position in large part by creating at least 4,000 off-balance 
 
91 See News Release -- FASB Issues Accounting Standard to Improve Disclosures About Pension and 
Other Postretirement Benefit Plans, Financial Accounting Standards Board, Dec. 23, 2003 (available at 
http://www.fasb.org/news/nr122303.shtml); News Release -- FASB Proposes Improvements to Financial 
Statement Disclosure for Pension and Other Postretirement Plans, Financial Accounting Standards Board, 
Sept. 15, 2003 (available at http://fasb.org/news/nr091503.shtml).   
 
92 See Alix Nyberg, Death to Smoothing, CFO Magazine, Feb. 22, 2005 (new disclosure requirements have 
been met with mixed reviews and smoothing appears to be safe at least until 2006).  Available at 
http://www.cfo.com. In November 2005, the FASB voted to conduct an examination of FAS No. 87.  Lisa 
Yoon, Pensions Go On the Balance Sheet: FASB, CFO Magazine, Nov. 14, 2005.  Available at 
http://www.cfo.com.
93 See Summary of Statement No. 87, Financial Accounting Standards Board, Dec. 1985 (available at 
http://www.fasb.org/st/summary/stsum87.shtml); Brian W. Carpenter & Daniel P. Mahoney, Pension 
Accounting: The Continuing Evolution, CPA J., Oct. 2004 (measurement issues related to defined benefit 
plans have been unchanged since 1985, when FASB issued SFAS 87, which was intended to be a stopgap 
measure) (available at http://www.nysscpa.org.)  The FASB may be concerned about negative effects 
resulting from the abolition of smoothing.  According to one survey of major pension fund managers, 
nearly half would reallocate an average of nine percent of their assets from equities to fixed income to 
reduce the volatility that might result from an end to smoothing.  This reallocation could remove $250-$600 
billion from the stock market.   Alix Nyberg Stuart, Death to Smoothing, CFO Magazine, Feb. 22, 2005.  
Available at http://www.cfo.com.
94 Securities and Exchange Commission, Report and Recommendations Pursuant to Section 401(c) of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on Arrangements with Off-Balance Sheet Implications, Special Purpose 
Entities, and Transparency of Filings by Issuers (June 2005) at 15 (hereafter SEC Sec. 401(c) Report). 
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sheet Special Purpose Entities (SPEs) that housed the company’s massive debt.95 Enron 
incurred approximately $14 billion of off-balance sheet debt through structured finance 
transactions involving the use of SPEs.96 This elaborate financial charade unraveled in 
2001.  In November of that year Enron filed a Form 8-K, disclaiming the reliability of its 
financial statements for the previous four years.  When the SPEs were consolidated onto 
Enron’s financial statements, the company lost well over $1 billion in shareholder equity 
and reduced previously reported net income by approximately $600 million.  Shortly 
thereafter, Enron filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.97 Subsequent Enron-
related class action litigation resulted in settlements that exceeded $7 billion by 2005.98 
Enron’s extensive use and misuse of SPEs was an extreme example of a common 
practice.99 The use of SPEs as financing vehicles began in the early 1980s and became 
very popular by the late 1990s. SPEs are established by sponsoring companies too off-
load debt and assets.  A typical arrangement involving an SPE is an asset-backed 
securities transaction involving the sale of a security whereby repayment is directly tied 
 
95 Gretchen Morgenson, How 287 Turned into 7: Lessons in Fuzzy Math, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 2002, at 
A1.  Just one of these SPEs concealed over $1 billion of Enron’s debt.  Susan E. Squires, Cynthia J. Smith, 
Lorna McDougall & William R. Yeack, Inside Arthur Andersen 9 (2003).  Cf. Alan Reinstein & Thomas R. 
Weirich, Accounting Issues at Enron, CPA J., Dec. 2002 (Enron used about 500 SPEs and thousands of 
other questionable partnerships).  Available at http://www.cpajournal.com.
96 SEC Sec. 401(c) Report, supra note 94, at 16. 
 
97 Hunter Carpenter, Comment, Special-Purpose Entities: A Description of the Now-Loathed Corporate 
Financing Tool, 72 MISS. L.J. 1065, 1067 (2003); Cunningham, supra note 2, at 1421 n.4. 
 
98 Stephen Taub, Enron Settlements Hit Record $7 Billion, CFO Magazine, Aug. 3, 2005.  Available at 
http://www.cfo.com.
99 Jackie Spinner, Rules Mean Uncertainty for Enron-Style ‘SPEs,’ Wash. Post, Jan. 24, 2003, at E01 
(“[M]ost large companies have some type of relationship with an SPE.”); Andrew Osterland, Reining in 
SPEs: New Rules for Special-Purpose Entities May Result in Bigger Corporate Balance Sheets, CFO 
Magazine, May 1, 2002 (“Tougher rules on SPE consolidation could affect virtually every Fortune 500 
company.”).  Available at http://www.cfo.com.
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to the cash flow of a segregated pool of assets.100 By 2002, the total outstanding value of 
asset-backed debt in the U.S. involving SPEs was an estimated $1.3 trillion.101 
Synthetic leases are another application of SPEs, whereby a corporation uses the 
vehicle to acquire real estate or equipment.  The synthetic lease permits the corporation to 
obtain the tax benefits of ownership, while keeping the debt associated with acquisition 
of the property off its balance sheet.102 Corporations seek to avoid balance sheet debt 
because financial ratios used by analysts to value them are negatively affected by such 
debt.103 Enron, one such corporation seeking to obscure its debt, made extensive use of 
synthetic leases.104 
In June 2005, the SEC released a study, mandated by Sarbanes-Oxley, concerning 
SPEs and off balance sheet reporting.  The study of 200 issuers of stocks and bonds with 
total equity market capitalization of $7.75 trillion -- including the 100 largest companies 
 
100 Carpenter, supra note 97, at 1072.  See also Angela Petrucci, Note, Accounting for Asset Securitization 
in A Full Dislcosure World, 30 J. Legis. 327, 327 (2004) (off-balance sheet financing is often criticized 
unfairly); Robert B. Thompson, Corporate  Governance After Enron, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 99, 113 (2003) 
(“SPEs are a legitimate way for a corporation to buy or sell risks as a form of hedging.”). 
 
101 Glenn R. Simpson, Power Play: Deals That Took Enron Under Had Many Supporters -- Big-Name 
Lobbying Stymied FASB Push To Disclose Off-Balance-Sheet Entities, Wall St. J., April 4, 2002, at A1.  
See also Cassell Bryan-Low, Accounting Board Clarifies Rule -- FASB To Narrow Criteria for Entities 
That Firms Must Bring Onto Books; Wall St. J., Nov. 3, 2003, at A11B (estimates of the assets in SPEs run 
into the trillions of dollars); Joyita R. Basu, Note, Accounting for and Disclosure of Special Purpose 
Entities by Financial Holding Companies: Lessons from PNC Financial Services, 7 N.C. BANKING INST.
177, 178 (2003) (“Financial institutions have been using SPEs for decades to monetize loans and 
receivables on their balance sheets.”). 
 
102 Baron v.  Smith, 2004 WL 1847751, *4 (1st Cir., Apr. 8, 2004); Ray A. Smith, Firms Await Ruling on 
Use of Synthetic Leases, Wall St. J., Oct. 2, 2002, at B8.  The mechanics of synthetic lease transactions are 
described in Steven G. Frost & Paul Carmen, Federal and State Tax Consequences of Synthetic Leasing – 
Multiple Benefits, Minimal Risks, 95 J. TAX’N 361 (2001); Donald J. Weidner, Synthetic Leases: Structured 
Finance, Financial Accounting and Tax Ownership, 25 J. CORP. L. 445 (2000); and H. Peter Nesvold, What 
Are You Trying To Hide? Synthetic Leases, Financial Disclosure, and the Information Mosaic, 4 STAN. J.L. 
BUS. & FIN. 83 (1999). 
 
103 Anthony J. Luppino, Stopping the Enron End-Runs and Other Trick Plays: the Book-Tax Accounting 
Conformity Defense, 2003 COLUMBIA BUS. L. REV. 35, 50-51. 
 
104 Ray A. Smith, Firms Await Ruling on Use of Synthetic Leases, Wall St. J., Oct. 2, 2002, at B8. 
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in the United States -- determined that an enormous amount of debt remains off balance 
sheet.  The study, extrapolating from results for the 200 issuers, concluded that there is 
approximately $1.25 trillion in non-cancelable future cash obligations committed under 
operating leases that are not recognized on issuer balance sheets.105 The study also 
suggested that approximately $414 billion in pension liabilities remain off balance 
sheet.106 
Accounting for SPEs was, until 2003, primarily governed by FAS No. 140 
(“Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and Extinguishments of 
Liabilities”) and ARB No. 51 (“Consolidated Financial Statements”).  Additional 
guidance was provided by EITF Issue Nos. 90-15, 96-21, and 97-1, and EITF Topic No. 
D-14.107 FAS No. 140 governed, and still continues to govern, the accounting for 
securitizations of financial assets through Qualifying Special Purpose Entities 
(QSPEs).108 When FAS No. 140 does not apply (as it generally did not in the case of 
Enron), SPEs are evaluated based on voting control.  Until 2003, a company was not 
required to consolidate onto its balance sheet an SPE when it owned less than a majority 
 
105 SEC Sec. 401(c) Report, supra note 94, at 64. 
 
106 Id. at 56.  See also Lisa Yoon, Rethink Off-Balance-Sheet Reporting: SEC, CFO Magazine, June 18, 
2005 (available at http://www.cfo.com).  
 
107 See Summary of Decisions Reached at the December 17, 2003 Board Meeting Regarding FASB 
Interpretation No. 46, Consolidation of Variable Interest Entities 2 n.2, Financial Accounting Standards 
Board, Dec. 17, 2003.  Available at http://www.fasb.org/12-17-03_mtg_fin46.pdf. The FASB has admitted 
that the accounting literature concerning SPEs has been fragmented and incomplete.  Luppino, supra note 
103, at 77. 
 
108 A QSPE is a trust that meets all of then following conditions: (1) it is legally distinct from the 
transferor; (2) its activities are prearranged and limited; (3) it holds only passive financial instruments; and 
(4) it can only sell assets automatically and in response to certain events.  QSPEs include the credit card, 
mortgage, home equity, auto loan, and other passive securitizations that account for the majority of the 
asset-backed securities market.  They continue to be exempt from mandatory balance sheet inclusion.  
David Zion & Bill Carache, Credit Suisse First Boston Equity Research -- FIN 46: New Rule Could 
Surprise Investors 8 (June 23, 2003) (hereafter FIN 46).  Available at 
http://www.securitization.net/pdf/FIN_46_New_Rule.pdf.
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of the vote and the independent majority owner contributed at least three percent of the 
SPE’s total capital.109 This rule, derived from various EITF Issues and Topics, enabled 
Enron to conceal its staggering debt.110 
The FASB had debated reform of accounting for SPEs for two decades before 
Enron’s accounting fraud was exposed.111 The FASB considered, and then abandoned, a 
series of proposals that would have required public companies using SPEs to disclose that 
information on their consolidated income statements.  The major accounting firms were 
among the vocal opponents of these reform measures.  It was not until September 2000 
that the FASB issued rules requiring disclosure about SPEs in the footnotes to financial 
statements.  The new rules did not extend beyond footnote disclosure112 and compliance 
with them was sporadic.113 In January 2001, nine months before Enron filed for 
bankruptcy protection, the FASB announced that it was tabling its project to reform the 
rules concerning consolidation of SPEs.114 
109 FIN 46, supra note 108, at 8. 
 
110 Mark P. Holtzman, Elizabeth Venuti & Robert Fonfeder, Enron and the Raptors, CPA J., Apr. 2003.  
Available at http://www.cpajournal.com. The details of Enron’s use of SPEs have been extensively 
documented.  See, e.g., William C. Powers, Jr., et al., Enron Corporation, Report of Investigation by the 
Special Investigative Commission of the Board of Directors of Enron Corporation (2002).  Available at 
http://news.findlaw.com.hdocs/enron/sicreport020102.pdf.
111 Conference Board Commission (Parts 2 and 3), supra note 22, at 39 (“[E]fficient capital markets cannot 
tolerate a . . . 20-year delay for the publication of a standard relating to off-balance sheet, special purpose 
entities.”). 
 
112 Simpson, supra note 101, at A1. 
 
113 Cassell Bryan-Low, Deals & Deal Makers: Off-Balance Sheet Operations Are Focus of New 
Regulations, Wall St. J., July 15, 2003, at C5.  The SEC has also imposed reporting requirements.  In 
January 2003, the SEC adopted amendments to implement Section 401(a) of Sarbanes-Oxley, which 
requires each annual and quarterly financial report filed with the SEC to disclose all material off-balance 
sheet transactions, arrangements and obligations.  See Testimony of William H. Donaldson (SEC chairman) 
Before Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs 13, Sept. 9, 2003.  Available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/090903tswhd.htm.
114 Badly in Need of Repair, Economist, May 2, 2002.  Available at http://www.economist.com.
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Enron, which restated earnings to the extent of approximately $600 million after 
accounting for off-balance sheet activity and income from securitization, did not act 
alone.  Between 1997 and 2002, at least five other companies restated earnings by at least 
$40 million apiece to reflect such accounting.115 But it was primarily the spectacular 
Enron fraud that finally compelled the FASB to respond.116 In February 2002 the 
standards board recommenced work on a project to reform accounting for SPEs.  In 
January 2003, the FASB issued a complex new rule that governs SPEs and other off-
balance sheet activity -- Interpretation No. 46 (FIN 46), “Consolidation of Variable 
Interest Entities, an Interpretation of ARB No. 51.”117 
FIN 46 was superseded by FIN 46(R) in December 2003.118 Both interpretations 
are designed to provide guidance as to whether a company should place its off-balance 
sheet activity on its balance sheet.  This activity is not limited to SPEs.  FIN 46(R) 
addresses Variable Interest Entities (VIE), which encompass both SPEs and such other 
financing vehicles as hedge funds, venture capital partnerships, joint ventures, general 
partnerships, limited partnerships, trusts, and leases.  Under 46(R), entities are classified 
as either variable interest or voting interest.  In the case of the former classification, the 
entity is evaluated for possible consolidation according to a risk-and-rewards approach 
 
115 Simpson, supra note 101, at A1.  See also Osterland, supra note 99 (stock of Adelphia Communications 
Corp. plunged by nearly 50 percent after the company disclosed $2.7 billion in off-balance-sheet debt 
housed in SPEs). 
 
116 FASB Rule Will Clip Enronesque Alliances, Wall St. J., Jan. 16, 2003, at C3. 
 
117 See News Release -- FASB Issues Guidance To Improve Financial Reporting for SPEs, Off-Balance 
Sheet Structures and Similar Entities, Financial Accounting Standards Board, Jan. 17, 2003.  Available at 
http://fasb.org/news/nr011703.shmtl.
118 See generally Jalal Soroosh & Jack T. Ciesielski, Accounting for Special Purpose Entities Revised: 
FASB Interpretation 46(R), CPA J., July 2004.   Available at http://www.nysscpa.org.
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that requires an estimation of expected losses and returns.  Consolidation is required if 
the company is vulnerable to a majority of the entity’s risk of loss, is entitled to receive 
the bulk of the entity’s residual returns, or both.  But if the entity is classified as a voting 
interest, it is evaluated for consolidation based on voting power.119 
The effects of FIN 46 and FIN 46(R) were expected to be substantial.  Companies 
in the S&P 500 were expected to bring approximately $379 billion of assets and $377 
billion of liabilities onto their balance sheets when FIN 46 first became effective.  These 
adjustments would have increased total assets held by the S&P 500 by approximately two 
percent, to $19.2 trillion.  Liabilities would have increased by about 2.4 percent, to $16.2 
trillion.  The bulk of the adjustments were expected to take place on the books of 
financial services companies.120 
The expected large-scale adjustments tend to confirm that off-balance sheet 
activity has made a major contribution to the accounting scandals that began to unfold in 
the late 1990s and to the crisis in investor confidence that developed in their aftermath.121 
No doubt Enron’s fraud took place in part because the company’s management failed to 
 
119 FIN 46, supra note 108, at 7; Scott Taylor & Daniel Volpi, New FASB Guidelines for Consolidation of 
Variable Interest Entities Will Affect U.S. Energy Sector, March 6, 2003 (available at 
http://www2.standardandpoors.com). 
 
120 FIN 46, supra note 108, at 6.  See also Stephen Taub, FIN 46 Costs Cisco $567 Million, CFO 
Magazine, Feb. 5, 2004.  Available at http://www.cfo.com. But see Robert Julavits, Fewer SPE Assets 
Going to Sheet, AMERICAN BANKER, Aug. 5, 2003, at Markets 1 (Citigroup Inc. is restoring $5 billion to its 
balance sheet, rather than the $55 billion originally estimated, by restructuring or winding-down SPEs).  
Available at http://www.americanbanker.com.
121 See FIN 46, supra note 108, at 51.  According to one survey, 19 of the 224 securities fraud class action 
suits filed in 2002 concerned the burying of liabilities, including transfers to SPEs.   See Paul R. Besette, 
Michael J. Biles & Alfred Mcdaniel, Accounting Fraud in 2002 – Lessons Learned, 1377 PLI Corp 155, 
161 (2003).  See also Tony McAuley, The Parmalat Archipelago, CFO Magazine, Feb. 9, 2004 (massive 
accounting fraud at Parmalat was facilitated by company’s use of hundreds of off-balance sheet SPEs).  
Available at http://www.cfo.com.
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follow certain rules set forth in GAAP.122 But the fraud also was facilitated and 
encouraged by such rules.123 GAAP’s historic failure to adequately account for off-
balance sheet activity has been a hallmark of the deficiencies of U.S. accounting 
standards.  Moreover, it is not at all clear that the FASB has solved the problem.  FIN 46, 
adopted after two decades of discussion and study by the FASB, was widely criticized.124 
FIN 46(R) has fared somewhat better, but remains deficient.  One example of the FASB’s 
failure to solve the off-balance-sheet problem concerns operating lease commitments.  
Post-FIN 46(R), companies continue to be able to keep such commitments off their 
balance sheets.  For the companies in the S&P 500, such commitments totaled $482 
billion in 2004.  This was equivalent to eight percent of the $6.25 trillion reported as debt 
on the companies’ balance sheets.  The FASB has done nothing to address this issue.125 
Moreover, the 2005 SEC study concerning SPEs concluded that, in anticipation of 
the implementation of FIN 46 and FIN 46(R), a number of entities circumvented the rules 
by restructuring arrangements with potential VIEs such that they did not require 
consolidation.  The SEC study concluded: “[A] new series of structures that straddle the 
 
122 See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules Versus Principles Versus 
Rents, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1023, 1044 (2003). 
 
123 See, e.g., Luppino, supra note 103, at 40 n.4, 141-42, and 153.  Accounting scandals at Enron and 
Parmalat also prompted the European Union to require listed, non-exempt companies to disclose off-
balance-sheet transactions, under riules adopted in 2005.  See Stephen Taub, EU Orders Off-Balance-Sheet 
Disclosures, CFO Magazine, Dec. 16, 2005.  Available at http://www.cfo.com.
124 One of the Big Four accounting firms described FIN 46 as “severely non-operational.”  FIN 46, supra 
note 108, at 10.  See also Christine Richard, Wall Street Pros Are in an Uproar Over Commercial Paper 
Rules, Wall St. J., May 5, 2003; Adam Temkin, Is FIN 46 the Wrong Solution To the Right Problem?  
Securitization Professionals Share Their Views in Standard & Poor’s SF Market Opinion Survey, Apr. 11, 
2003 (two-thirds of securitization professionals surveyed by S&P do not believe that FIN 46 solves the 
problem of corporate malfeasance) (available at http://www.standardandpoors.com). 
 
125 Jonathan Weil, Open Secrets: How Leases Play A Shadowy Role in Accounting, Wall St. J., Sept. 22, 
2004, at A1.  But cf. Tim Reason, All in the Family, CFO Magazine, Sept. 1, 2004 (sample of 300 quarterly 
reports shows that post-FIN 46R, companies are now claiming ownership of many assets and liabilities 
previously kept off-balance sheet).  Available at http://www.cfo.com.
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lines between consolidation approaches has sprung up, and various structures have been 
designed to work around the guidance in Interpretation No. 46(R).”126 
(4) Intangible Assets 
 A fourth area where GAAP has been a dismal failure concerns accounting for 
intangible assets.  In 1978 it was estimated that the book value of the tangible assets of 
publicly traded United States corporations accounted for more than 83 percent of the 
market value of those companies.  By 2002 that figure had declined to an estimated 30-40 
percent.  Today, most of the value in United States corporations comes from intangible 
assets, such as patents, copyrights, brands, and customer lists.127 Yet, pursuant to GAAP, 
these assets rarely appear on corporate balance sheets.128 
One particular aspect of GAAP’s failure is its requirement under FAS No. 2 
(“Accounting for Research and Development Costs”), issued in October 1974, that 
expenditures on R&D -- one of the most concrete of intangibles -- be immediately 
expensed.  GAAP requires expensing in the period in which the items are incurred and a 
 
126 SEC Sec. 401(c) Report, supra note 94, at 109. 
 
127 Alan Murray, Accounting Rules Should Adapt To New Economy, Wall St. J., July 23, 2002, at A4.  
Accord Robert E. Litan & Peter J. Wallison, The GAAP Gap – Corporate Disclosure in the Internet Age 26 
(2000) (intangible assets constitute approximately 80 percent of the value of the S&P 500); Ben 
McLannahan, Hidden Treasures, CFO Magazine, Dec. 30, 2003 (intangibles dwarf the tangible book assets 
of all sorts of companies in all sorts of industries) (available at http://www.cfo.com).   But see Steven 
Liesman, Deciphering the Black Box, Wall St. J., Jan. 23, 2002, at C1 (study of 5,300 publicly traded 
companies shows that intangible assets account for nine percent of total assets).  See also Leonard 
Nakamura, A Trillion Dollars a Year in Intangible Investment and the New Economy, in Intangible Assets 
19, 27-28 (John R. M. Hand & Baruch Lev eds., 2003) (intangibles represent a third or more of the market 
value of U.S. domestic corporations and 6-10 percent of U.S. GDP is spent annually on intangibles).   
 
128 Neil Gross, Commentary: Valuing “Intangibles” Is a Tough Job, But it Has to Be Done, BusinessWeek 
Online, Aug. 6, 2001.  Available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/01_32/b3744009.htm.
Accord Louis K. C. Chan, Josef Lakonishhok & Theodore Sougiannis, The Stock Market Valuation of 
Research and Development Expenditures 387, 387 in Intangible Assets, supra note 127 (“Under generally 
accepted U.S. accounting principles, many types of intangible assets are not reported in firms’ financial 
statements.”); Peter J. Wallison, Debating Sarbanes-Oxley: Give Us Disclosure, Not Audits, Wall St. J., 
June 2, 2003, at A16 (“Intangible assets. . . do not appear on GAAP balance sheets.”). 
 
34
charge against current earnings.129 Such an approach falsely implies that R&D 
expenditures do not create an asset that has future value.130 The result is a serious 
distortion of the fundamental accounting principle that costs be matched with revenues 
and a “systematic decline in the usefulness of financial information to investors over the 
past twenty years.”131 Many other intangible investments are never identified in financial 
statements.132 
The failure of the current reporting model to capture the value of intangibles has 
had a number of other specific adverse consequences.  These consequences include 
diminished market liquidity,133 increased insider trading by managers who are able to 
exploit the information asymmetry between them and outside investors,134 an increased 
cost of capital, and the misallocation of resources.135 
129 Robert F. Reilly, Valuation of Technology Companies, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 42, 43 (July/August 
2003) (“Under GAAP, R&D expenditures are normally expensed as incurred.”).  Likewise, FAS No. 86 
(“Accounting for the Costs of Computer Software to Be Sold, Leased, or Otherwise Marketed”), issued in 
August 1985, provides that costs incurred to establish the technological feasibility of a product are 
considered R&D under FAS No. 2 and charged to expenses as incurred.  See Wayne S. Upton, Jr., Business 
and Financial Reporting, Challenges from the New Economy 66 (Apr. 2001) (hereafter New Economy).  
Available at http://www.fasb.org.
130 Margaret Blair & Steven Wallman, The Growing Intangibles Reporting Discrepancy 449, 455 in 
Intangible Assets, supra note 127. 
 
131 Baruch Lev & Paul Zarowin, The Boundaries of Financial Reporting and How To Extend Them 487, 
508, in Intangible Assets, supra note 127.  Accord Juergen H. Daum, Intangible Assets and Value Creation 
84 (2003) (many corporate crises would have been detected sooner if investors, creditors and management 
had been able to measure the value and development of intangible assets). 
 
132 Chandra Kanodia, et al., Should Intangibles Be Measured?  What Are the Economic Trade-Offs?, 42 J. 
ACCT. RES. 89, 90 (2004). 
 
133 Jeff P. Boone & K. K. Raman, Off-Balance Sheet R&D Assets and Market Liquidity 335, 360 in 
Intangible Assets, supra note 127. 
 
134 David Aboody & Baruch Lev, Information Asymmetry, R&D, and Insider Gains 366, 382 in Intangible 
Assets, supra note 127. 
 
135 Blair & Wallman, supra note 130, at 460, 462. 
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 To date, the FASB has shown no inclination to overhaul the accounting for 
intangible assets.  Incremental reform was made in 2001, when the FASB adopted two 
rules that eliminate amortization of goodwill in the case of acquisitions. But neither 
standard addresses the reporting of internally developed intangible assets.136 Further 
reform is not on the horizon, notwithstanding the conclusion of a 2001 FASB report that 
a basis for the recognition and measurement of internally generated intangible assets 
should be developed.137 The FASB’s failure to bridge the current gap in accounting for 
intangibles is a fourth significant problem.138 
(5) Rules vs. Principles 
 A fifth infirmity in the current reporting model is GAAP’s focus on specific 
bright-line rules, as opposed to general principles.   The SEC has identified three major 
shortcomings of rules-based standards.  Such standards: (1) can be misused by financial 
engineers, such as auditors, as a roadmap to comply with the letter but not the spirit of the 
standards; (2) contain numerous exceptions, resulting in inconsistencies in accounting 
 
136 Benjamin P. Foster, Robin Fletcher & William D. Stout, Valuing Intangible Assets, CPA J., Oct. 2003.  
Available at http://www.cpajournal.com. Accord Bruce H. Nearon, Intangible Assets: Framing the Debate,
CPA J., Jan. 2004 (“[W]ith few exceptions, we account for intangible assets in the same manner as we did 
30 years ago.”)  Available at http://www.cpajournal.com.
137 See New Economy, supra note 129, at 59. 
 
138 Even if the FASB decided to act, it would confront some serious obstacles.  First, the current state of 
technology “does not allow for sufficiently reliable measurement of many intangibles.”  Samuel A. 
DiPiazza Jr. & Robert G. Eccles, Building Public Trust: The Future of Corporate Reporting 46 (2002).  
Accord New Economy, supra note 129, at 82 (“Measurement . . . is the big question that frustrates many 
attempts to incorporate intangible assets in financial statements.”).  But see Foster, et al., supra note 136 
(objective external evidence of value of intangibles exists in form of insured values and use of intangibles 
as collateral).  Second, few entities maintain comprehensive inventories of intangible assets beyond those 
required for tax and financial reporting or for protection of intellectual property.  New Economy, supra note 
129, at 99.  Third, inclusion of intangibles in the balance sheet risks misleading investors.  Arguably, 
corporations would have increased incentives to create flattering false numbers, which auditors might have 
difficulty recognizing.  See Touchy-Feely: Accountants Want To Start Measuring Intangible Assets and 
New Economy ‘Value Drivers.’  They Are Unlikely To Be Any Good at It, Economist, May 17, 2001.  
Available at http://www.economist.com.
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treatment by auditors of transactions and events with similar economic substance; and (3) 
create a need and demand by auditors for voluminous detailed implementation guidance 
on their application, thereby generating complexity and uncertainty.139 
Four specific accounting topics are often described as overly rules-based: leases, 
derivatives and hedging, stock-based compensation, and de-recognition of assets and 
liabilities.  With regard to derivatives, for example, FAS No. 133 lists nine exceptions to 
its scope, there are 15 Derivative Implementation Group issues related to the application 
of these scope exceptions, and more than 800 pages of GAAP apply to the topic.140 Other 
bright-line GAAP tests historically have been applied to the consolidation of SPEs and 
the smoothing of gains or losses in pension plans.141 
The primary alternative to a rules-based system such as GAAP is a principles-
based system.  The latter regime, which utilizes general accounting principles rather than 
bright-line rules,142 has already been adopted, or is likely to be adopted, by many 
 
139 Section 108(b) Study, supra note 25, at 11 and 47-48.  Accord Financial Reform: Relevance and 
Reality in  Financial Reporting, Speech by Cynthia A. Glassman (SEC Commissioner) 3, Sept. 16, 2003 
(GAAP’s detailed bright-line tests are vulnerable to financial engineering).  Available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch091603cag.htm. See also Accounting for Change: The Need for 
Radical Audit Reform in America Grows Ever More Pressing, Economist, June 27, 2002 (“GAAP rules are 
still too detailed and prescriptive; they have lost sight of the aim that company accounts should present a 
true and fair picture.”); The Lessons From Enron: After the Energy Firm’s Collapse, the Entire Auditing 
Regime Needs Radical Change, Economist, Feb. 7, 2002 (Enron’s behavior confirmed that GAAP is too 
rules-based) (both available at http://www.economist.com); and Frederick Gill, Principles-Based 
Accounting Standards, 28 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 967, 972, 980 (2003) (U.S. GAAP has become 
incredibly complex, with only small groups of specialists thoroughly understanding the accounting for 
common transactions). 
 
140 Section 108(b) Study, supra note 25, at 24.  See also Rebecca Toppe Shortridge & Mark Myring, 
Defining Principles-Based Accounting Standards, CPA J., Aug. 2004 (U.S. GAAP related to lease 
accounting is addressed in 20 Statements, nine FASB Interpretations, 10 Technical Bulletins, and 39 EITF 
Abstracts).  Available at http://www.nysscpa.org.
141 Section 108(b) Study, supra note 25, at 25. 
 
142 See, e.g., Bernhard Grossman, Comparative Corporate Governance: Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles v. International Accounting Standards, 28 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 847, 861 (2003) 
(principles-based system constitutes effort to limit bending of individual rules); Paul Hofheinz, Battle of the 
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countries around the globe.  This trend is primarily attributable to efforts by the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and its predecessor, which have been 
striving for 30 years to achieve global convergence to principles-based accounting 
standards.143 Prior to 2005, countries in Europe and Asia used at least 26 different 
accounting standards, none of which was quite the same as United States GAAP.144 In 
2002, however, the European Parliament and the European Council of Ministers voted to 
require the adoption of IASB standards.  By 2005 all European Union (EU) listed 
companies were required to prepare their consolidated financial statements in accordance 
with IASB standards,145 which are published in a series of pronouncements denominated 
as International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs).146 This requirement applies to 
 
Accountants: Europe Tries To Win Over U.S., Wall St. J., July 16, 2002, at A12 (Enron would have 
encountered more difficulty moving debt to SPEs if auditors had followed international accounting rules). 
 
143 The IASB began operations in 2001.  Its predecessor, the International Accounting Standards 
Committee (IASC), was established in 1973 and disbanded in 2001.  The IASB is funded by contributions 
from the major accounting firms, private financial institutions and industrial companies, central and 
development banks, and other organizations.  The IASB, which has 14 Board members (at least five of 
whom have a background as practicing auditors), has stated that its mission is to develop “a single set of 
high quality, understandable and enforceable global accounting standards that require transparent and 
comparable information in general purpose financial statements.”  See http://www.iasb.org. The United 
States, which does not follow international accounting standards, nevertheless has four seats on the IASB.  
Stephen Taub, Who Determines International Standards?, CFO Magazine, March 11, 2005 (available at 
http://www.cfo.com).   
 
144 Michael Maiello, The International 500: Tower of Babel, Forbes.com, July 22, 2002.  Available at 
http://www.forbes.com. See also Josephina Fernandez McEvoy, The Scourge of Sarbanes-Oxley, 22 AM.
BANKR. INST. J. 40, 40 (Dec./Jan. 2004) (Latin American countries have their own accounting standards). 
 
145 The European Parliament retains the power to disapprove of specific IASB standards.  Common 
Ground: A Move Toward Global Accounting Standards Is Proving Controversial, Economist, Dec. 18, 
2003.  Available at http://www.economist.com. Also, European companies that report their results under 
U.S. GAAP are not required to switch to international standards until 2007.  David Reilly, Accounting 
Chief in Europe Vows To Resist Pressure, Wall St. J., Oct. 17, 2003, at C9. 
 
146 The IASB has also adopted and sometimes amended the body of standards previously issued by the 
Board of the IASC.  Those 41 pronouncements continue to be designated “International Accounting 
Standards (IASs).”  The IASB amended 13 IASs in 2003.  Press Release -- International Accounting 
Standards Board Issues Wide-Ranging Improvements To Standards, Dec. 18, 2003.  Available at 
http://www.iasb.org.
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approximately 7,000 listed companies in the EU,147 representing about 25 percent of the 
world’s total market capitalization.148 Individual governments have the option of 
extending the requirement to all companies, of which there are approximately 5 million in 
Europe.149 
Most non-EU nations also are likely to converge to IFRSs. A study conducted by 
six major accounting firms in 2002 disclosed that 95 percent of the 59 countries surveyed 
either have adopted, intend to adopt, or intend to converge with, IFRSs.150 More 
recently, the IASB projected that 100 countries will be using IFRSs in 2006, and 150 
countries by 2010.151 These projections suggest the not too distant adoption of global 
accounting standards.  Indeed, if the United States, with approximately 52 percent of the 
world’s market capitalization, and Japan, accounting for another nine percent, took the 
EU’s cue and adopted IFRSs, the standards would become global.152 But Japan has not 
expressed an intention to converge with IFRSs, and the SEC has rejected the notion that 
 
147 So Far, So Good, Economist, June 16, 2005.  Available at http://www.cfo.com.
148 Report by Sir David Tweedie (IASB Chairman) to IASC Foundation Trustees 8, Nov. 4, 2003 
(available at http://www.iasb.org); DiPiazza & Eccles, supra note 134, at 50.   
 
149 Report by Sir David Tweedie, supra note 148, at 8. 
 
150 BDO, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, et al., GAAP Convergence 2002: A Survey of National Efforts To 
Promote and Achieve Convergence with International Financial Reporting Standards 4, 7 (2003).  
Available at http://www.pwcglobal.com. See also Cassell Bryan-Low, Accounting’s Global Rule Book,
Wall St. J., Nov. 28, 2003, at C1 (by 2005, as many as 91 countries will require or allow their companies to 
use international standards). 
 
151 See Tim Reason, The Narrowing GAAP, CFO Magazine, Dec. 1, 2005.  Available at 
http://www.cfo.com.
152 DiPiazza & Eccles, supra note 138, at 50. 
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IFRSs constitute a model for the principles-based accounting standards it believes the 
United States should adopt.153 
Arguments in favor of worldwide convergence of accounting standards are 
compelling.  Benefits resulting from convergence are likely to include reduced 
accounting fraud, increased movement of capital, greater transparency in transactions, 
increased comparability of financial statements, more informed investment choices, and 
increased coordination between accounting and taxation.154 In recognition of the 
foregoing benefits, FASB and the IASB have agreed to work together toward 
convergence.  In October 2002, the two boards issued a memorandum of understanding 
to formalize their commitment to the convergence of United States GAAP and 
international accounting standards.155 
153 Section 108(b) Study, supra note 25, at 18.  See also Natsuo Nishio, Japan Is Hurt by Accounting 
Model, Wall St. J., Feb. 17, 2004, at A6B; Mundstock, supra note 26, at 844 (“IFRS are inherently inferior 
to FASB’s pronouncements. . . .”) 
 
154 See New World Order – IASB Chairman Sir David Tweedie Says Global Accounting Standards Are 
Within Reach, CFO Magazine, March 1, 2004 (available at http://www.cfo.com); Sabine D. Selbach, The 
Harmonization of Corporate Taxation & Accounting Standards in the European Community and Their 
Interrelationship, 18 CONN. J. INT’L L. 523, 562 (2003).   
 
155 See Robert H. Herz & Kimberley R. Petrone, International Convergence of Accounting Standards—
Perspectives From the FASB on Challenges and Opportunities, 25 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 631, 643 (2005); 
News Release -- FASB and IASB Agree To Work Together Toward Convergence of Global Accounting 
Standards, Financial Accounting Standards Board (Oct. 29, 2002).  Available at 
http://www.fasb.org/news/nr102902.shtml. International convergence and global adoption of principle-
based standards are two distinct concepts, in theory.  But since much of the world outside of the U.S. uses a 
principles-based system, convergence is likely to lead to such a system.  Indeed, the SEC has concluded 
that the U.S. should move away from rules and toward what it calls an “objectives-oriented approach.”  
Section 108(b) Study, supra note 25, at 8 (“[W]e conclude that the benefits of adopting objectives-oriented 
or principles-based standards in the U.S. justify the cost. . . .”).  However, the same SEC study rejected the 
idea that IFRSs constitute a desirable model.  Id. at 18.  Cf. Remarks Before the IASB Meeting with World 
Standard-Setters, Donald T. Nicolaisen (chief accountant, SEC), Sept. 28, 2004, at 3 (“I am eager to 
embrace IFRS because I believe our investors in the U.S. will benefit.”).  Available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch092804dtn.htm.
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The early announced goal was to remove most differences between the two sets of 
standards by 2005.156 Given the wide disparities between the two systems, however, that 
objective was unrealistic.157 Moreover, since the SEC has rejected the notion that IFRSs 
constitute a desirable model, while much of the rest of the world appears likely to adopt 
that model, convergence between the United States and other nations is likely to be a 
long-term project.  The consequence is that rules-based GAAP will continue to be the 
United States model for the foreseeable future.158 And that result entails the negative 
outcomes noted above, including the facilitation of accounting fraud.  As GAAP has 
become increasingly rules-based, it has become “increasingly feasible for opportunistic 
managers to meet bright-line requirements in order to inflate reported net income.”159 
Enron provides a stark example of the proposition that United States GAAP has been a 
 
156 U.S., EU Set 2005 To End Differences in Accounting Rules, Wall. St. J., Oct. 30, 2002, at C9.   
 
157 See A Review of FASB Action Post-Enron and WorldCom: Hearing Before House Subcomm. on 
Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection, 108th Cong. 10 (2003) (statement of Robert H. Herz, FASB 
Chairman) (“Because there are literally hundreds of differences between U.S. and international standards, 
realistically this effort will still be ongoing well beyond 2005. . . .”); Lingling Wei, FASB Moves To 
Converge Rules, Wall St. J., Dec. 16, 2003, at C15 (FASB and IASB seek to reconcile hundreds of 
divergent standards).   But cf. Stephen Taub, European Group Seeks Accounting Changes, CFO Magazine, 
May 2, 2005 (study by Committee of European Securities Regulators concludes that GAAP in U.S. 
Canada, and Japan is mostly equivalent to IFRS, with certain significant differences).  Available at 
http://www.cfo.com.
158 See Lori Calabro, In the Same Language, CFO Magazine, Jan. 28, 2005 (convergence between U.S. and 
international standards is now slated for 2007 or 2008) (available at http://www.cfo.com); Robert L. 
Bartley, Debating Sarbanes-Oxley: Economic Profit vs. Accounting Profit, Wall St. J., June 2, 2003, at A17 
(Sarbanes-Oxley enshrined GAAP more firmly than ever); and Katherine Schipper, Principles-Based 
Accounting Standards, 17 Acct. Horizons 61, 71 (2003) (Sarbanes-Oxley is rules-based).  See also Andrew 
Peple, Moving the Market: Major Economies at Loggerheads Over Global Accounting Rules, Wall St. J., 
Feb. 9, 2004, at C3 (drive for global accounting standards has stalled). 
 
159 Benston, supra note 42, at 1339-40. 
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substantial contributing factor in recent accounting fraud,160 and it is certainly not the 
only example.  GAAP facilitated many of the recent scandals.161 
(6) Pro Forma Reports 
 A sixth weakness of the current financial reporting system in the United States is 
the permitted use of unaudited162 pro forma reports.  Such reports are designed to reflect 
the effects of applying significant assumptions to a company’s financial statements or 
information.  Historically, these assumptions concerned a proposed business 
combination, a change in capitalization, a change in form of business organization, a 
proposed sale or purchase, or the disposition of a significant segment of a business.163 
But in recent years pro forma reports have been used by numerous companies to reflect 
corporate earnings as if certain ordinary items, usually expenses, did not exist.  The 
misleading exclusion of such expenses is often endorsed by management because it has 
the effect of artificially boosting corporate earnings.     
 
160 G.J. Benston & A.L. Hartgraves, Enron: What Happened and What Can We Learn From It, 21 J. ACCT.
& PUBLIC POLICY 105, 126 (2002) (“U.S. GAAP, as structured and administered by the SEC, the FASB, 
and the AICPA, are substantially responsible for the Enron accounting debacle.”). 
 
161 See, e.g., Markham, supra note 27, at 815-16 (“[T]he current financial accounting rules facilitated many 
of the recent accounting scandals.”); Patricia A. McCoy, Realigning Auditors’ Incentives, 35 CONN. L. 
REV. 989, 1007 (“GAAP played a major role in the accounting abuses of the 1990s.”); and Stephen Taub, 
GAAP Faulted for Freddie Mac Woes, CFO Magazine, Feb. 9, 2004 (available at http://www.cfo.com).  
 
162 Auditors have limited responsibilities for quarterly financial reports and other interim financial 
information.  Auditors are engaged to review that information, but it is not subject to the same scrutiny as 
are the full year’s audited financial statements.  Report and Recommendations, Public Oversight Board – 
Panel on Audit Effectiveness 81, Aug. 16, 2000 (hereafter Public Oversight Board).  Available at 
http://www.pobauditpanel.org/down/load.html. Accord Out, by $100 Billion: Nasdaq Firms’ Pro-Forma 
Alchemy, Economist, Feb. 21, 2002 (pro forma numbers are neither audited nor subject to any controlling 
rules).  Available at http://www.economist.com.
163 Larry P. Bailey, 2003 Miller GAAS Guide: A Comprehensive Restatement of Standards for Auditing, 
Attestation, Compilation, and Review 622 (2003). 
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Pro forma reporting increased dramatically in the last 20 years.164 It first became 
popular among Internet companies during the dot.com boom,165 later expanded to nearly 
all industries,166 and has been described as a “make-your-own-accounting-rules habit.”167 
A survey released in 2002 by the National Investor Relations Institute (NIRI) disclosed 
that 57 percent of the 233 companies sampled used pro forma information in their 
quarterly earnings reports.168 Another survey from 2002 found that more than 300 
companies in the S&P 500 engaged in pro forma reporting.169 
The permitted use of pro forma reports has the undesirable consequence of 
distorting to a substantial degree the actual performance of companies reporting on that 
basis.  During the period 1988-2004, pro forma earnings were approximately 21 percent 
higher than GAAP earnings for S&P 500 companies.170 These distortions are not readily 
apparent to many investors who read quarterly reports and are unaware, or fail to 
 
164 Mark T. Bradshaw & Richard G. Sloan, GAAP versus The Street: An Empirical Assessment of Two 
Alternative Definitions of Earnings, 40 J. ACCT. RES. 41, 41 (2002). 
 
165 Gren Manuel, European Interest Grows in Pro Forma Accounting, Wall St. J., Jan. 8, 2002, at C9 (pro 
forma reporting became a hallmark of many U.S. Internet companies in the late 1990s). 
 
166 Jonathan Weil, Moving Target: What’s the P/E Ratio?  Well, Depends on What Is Meant by Earnings, 
Wall St. J., Aug. 21, 2001, at A1 (use of pro forma reporting can be found in companies in nearly every 
industry). 
 
167 Jonathan Weil, ‘Pro Forma in Earnings Reports? . . . As If, Wall St. J., Apr. 24, 2003, at C1.  See also 
Cautionary Advice Regarding the Use of “Pro Forma” Financial Advice in Earnings Releases, Securities 
and Exchange Commission, Dec. 4, 2001 (Release Nos. 33-8039, 34-45124, FR-59) (pro forma financial 
information has no defined meaning and no uniform characteristics).  Available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/33-8039.htm.
168 Data reported at http://niri.org/publications/alerts/EA20020117.cfm.
169 Edward Teach & Tim Reason, Lies, Damn Lies, and Pro Forma, CFO Magazine, Apr. 1, 2002.  
Available at http://www.cfo.com).  See also Stephen Taub, The Next Great Controversy? Pro Forma 
Earnings, CFO Magazine, Jan. 22, 2002 (among publicly-traded corporations with a market capitalization 
exceeding $5 billion, more than 75 percent reported earnings on pro forma basis).  Available at 
http://www.cfo.com.
170 Stephen Taub, How Good Are Those Earnings, Really?, CFO Magazine, Nov. 9, 2004 (available at 
http://www.cfo.com); David Henry, Cleaning Up the Numbers, BusinessWeek, March 25, 2003, at 126.  
 
43
understand, that data has been presented in such a format.171 Small investors rely most 
heavily on pro forma reports.172 Corporate executives engaged in fraud use the lack of 
sophistication of these small investors to their advantage.  Many accounting frauds are 
initiated in quarterly reports, and then expanded to annual statements.173 For example, 
the substantial accounting scandal involving Global Crossing, Ltd. was based on 
fraudulent pro formas.174 
In January 2003 the SEC adopted a set of rules pursuant to Sarbanes-Oxley that is 
designed to regulate the use of pro forma reporting.  The rules, which became effective in 
March 2003, restrict but do not bar the use of non-GAAP financial measures in SEC 
filings.  They also regulate public disclosures outside of the context of such filings.  
Under Regulation S-K, whenever a company uses a non-GAAP financial measure in a 
document filed with the SEC, the filing must include: (1) a presentation with equal or 
greater prominence of the most directly comparable financial measure calculated and 
presented in accordance with GAAP; (2) a reconciliation of the non-GAAP financial 
measure to the most directly comparable GAAP financial measure; (3) a statement 
disclosing why management believes the presentation of the non-GAAP financial 
 
171 See Dan L. Heitger & Brian Ballou, Pro Forma Earnings: Adding Value or Distorting Perception?,
CPA J. (March 2003) (“[U]nregulated pro forma earnings serve only to confuse investors about a 
company’s actual financial performance.”).   Available at 
http://nysscpa.org/cpajournal2003/2003/0309/dept/d034403.htm.
172 Nilabhra Bhattacharya, et al., Who Trades on Pro Forma Earnings Information? (July 2004) (study of 
1,134 pro forma earnings releases finds that market segment that relies most heavily on pro forma earnings 
information is populated predominantly by small investors).  Available at 
http://www.docs.cox.smu.edu/~research/nbhatta/BBCM704.pdf.
173 Public Oversight Board, supra note 162, at 81 n.16. 
 
174 See Cunningham, supra note 36, at 930-32.  Class action litigation involving Global Crossing was 
settled for $325 million in March 2004.  That settlement did not cover Arthur Andersen, the former auditor 
for the fiber-optic company.  Almar Latour & Dennis K. Berman, Global Crossing, SEC Deal Expected,
Wall St. J., March 22, 2004, at A8.  
 
44
measure provides useful information to investors; and (4) if material, a statement of the 
purpose, if any, for which management uses the non-GAAP financial measure.  
Regulation G imposes some of these same conditions on the use of non-GAAP financial 
measures outside the context of SEC filings.175 
The foregoing rules have not induced many businesses to refrain from issuing pro 
forma reports.  A 2004 NIRI survey of 360 companies found that 60 percent of them 
continued to report non-GAAP information in their earnings releases.176 This is 
permitted, because Regulations S-K and G do not forbid the use of pro forma 
measures.177 And because such measures have no defined standards, misleading and 
confusing earnings reports continue to be issued.178 The issuance of such reports is not 
 
175 The adopting release for these rules is set forth at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8176.htm. See 
generally Norman D. Slonaker, Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures, 1454 PLI/Corp 117 (Nov. 10, 
2004); N. Adele Hogan, Non-GAAP Financial Measures and “Real-Time” Reporting: Final Rules 
Pursuant To Sections 401(b) and 409 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 1385 PLI/Corp 91 (Sept.-Dec. 2003);and 
Robert Bloom & David Schirm, SEC Regulations G, S-B, and S-K: Reporting Non-GAAP Financial 
Measures, CPA J., Dec. 2003 (available at http://www.cpajournal.com.).  The rules were issued by the 
SEC, because FASB has no jurisdiction over pro forma reporting.  See Jonathan Weil, Accounting Board 
Responds To Use of Earnings on Pro-Forma Basis, Wall St. J., Aug. 22, 2001, at A2. 
 
176 Alix Nyberg, A Matter of Emphasis, CFO Magazine, July 1, 2004 (available at http://www.cfo.com)
(“Today, though, there’s little evidence that Reg G has had much effect on pro forma reporting.”).  See also 
Stephen Taub, Google to Report Pro-Forma Results, CFO Magazine, Oct. 14, 2005 (issuance of pro forma 
numbers alongside GAAP numbers is very common practice on Wall Street) (available at 
http://www.cfo.com); Michael Rapoport, Pro Forma Proves a Hard Habit To Break on Earnings Reports,
Wall St. J., Sept. 18, 2003  (numerous companies are still using pro forma metrics); and Stephen Taub, Pro 
Forma Lives, CFO Magazine, Aug. 13, 2003 (“The death of pro forma results has been greatly 
exaggerated.”)  Available at http://www.cfo.com. A trend that emerged in 2005 was for pro forma reports 
to exclude all charges for stock-based compensation, including stock options and restricted stock.  See 
Craig Schnieder, Stock Options, Meet Pro Formas, CFO Magazine, Oct. 31, 2005.  Available at 
http://www.cfo.com.
177 David B.H. Martin, Reporting Earnings – A New Model, 1395 PLI/Corp 69, 75-78 (Nov. 2003). 
 
178 Cunningham, supra note 36, at 964 (new SEC rules are likely to permit continued manufacturing and 
use of pro forma data that remains misleading in practice); Stephen Bryan & Steven Lilien, Managed 
Disclosure and Pro Forma Earnings, CPA J., March 2004 (unaudited pro forma earnings vary widely) 
(available at http://www.cpajournal.com). . This is not mere theory.  See Ian McDonald, Ahead of the Tape: 
Lies, Damned Lies & Earnings, Wall St. J., Nov. 26, 2004, at C1 (for the S&P 500 during the third and 
fourth quarters of 2004 there was an estimated 17-20% chasm between GAAP net income and pro forma 
earnings).   
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constrained by the risk of enforcement action.  The SEC has initiated a single 
enforcement action in connection with the issuance of misleading pro forma data,179 after 
investigating a mere handful of companies.180 
D.  Sources and Limits of GAAS 
 Pursuant to the Exchange Act, all public companies registered with the SEC are 
required to have their financial statements audited by an independent accountant.181 Such 
statements disclose a company’s financial position, stockholders’ equity, results of 
operations, and cash flows.  While management is responsible for the preparation and 
content of a public company’s financial statements, the external auditor is responsible for 
auditing those statements in accordance with GAAS.  The purpose of the audit is to 
provide reasonable assurance that the statements are fairly presented in all material 
respects in accordance with GAAP.182 Certification of such fair presentation is based on 
 
179 Cease and desist proceedings were initiated by the SEC against Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts Inc. for 
making misleading statements in the company’s third-quarter 1999 pro forma earnings release.  See Press 
Release -- SEC Brings First Pro Forma Financial Reporting Case, Securities and Exchange Commission, 
Jan. 16, 2002 (available at http://www.sec.gov/news/headlines/trumphotelsd.htm); Christina Binkley & 
Judith Burns, Trump Hotels Gets Rebuke From SEC on Earnings Report, Wall St. J., Jan. 17, 2002, at B4.  
Trump Hotels consented to the SEC’s cease and desist order without admitting or denying the findings.  
Teach & Reason, supra note 169; David S. Ruder, et al., The Securities and Exchange Commission’s Pre- 
and Post-Enron Responses to Corporate Financial Fraud: An Analysis and Evaluation, 80 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1103, 1133-34 & n.172 (2005). 
 
180 Jonathan Weil, SEC Threatens to Sue Companies for Misleading ‘Pro Forma’ Results, Wall St. J., Dec. 
5, 2001, at A2. 
 
181 In 2003, 17,988 public companies were registered with the SEC and subject to the federal securities 
laws.  15,847 of these companies were domestic and 2,141 were foreign.   Public Accounting Firms: 
Required Study on the Potential Effects of Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation, Report by U.S. General 
Accounting Office to Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and House Comm. on 
Financial Services 15 (Nov. 2003) (GAO-04-216) (hereafter Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation).  Available at 
http://www.gao.gov.
182 United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 810 (1984). 
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the auditor’s review of the company’s records and verification of their accuracy through 
sampling, confirmation, or observation.183 
Prior to Sarbanes-Oxley, auditing standards in the United States were the 
responsibility of the AICPA.  Over the years the AICPA’s Auditing Standards Board 
(ASB) issued a number of specific Statements on Auditing Standards (SAS) that 
generally comprise GAAS.184 Approximately 100 SASs have been issued, and they were 
substantially codified in 2002.185 Sarbanes-Oxley changed the auditing landscape by 
ousting AICPA from its standard-setting role and granting to the PCAOB the authority to 
set auditing standards to be used by registered public accounting firms in the preparation 
and issuance of required audit reports.186 In April 2003 the PCAOB announced that it 
would not recognize any professional group of accountants to propose auditing standards.  
Instead, the PCAOB would develop “Professional Auditing Standards” that must be 
followed by registered public accounting firms for audits of public companies.187 In the 
meantime, the PCAOB adopted as interim standards the ASB’s auditing, attestation, and 
 
183 For a judicial description of the audit process, see Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 749-50 
(1992). 
 
184 Larry P. Bailey, 2003 Miller GAAS Guide: A Comprehensive Restatement of Standards for Auditing, 
Attestation, Compilation, and Review 4-5 (2003).  The ASB, a senior technical committee of the AICPA, 
was expanded in 2003 to include 19 members – most of whom are practicing CPAs.  News Release -- 
AICPA Expands Membership on Auditing Standards Board, American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants, Oct. 20, 2003.  Available at http://www.aicpa.org. ASB members are not required to ever ties 
with their employers, and in this respect the ASB is even less independent than FASB.  John E. McEnroe & 
Marshall K. Pitman, An Analysis of the Accounting Profession’s Oligarchy: The Auditing Standards Board,
in 16 RESEARCH IN ACCOUNTING REGULATION 29, 31 (Gary J. Previts ed., 2003). 
 
185 Lawrence A. Cunningham, Private Standards in Public Law: Copyright, Lawmaking and the Case of 
Accounting, 104 MICH. L. REV. 291, 312 (2005). 
 
186 David E. Hardesty, Corporate Governance and Accounting Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, at 
107 (2002). 
 
187 See PCAOB Release No. 2003-005 -- Statement Regarding the Establishment of Auditing and Other 
Professional Standards, Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, Apr. 18, 2003.  Available at 
http://www.pcaobus.org/rules/Release2003-005.pdf.
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quality control standards, the AICPA’s ethics and independence standards, and any 
relevant standards issued by the SEC, all as they existed on April 16, 2003.188 These 
interim standards would ultimately be modified, repealed, replaced, or adopted 
permanently.  The PCAOB adopted its first new auditing standard in December 2003.189 
Currently, the primary SAS applicable to the detection of fraud during the 
conduct of an audit is SAS No. 99, “Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement 
Audit.”  This standard was approved by the AICPA in October 2002, and it is effective 
for audits of financial statements for periods beginning on or after December 15, 2002.190 
SAS No. 99, which has been adopted on an interim basis by the PCAOB, replaced SAS 
No. 82, which carried the same title.191 
SAS No. 82, adopted in February 1997, was inadequate.  An audit conducted 
pursuant to this standard was not a ‘fraud audit’ or a detailed forensic-style examination 
 
188 See PCAOB Release No. 2003-006 -- Establishment of Interim Professional Auditing Standards, Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board, Apr. 18, 2003.  Available at 
http://www.pcobus.org/rules/Release2003-006.pdf. See also Kris Frieswick, How Audits Must Change,
CFO Magazine, July 1, 2003 (AICPA holds the copyright for all of the auditing standards it has drafted 
since it began issuing them 60-plus years ago, so until the PCAOB writes its own standards, it must use the 
ones that AICPA wrote, possibly at cost).  Available at http://www.cfo.com. Cf. Cunningham, supra note 
185, at 293 (AICPA work retains copyright, subject to some qualifications). 
 
189 See Press Release -- Board Adopts First Auditing Standard, Technical Amendments, Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board, Dec. 17, 2003.  Available at http://www.pcaob.org/pcaob_news_12-17-
03.asp. Meanwhile, the ASB continues to set auditing standards for non-public companies. 
 
190 Stephen Taub, AICPA Unveils Anti-Fraud Standard, CFO Magazine, Oct. 16, 2002.  Available at 
http://www.cfo.com.
191 Earlier, SAS No. 82 had replaced SAS No. 53, “The Auditor’s Responsibility for the Detection of 
Errors and Irregularities.”  SAS No. 53, adopted by the AICPA in April 1988, required the auditor to design 
the audit to provide reasonable assurances of detecting material errors and irregularities.  This standard had 
little effect on audit planning and testing, and it received limited acceptance from public users, the SEC, 
and the courts.  The Accounting Profession, supra note 21, at 64.  The original standard, SAS No. 16 
(“Errors or Irregularities”) was issued by the AICPA in 1977.  Jeanne Calderon & Rachel Kowal, Auditors 
Whistle an Unhappy Tune, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 419, 434 (1998). 
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of evidence.192 SAS No. 82 also maintained the AICPA’s position that an auditor had no 
obligation to disclose the existence of fraud to third parties, once discovered.193 One 
study concluded that while the stated purpose of SAS No. 82 was to clarify auditors’ 
responsibilities to detect fraud, the AICPA’s actual intent was to lower public 
expectations concerning such obligations.194 A separate study conducted by the 
PCAOB’s predecessor -- the POB ---concluded that SAS No. 82 failed to effectively 
deter fraud or significantly increase the likelihood that the auditor would detect material 
fraud, primarily because the standard failed to direct auditing procedures toward fraud 
detection.195 
SAS No. 99 superseded SAS No. 82 in October 2002, in the wake of Enron and 
other accounting scandals, but once again it did not alter the auditor’s minimal 
responsibility to detect fraud.  SAS No. 99 focused more on risk assessment than on 
forensic procedures.196 It retained the mantra that the auditor’s responsibility is merely to 
plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance as to whether the financial 
statements are free of material misstatements.197 
192 Public Oversight Board, supra note 162, at 76. 
 
193 Calderon & Kowal, supra note 191, at 437. 
 
194 See McEnroe & Pitman, supra note 184, at 39. 
 
195 Public Oversight Board, supra note 162, at 86.  See also John H. Eickemeyer, Audit Issues in 
Litigation, SH057 ALI-ABA 87, 104 (2003) (SAS No. 82 provides little specific guidance for auditors in 
detecting fraud and imposes no requirement that auditors attempt such detection); Stephen T. Jakubowski, 
et al., SAS 82’s Effects on Fraud Discovery, CPA J., Feb. 2002 (SAS 82 has not led to increase in discovery 
of fraudulent financial reporting) (available at http://www.cpajournal.com.
196 Frieswick, supra note 188. 
 
197 See The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 -- Understanding the Independent Auditor’s Role in Building 
Public Trust, PricewaterhouseCoopers 22-23 (2003).  Available at 
http://pwcglobal.com/Extweb/NewCoAtWork.nsf. Accord Daniel D. Montgomery, Mark S. Beasley, 
Susan L. Menelaides & Zoe-Vonna Palmrose, Auditors’ New Procedures for Detecting Fraud, J. ACCT. 63, 
63 (May 2002) (successor to SAS No. 82 does not change auditor’s responsibilities for fraud detection in a 
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Given that GAAS historically has not been concerned with fraud detection, it is 
not surprising that auditors uncover only a small amount of the corporate fraud that takes 
place in the United States.  The cost of such fraud is estimated at $600 billion annually in 
this country,198 but only a fraction of this huge sum is uncovered by auditors.  A study by 
the Association of Fraud Examiners found that external auditors detect only 11.5 percent 
of all corporate fraud.  A higher percentage is discovered by accident.199 Of course, some 
fraud will be virtually impossible to detect.200 But much of the remainder likely goes 
undetected at least in part because audits are not designed under GAAS to find fraud.   
Numerous other indicia of audit failure in the United States are available.  One is 
the extraordinary number of restatements of financial statements that have occurred in 
recent years.  Restatements are significant, because they can be considered as a “proxy 
for fraud”201 that was not uncovered in an initial audit.  A 2005 study by the Huron 
 
financial statement audit); Joseph T. Wells, New Approaches to Fraud Deterrence, J. ACCT. 72, 74 (Feb. 
2004) (auditors have historically attempted to avoid responsibility for fraud detection).   
 
198 2002 Report to the Nation: Occupational Fraud and Abuse, Association of Certified Fraud Examiners 
11 (2002). 
 
199 Id. (18.8% of fraud is discovered by accident).  See also Stephen Taub, Corporate Crime Increases,
CFO Magazine, Nov. 30, 2005 (2005 survey by PricewaterhouseCoopers of 3,634 companies in 34 
countries finds that 34% of corporate fraud is discovered by accident, making chance the most common 
fraud detection tool) (available at http://www.cfo.com); Lessons Learned from Enron’s Collapse -- 
Auditing the Accounting Industry: Hearings Before House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 
78, 156 (2002) (statement of James S. Chanos) (no major financial fraud in the United States in the last ten 
years was uncovered by an outside accounting firm); Howard R. Davia, Patrick C. Coggins, John C. 
Wideman & Joseph T. Kastantin, ACCOUNTANT’S GUIDE TO FRAUD DETECTION AND CONTROL 37 (2d. ed. 
2000) (auditors uncover 20 percent of fraud in the United States).  The SEC’s track record is no better.  The 
SEC failed to spot almost every major financial scandal in recent years.  Mark Maremont & Deborah 
Solomon, Missed Chances: Behind SEC’s Failings: Caution, Tight Budget, ‘90s Exuberance, Wall St. J., 
Dec. 24, 2003, at A1. 
 
200 See, e.g., Lance Levine, Compliance with GAAP and GAAS: Its Proper Use as an Accountant’s Defense 
in a Rule 10b-5 Suit, 1993 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 109, 125 (1993) (“It is clear that management, in most 
cases, will be perfectly capable of disguising a fraudulent scheme from its auditors if it wishes.”). 
 
201 Coffee, supra note 4, at 1407; Warren, supra note 13, at 886.  Not all restatements are attributable to 
fraud.  For example, by mid-2003, nine of the 288 U.S.-listed companies electing to expense stock options 
had decided to restate results to reflect that accounting change.  Jonathan Weil, Microsoft’s Reboot: 
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Consulting Group found that restatements of quarterly and annual statements reached a 
record high of 414 in 2004, a 28 percent increase from the 323 total restatements in 2003.  
The number of restatements involving annual, audited financials rose to a record high of 
253 in 2004.202 An earlier study by the United States General Accounting Office 
confirmed the soaring numbers.  According to the GAO study, the number of 
restatements due to accounting irregularities increased 145 percent from January 1997 to 
June 2002.  The number of restatements rose from 92 in 1997 to 225 in 2001.  The 
proportion of listed companies on the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock 
Exchange, and NASDAQ restating their financial reports tripled from less than 0.89 
percent in 1997 to about 2.5 percent in 2001.  From January 1997 to June 2002, about ten 
percent of all listed companies announced at least one restatement.  The restating 
companies lost about $100 billion in market capitalization.203 
Decision To Restate Earnings Is Unusual, Wall St. J., July 10, 2003, at C1.  Some restatements also result 
from new accounting methods required by the SEC.  See SEC Plans Initiative Tied To Restatements, Wall 
St. J., Dec. 5, 2003 (available at 2003 WL-WSJ 68130109); Michael Schroeder, SEC List of Accounting-
Fraud Probes Grows, Wall St. J., July 6, 2001, at C1 (study by Arthur Andersen finds that nine percent of 
restatements are explained by new accounting methods).  More generally, while an estimated 61% of the 98 
reported restatements of annual financial statements resulted in securities class action litigation in 2000, by 
2004 that figure had declined to an estimated 17%.  2004 PWC Study, supra note 19, at 11.  The 
occurrence of a restatement raises average settlement values 20 percent in securities fraud class actions, 
even in the absence of an auditor as a co-defendant.  Recent Trends, supra note 10, at 10.  See also John C. 
Coffee, Jr., Limited Options, LEGAL AFFAIRS 52, 52 (Nov./Dec. 2003) (in general, restatements are not 
mere technical accounting adjustments, as indicated by immediate market-adjusted average decline of ten 
percent in stock price of firms announcing restatements). 
 
202 Summary: 2004 Annual Review of Financial Reporting Matters, Huron Consulting Group (2005), 
available at http://www.huronconsultinggroup.com. See also Diya Gullapalli, Tracking the 
Numbers/Outside Audit: Too Err Is Human, to Restate Financials, Divine, Wall St. J., Jan. 20, 2005, at C3. 
 
203 Financial Statement Restatements: Trends, Market Impacts, Regulatory Responses, and Remaining 
Challenges -- Report to the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, U.S. General 
Accounting Office 4 (Oct. 2002) (GAO-03-138) (available at http://www.gao.gov).  While the loss in 
market capitalization is significant, it represents less than 0.2 percent of the total market capitalization of 
the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, and Nasdaq.  Rob Wells, Restatements of 
Profits Prove Costly to Investors, Wall St. J., Oct. 24, 2002, at D2.  See also Nanette Byrnes, Accounting in 
Crisis, BusinessWeek, Jan. 28, 2002, at 44 (during the period 1996-2001, investors lost close to $200 
billion in earnings restatements and lost market capitalization following audit failures); Coffee, supra note 
201, at 52-53 (the ten percent of all listed companies that restated earnings represents only the proverbial 
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The foregoing numbers are especially significant when placed in historical 
context.  Just three United States companies restated results in 1981.204 Another apt 
comparison is with the number of restatements in other countries.  Britain’s equivalent to 
the SEC -- the Financial Reporting Review Panel -- demanded that a mere 15 companies 
restate results during the 12 years prior to 2003.  Statistics for Europe as a whole are 
comparable to those for Britain.  (Of course, these numbers could represent nothing more 
than lax enforcement overseas.)205 
Improper revenue recognition was the leading cause of restatements during the 
period 2000-2004,206 consistent with the most common allegation in securities class 
action suits and the most common explanation for SEC enforcement actions.207 Some of 
the announced restatements have been extraordinarily large -- $9 billion for Fannie Mae, 
$6.4 billion for Xerox, $5 billion for Freddie Mac, $3.9 billion for AIG, at least $2.2 
billion for Qwest Communications, $2 billion for Tyco, and $1.6 billion for Rite-Aid.208 
tip of the iceberg, “signaling a far larger concentration of companies that manipulated their earnings and 
got away with it.”); and Coffee, supra note 14, at 282-85 (“During the 1990s, earnings restatements, long 
recognized as a proxy for fraud, suddenly soared. . . . [They] were increasingly issued by large, mature, 
publicly held firms, rather than by smaller, less experienced companies.”).  
 
204 Ianthe Jeanne Dugan, Depreciated: Did You Hear the One About the Accountant?  It’s Not Very Funny,
Wall St. J., March 14, 2002, at A1.  See also Benston, supra note 42, at 1339 n.56 (search of databases for 
mentions of restatements due to irregularities or errors finds 274 in 1977-1989 (17 a year on average), 392 
in 1990-1997 (49 a year), and 464 in 1998-2000 (155 a year)). 
 
205 See Floyd Norris, Corporate Rules in Europe Have Been Flexible, but Change Is Coming, N.Y. Times, 
Apr. 8, 2005, at C1; Ahold Out: The Ahold Scandal Shows That Europe Is Not Immune from America’s 
Corporate Ills, Economist, Feb. 27, 2003; and Holier Than Thou: European Sanctimony Over American 
Accounting Scandals Is Misplaced, Economist, Feb. 6, 2003 (available at http://www.economist.com).   
 
206 Stephen Taub, Record Number of Restatements in 2004, CFO Magazine, Jan. 21, 2005.  Available at 
http://www.cfo.com. See also Lynn Cowan, The Economy: More Large-Cap U.S. Companies Restate 
Results Than Small Fry, Wall St. J., Aug. 9, 2002, at A2.   
 
207 See n.14, supra.
208 Stephen Taub, AIG Finally Files 10-K, Restates, CFO Magazine, May 31, 2005 (available at 
http://www.cfo.com); Stephen Taub, Refunding Bonuses for Restated Earnings, CFO Magazine, Jan. 7, 
52
Another sign of widespread audit failure is the high percentage of corporations 
that file for bankruptcy subsequent to being audited and given a clean bill of health.    
Between January 1, 2001 and June 30, 2002, 307 publicly traded companies filed for 
Chapter 11 protection.  228 of these companies received an auditor’s report within 366 
days of filing for protection -- 85 percent of them from a Big Five accounting firm.  But 
only 57.9 percent of these 228 reports for soon-to-be bankrupt companies included 
“going-concern” warnings,209 which an auditor is required to provide under SAS No. 59 
if substantial doubt exists about an audit client’s ability to continue as a going concern 
and a disclaimer of opinion is not provided by the auditor.210 Likewise, a 2002 study by 
Bloomberg News found that in 54 percent of the 673 largest bankruptcies of public 
 
2005 (available at http://www.cfo.com); Shawn Young, Executives on Trial: Qwest Trial Shows That Rank 
Is No Protection, Wall St. J., Apr. 2, 2004, at C1; The Rest of the Fallen: Heads Rolled Over Bungled 
Launches, Loose Accounting, and Soured Deals, BusinessWeek, Jan. 12, 2004, at 78, 79; Craig Schneider, 
Xerox: New Lease on Life, CFO Magazine, Oct. 24, 2003 (available at http://www.cfo.com); Executives on 
Trial: Rite Aid Ex-Counsel Is Convicted, Wall St. J., Oct. 20, 2003, at C8; Marcelo Prince & Christine 
Nuzum, Qwest’s Long-Awaited Revision of Results Shows Wider Losses, Wall St. J., Oct. 17, 2003, at A8; 
and Executives on Trial: Scandal Scorecard, Wall St. J., Oct. 3, 2003, at B1.   
 
209 Martin D. Weiss, The Worsening Crisis of Confidence on Wall Street: The Role of Auditing Firms 7-8 
(July 5, 2002).  The same study (the Weiss Report), submitted to the United States Senate in connection 
with hearings on Sarbanes-Oxley, concluded that auditing firms gave a clean bill of health to 93.9 percent 
of public companies that were subsequently involved in accounting irregularities.  Id. at 4.   The Weiss 
Report, available at http://www.weissratings.com/worsening_crisis.pdf, has been criticized.   See Michael 
D. Akers, et al., Going-Concern Opinions: Broadening the Expectations Gap, CPA J., Oct. 2003  (“The 
flaws of the Weiss Report – inadequate sample selection; the use of criteria not proved to predict 
bankruptcy; and the lack of statistical support – suggest that the study cannot be relied upon as an indicator 
of the success or failure of auditing firms to predict the bankruptcy or the going concern status of a 
company.”)  Available at http://www.cpajournal.com. However, other studies have confirmed that auditing 
firms frequently fail to issue going concern opinions to firms that shortly thereafter file for bankruptcy.  See 
M. Geiger & K. Raghunandan, Going Concern Opinions in the “New” Legal Environment, 16 ACCT.
HORIZONS 17 (2002); K. Raghunandan & K. Rama, Audit Reports for Companies in Financial Distress 
Before and After SAS No. 59, 14 AUDITING: J. PRACTICE & THEORY 50 (1995).   
 
210 J.V. Carcello, D.R. Hermanson & T.L. Neal, Auditor Reporting Behavior When GAAS Lacks 
Specificity: The Case of SAS No. 59, 22 J. ACCT. & PUB. POLICY 63 (2003); Bruce K. Behn, Kurt Pany & 
Richard Riley, SAS No. 59: Going Concern Evidence, CPA J. (July 1999).  Available at 
http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/1999. SAS No. 59 was amended by SAS No. 96 in January 2002 
(effective for audits of financial statements for periods beginning on or after May 15, 2002), but the 
amendment did not alter the basic requirement.  See http://aicpa.org/members/div/auditstd/riasai/sas96.htm.
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companies since 1996, auditors provided no cautions in annual financial statements in the 
months before the bankruptcy filing.  Auditors issued warnings in only 14 of the 50 
largest bankruptcies.211 More recently, a 2004 report found that 40-50 percent of all 
companies filing for bankruptcy since the effective date of SAS 59 failed to receive a 
going-concern paragraph in the audit opinion on their last financial statements issued 
prior to filing for bankruptcy.212 
Still another measure of likely audit failure is provided by the limited reporting 
made by auditors under Section 10A of the Exchange Act.  The PSLRA added Section 
10A, which requires reporting to the SEC when, during the course of a financial audit, an 
auditor detects likely illegal acts that have a material impact on the financial statements 
and appropriate remedial action is not being taken by management or the board of 
directors.213 Section 10A first became effective for most companies for fiscal years 
beginning on or after January 1, 1996.  From the inception of the reporting requirement 
until May 15, 2003, a mere 29 Section 10A reports had been submitted to the SEC -- an 
average of fewer than four per year.214 This is a remarkably low number, given the 
 
211 Stephen Taub, Teetering on the Brink -- But No Audit Warning, CFO Magazine, Apr. 25, 2002. 
Available at http://www.cfo.com.
212 Elizabeth K. Venuti, The Going-Concern Assumption Revisited: Assessing A Company’s Future 
Viability, CPA J., May 2004 (arguing that one effect of PSLRA was to tip scales in favor of not issuing a 
going-concern opinion, because PSLRA protects auditors from lawsuits, whereas issuance of going –
concern opinion could hasten demise of client and result in loss of audit fees).  Available at 
http://www.nysscpa.org.
213 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1.  See generally Daniel J. Kramer & James McBride, Section 10A of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934: Auditors’ Duty to Detect and Disclose Fraud Under the Federal Securities Laws,
1309 PLI/Corp 307 (May – June 2002); Jamie A. Barber, Note, Congressional Oversight: Interpreting the 
Phrase “Financial Statements” Within Section 10A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 31 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 849 (2003). 
 
214 Securities Exchange Act: Review of Reporting Under Section 10A, Report by U.S. General Accounting 
Office to House Comm. on Energy and Commerce 5 (Sept. 3, 2003) (GAO-03-982R) (hereafter Section 
10A).  Available at http://www.gao.gov. See also John Connor, Auditors File 29 Cases of Likely Illegal 
Activity, Wall St. J., Oct. 7, 2003, at A14.  By comparison, during the same time period (1996-2003), the 
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18,000 or so financial statement audits that take place annually in the United States and 
the high tide of accounting scandals that swept over corporate America beginning in the 
late 1990s.215 
Yet another indication is that material weakness reports have sharply increased in 
the Sarbanes-Oxley environment.  Section 404 of the the Act, which requires an 
independent auditor to attest to a company’s internal controls, became effective for many 
public companies beginning with their first fiscal year ending after November 15, 2004.  
Materal weakness reports skyrocketed in 2005, compared with 2004, in the aftermath of 
Section 404’s implementation.  It is more likely that this upturn represents more stringent 
scrutiny by auditors, post-Section 404, than it does an actual increase in deficiencies.216 
The foregoing evidence collectively suggests widespread historical audit failure in 
the United States.217 While the list of explanations for audit failure is long, a significant 
part of the problem lies with GAAS itself.  As indicated above, GAAS does not require 
auditors to look for fraud.  Auditors are not required to conduct forensic audits, which are 
 
SEC filed seven actions against auditors for alleged violations of Section 10A for failing to file the required 
reports.  Six of the cases had settled by September 2003, with the majority of auditors agreeing to 
suspensions from practice before the SEC for periods ranging from one to ten years.  Section 10A, at 1-2.   
The task of the SEC is made easier in these cases by the absence of a scienter requirement in Section 10A.  
SEC v. Solucorp Indus., Ltd., 197 F. Supp. 2d 4, 10-111 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).     
 
215 But see Thomas L. Riesenberg, Trying To Hear the Whistle Blowing: The Widely Misunderstood 
“Illegal Act” Reporting Requirements of Exchange Act Section 10A, 56 BUS. LAW. 1417, 1458 (2001) 
(10A reports should be rare, because few boards of directors will refuse to respond to findings of fraud 
presented by external auditors).  Cf. PWC 2004 Study, supra note 19, at 10 (predicting significant increase 
in Section 10A matters, from 2005 onward). 
 
216 Helen Shaw, Material-Weakness Reports Skyrocket, CFO Magazine, July 18, 2005.  Available at 
http://www.cfo.com.
217 See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, Choosing Gatekeepers: The Financial Statement Insurance 
Alternative to Auditor Liability, 52 UCLA L. REV. 413, 419 (2004) (late 1990s and early 2000s saw 
numerous and sizable audit failures).  But see Stephen Barr, Breaking Up the Big 5, CFO Magazine, May 1, 
2000 (only 1 in 10,000 audits is deemed substandard by regulators, and only three-tenths of one percent of 
all audits result in a legal claim).  Available at http://www.cfo.com.
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designed to uncover fraudulent conduct.  In 2000, PCAOB’s predecessor -- the POB -- 
issued a comprehensive report recommending that auditors use forensic techniques in 
every audit.218 While SAS No. 99, adopted in 2002, does not mandate the use of such 
techniques, the Big Four and other firms were aggressively expanding their forensic 
accounting practices in 2004.219 No doubt the auditing industry has determined that this 
can be a lucrative practice area.  Fees for outside auditors tripled in 2003 for companies 
with at least $3 billion in sales -- in part because forensic techniques are time-consuming 
and expensive.  In 2004, audit fees paid to Big Four firms more than doubled.220 But 
forensic auditing remains the clear exception, even after Sarbanes-Oxley and the SEC 
rules adopted in its aftermath.  Moreover, the adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley has caused 
 
218 Public Oversight Board, supra note 162, at 88. 
 
219 Diya Gullapalli, Andersen Survivors Aim to Benefit From Scandals, Wall St. J., Sept. 14, 2004, at C1.  
See also Vinita Ramaswamy, Corporate Governance and the Forensic Accountant, CPA J., March 2005 
(available at http://www.nysscpa.org).  
 
220 Stephen Taub, Audit Fees Double Due to Sarbox, CFO Magazine, Feb. 11, 2005 (available at 
http://www.cfo.com); Jill M. D’Aquila, Tallying the Cost of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, CPA J., Nov. 2004 
(available at http://www.nysscpa.org).  Some of this audit fee increase is attributable to compliance with 
Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley.  Section 404 requires that management assess the effectiveness of a 
company’s internal control over financial reporting and that external auditors attest to, and report on, that 
assessment.  The number of controls that major companies must test and document can run into the tens of 
thousands.  404 Tonnes of Paper, Economist, Dec. 16, 2004 (available at http://www.economist.com).  
Section 404’s reporting requirements became applicable to large public companies in the 2004 audit cycle, 
and companies representing over 95% of total U.S. market capitalization are now obligated to comply with 
the requirements.  Section 404 helps explain the recent increase in audit fees.  According to one study, the 
net private costs associated with Section 404 compliance are $1.4 trillion.  See Sarbanes-Oxley: A Price 
Worth Paying?, Economist, May 19, 2005 (available at http://www.economist.com).  See also Stephen 
Taub, 404 Costs to Drop, Big Four Maintain, CFO Magazine, Dec. 9, 2005 (study of 96 members of 
Fortune 1,000 finds that audit fees account for just one-fourth of total Section 404 costs for larger 
companies and about one-third of 404 costs for smaller companies) (available at http://www.cfo.com); 
Donna Fuscaldo, For Tech Firms, Sarbanes-Oxley Provides Revenue Opportunities, Wall St. J., Dec. 1, 
2004 (public companies expected to spend $5.5 billion in 2004 and $5.8 billion in 2005 to become 
Sarbanes-Oxley compliant, but only a portion of these sums are attributable to audit fees).  Companies 
disclosing control weaknesses are fairly likely to change auditors.  A 2005 survey found that 44% of 329 
companies disclosing control weaknesses changed auditors.  Stephen Taub, Auditor Changes Accompany 
Controls Woes, CFO Magazine, May 24, 2005 (available at http://www.cfo.com).   
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some accounting firms to sell their forensic accounting practices, in order to avoid 
potential conflicts of interest.221 
Another obstacle to success is that most of the forensic auditing that does occur is 
targeted at the employee level, thereby ignoring the much more significant fraud 
undertaken by senior members of management.222 A study of 276 corporate frauds 
perpetrated during the period 1987-1999 found that the company’s chief executive officer 
was involved approximately 70 percent of the time.223 Similarly, the SEC has reported 
that the majority of enforcement actions it brought during the period 1997-2002 regarding 
fraudulent financial reporting stemmed from misconduct by top-level executives.  157 of 
the 227 enforcement actions brought by the SEC during this time period involved charges 
against at least one senior manager.  Charges were brought against 75 Chairmen of the 
Board, 111 Chief Executive Officers, 111 Presidents, 115 Chief Financial Officers, 21 
Chief Operating Officers, 16 Chief Accounting Officers, and 27 Vice Presidents of 
Finance.224 Forensic auditing techniques currently employed by the Big Four firms are 
not generally geared toward uncovering such high-level fraud,225 and thus it usually 
escapes undetected. 
 
221 Marie Beaudette, Some Firms Profit by Sarbanes-Oxley, Wall St. J., Nov. 10, 2004, at B12C. 
 
222 Frieswick, supra note 188. 
 
223 Ken Brown, Auditors’ Methods Make it Hard To Catch Fraud by Executives, Wall St. J., July 8, 2002, 
at C1.  See also David M. Brodsky, The Role of Forensic Accounting in Identifying and Reacting to 
Allegations of Financial Fraud and Employee Misconduct, 1491 PLI/Corp 39, 44 (Feb. 2005) (90% of 
financial reporting frauds are committed at the senior executive level). 
 
224 Section 704 Report, supra note 14, at 32.  See also Michael Schroeder, Jerry Guidera & Mark 
Maremont, Accounting Crackdown Focuses Increasingly on Top Executives, Wall St. J., Apr. 4, 2002, at 
A1. 
 
225 See Charles P. Cullinan & Steve G. Sutton, Defrauding the Public Interest: A Critical Examination of 
Reengineered Audit Processes and the Likelihood of Detecting Fraud, 13 CRIT. PERSPEC. ACCT. 297 
(2002).  See also Judith Burns, Corporate Governance (A Special Report), Wall St. J., June 21, 2004, at R8 
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IV. 
THE SCIENTER STANDARD: THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
 
Almost 90 percent of the securities class action suits filed in 2004 involved claims 
made under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act).226 In 
1976, the United States Supreme Court held in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder that merely 
negligent misstatements will not establish liability under Section 10(b).  Rather, plaintiffs 
are required to establish that defendants acted with scienter, defined by the Court as 
misconduct that is “knowing or intentional.”227 The Court did not foreclose the 
possibility that “recklessness” would satisfy the scienter requirement,228 and every federal 
court of appeals to later consider the issue has held that recklessness does suffice.229 
However, even prior to the enactment of the PSLRA the courts disagreed about what was 
required to plead recklessness.230 
(statement of former SEC Chairman Richard Breeden that post-Sarbanes-Oxley, “the area that is most 
broken is the audit profession, in its ability to detect fraud and abuse”).  
 
226 2004: A Year in Review, supra note 9, at 16.  Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and companion SEC 
Rule 10b-5 make it illegal to commit a manipulative or deceptive act in connection with the purchase or 
sale of securities.   Section 10(b) states, in relevant part: “It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or 
indirectly . . . (b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the 
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of 
investors.”  15 U.S.C. § 78(b).  SEC Rule 10b-5 is similar.  See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2003).   The 
elements of a Rule 10b-5 claim are: (1) a misrepresentation or omission of a material fact, (2) scienter, (3) 
causation, (4) reliance, and (5) damages.  The causation element requires a showing of both actual cause 
and proximate cause.    See, e.g., In re Daou Systems, Inc. Sec. Litig., 397 F.3d 704, 710 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 
227 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976). 
 
228 Id. at 193 n.12. 
 
229 Ottman v. Hanger Orthopedic Group, Inc., 353 F.3d 338, 343-44 (4th Cir. 2003); Joseph Grundfest & 
A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design 
and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627, 651 (2002); and Bruce Cannon Gibney, Comment, The End of 
the Unbearable Lightness of Pleading: Scienter After Silicon Graphics, 48 UCLA L. REV. 973, 1001-02 
(2001).   
 
230 Matthew Roskoski, Note, A Case-by-Case Approach to Pleading Scienter Under the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2265, 2267 (1999); Michael B. Dunn, Note, Pleading 
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The debate intensified after the PSLRA became law in 1995.  That statute requires 
that private plaintiffs, in addition to satisfying the specificity requirements of Rule 9(b) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong 
inference that the defendant acted with the requisite state of mind.”231 Subsequent to the 
enactment of the PSLRA, federal courts of appeal in ten different circuits issued opinions 
interpreting the “strong inference” standard.  These opinions conflict, primarily as to 
whether allegations of motive and opportunity to commit fraud satisfy the PSLRA’s 
pleading requirement for scienter.232 The circuit split emerged in large measure because 
the legislative history of the PSLRA provides little concrete guidance concerning the 
appropriate interpretation.233 
The appellate opinions are frequently divided into three camps for analysis: (1) 
Second and Third Circuits; (2) Ninth Circuit; and (3) First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, 
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits.  The Seventh and D.C. Circuits had not issued controlling 
opinions by December 2005, but several district courts in those circuits have addressed 
the scienter standard since the PSLRA was enacted.  The next section of this Article 
 
Scienter After the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: Or, A Textualist Revenge, 84 CORNELL L. REV.
193, 199 (1998). 
 
231 15 U.S.C. § 78(u)-4(b)(2) (2000). 
 
232 Gregory A. Markel, Pleading Scienter Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,
1396 PLI/Corp 1339, 1342-43 (Nov. 2003). 
 
233 See Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note 229, at 665-66 (“The authors find it difficult to draw any 
conclusion from the mélange of legislative history about Congress’ intent in adopting the ‘strong inference’ 
pleading standard. . . . We suggest that Congress was content to enact an ambiguous statute.”)  Accord 
Chuan Li, Note, Gauging the Hurdle to Strike Suits: Reconciling the Circuit Split Over the Proper 
Interpretation of the Heightened Pleading Standard Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 26 
J. CORP. LAW 435, 439 (2001) (“[T]he legislative history is confusing and has not been helpful. . . .”).  But 
see Michael R. Dube, Note, Motive and Opportunity Test Survives Congressional Death Knell in Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act, 42 B.C. L. REV. 619, 642-43 (2001) (“[I]t is difficult to view the 
legislative history of the PSLRA as anything other than Congressional rejection of the motive and 
opportunity test.”) 
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briefly examines key appellate decisions from the three camps, as well as district court 
opinions from the undecided circuits. 
A.  Second and Third Circuits 
 The Second Circuit test arguably has had three different post-PSLRA 
manifestations.234 These manifestations have been the product of different Second 
Circuit panels, which issued a series of conflicting opinions during the period 1999 – 
2001.  The series of cases included Press v. Chemical Investment Services Corp. (PSLRA 
was a codification of the Second Circuit’s own pre-Act jurisprudence, and scienter could 
be pled by showing either motive and opportunity to commit fraud, or strong 
circumstantial evidence denoting recklessness or conscious misbehavior);235 Novak v. 
Kasaks (courts are not wedded to the motive and opportunity test, and plaintiffs are 
required to plead conscious recklessness or actual intent);236 Rothman v. Gregor237 and 
Ganino v. Citizens Utilities Co.238 (both retreating from Novak); and Kalnit v. Eichler 
(making strict application of motive and opportunity test).239 Overall, for a period of time 
there was a material disagreement within the Second Circuit concerning the proper 
interpretation of that Circuit’s own standard.240 Now, however, Second Circuit courts 
generally agree that plaintiffs must allege facts showing (a) both motive and opportunity, 
 
234 Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note 229, at 653-54. 
 
235 166 F.3d 529, 538 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 
236 216 F.3d 300, 309-12 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 
237 220 F.3d 81, 90 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 
238 228 F.3d 154, 168-70 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 
239 264 F.3d 131, 139-41 (2d Cir. 2001).   
 
240 Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note 229, at 673. 
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or (b) strong circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness.241 This is 
the most pro-plaintiff standard in the country,242 and the Third Circuit is in accord.243 
B.  Ninth Circuit – At The Edge 
 The Ninth Circuit has made the strictest interpretation of the scienter pleading 
standard.  The leading case is In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Securities Litigation,244 which 
held that plaintiffs must plead, at a minimum, “particular facts giving rise to a strong 
inference of deliberate or conscious recklessness.”245 While adopting what has been 
described as a “super-recklessness” standard,246 the Ninth Circuit rejected the Second 
Circuit focus on pleading motive and opportunity.247 Despite criticism that its standard 
 
241 See, e.g., Rombach v. Chang, 355 F.3d 164, 176 (2d Cir. 2004); In re BISYS Sec. Litig., 2005 WL 
2844792, *6 (S.D.N.Y., Oct. 28, 2005); In re Geopharma, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2005 WL 2431518, *5 
(S.D.N.Y., Sept. 30, 2005).  See also In re Worldcom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2003 WL 21219049, *16 (S.D.N.Y., 
May 19, 2003) (noting Second Circuit retreat from Novak). 
 
242 Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note 229, at 674.  See also Ryan G. Miest, Note, Would the Real Scienter 
Please Stand Up: The Effect of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 on Pleading Securities 
Fraud, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1103, 1135 (1998) (“[E]mploying the motive and opportunity test fails to further 
the PSLRA’s interest in reducing abusive securities litigation. . . .”). 
 
243 The leading Third Circuit case is In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525 (3d Cir. 1999), which 
held that plaintiffs may plead scienter by alleging facts establishing motive and opportunity to commit 
fraud, or by setting forth facts that constitute circumstantial evidence of either reckless or conscious 
behavior.  In addition, all allegations must be supported by particular facts and such allegations must give 
rise to a strong inference of scienter.  Id. at 534-35.  Accord Klein v. Autek Corp., 2005 WL 2106622, *5 
(3d Cir. Sept. 1, 2005); In re: Alpharma Inc. Sec. Litig., 372 F.3d 137, 148 (3d Cir. 2004).  See also James 
V. Fazio, The Motive and Opportunity Test for Pleading Scienter Under the Federal Securities Laws: 
Where Is it Now?, 50 FED. LAW. 51, 52 (May 2003) (“In short, the Second and Third Circuits appear to be 
the only two circuits in which allegations of motive and opportunity may be sufficient in themselves to 
show scienter.”). 
 
244 183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 
245 Id. at 979.  Accord Gompper v. VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 895 (9th Cir. 2002); DSAM Global Value 
Fund v. Altris Software, Inc., 288 F.3d 385, 388-89 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 
246 Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1284 n.21 (11th Cir. 1999).  See Joseph T. Phillips,
Comment, A New Pleading Standard Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act?, 69 U. CINN. L. 
REV. 969, 988 (2001). 
 
247 183 F.3d at 979.  See Brent Wilson, Comment, Pleading Versus Proving Scienter Under the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 in the Ninth Circuit After In re Silicon Graphics and Howard v. 
Everex: Meet the Pleading Standard and the Fat Lady Has Already Sung, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 321, 
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is too restrictive,248 the Ninth Circuit has not retreated.  Cases decided in 2005 continued 
to adhere to Silicon Graphics.249 
C.  The Intermediate Standard 
 If the Second and Third Circuits, on the one hand, and the Ninth Circuit, on the 
other hand, represent the respective endpoints of the scienter pleading spectrum, then the 
broad center is occupied by seven of the remaining Circuits.   The center is not 
monolithic, but the fundamental perspective is the same -- merely pleading motive and 
opportunity generally will not suffice to demonstrate scienter, and facts sufficient to 
support a strong inference of recklessness are necessary.  The First,250 Fourth,251 Fifth,252 
Sixth,253 Eighth,254 Tenth,255 and Eleventh256 Circuits all have adopted the centrist view.    
 
365 (2002) and Dube, supra note 225, at 645 (“Only the Ninth Circuit interpreted the PSLRA as an outright 
rejection of the motive and opportunity test.”).  But see Ann Morales Olazabel, The Search for “Middle 
Ground”: Towards a Harmonized Interpretation of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act’s New 
Pleading Standard, 6 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 153, 173 (2001) (“Nothing in the opinion expressly rejects 
the consideration of motive and opportunity allegations. . . .”). 
 
248 See, e.g., Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1284 n.21 (11th Cir. 1999) (“To the extent that 
the effort in Silicon Graphics is an attempt to import into the law a new and uncertain super-recklessness, . . 
. we believe that the attempt is inconsistent with the plain statutory language.  Further, we doubt that the 
attempt would be worth the additional uncertainty that would be introduced.”). 
 
249 See, e.g., In re Saxton, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2005 WL 3271342, *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 2, 2005); Livid Holdings 
Ltd. v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 403 F.3d 1050, 1057 (9th Cir. 2005); and In re Daou Systems, Inc. Sec. 
Litig., 397 F.3d 704, 711, 718 (9th Cir. 2005).  The Ninth Circuit scienter standard has received some 
academic support.  See, e.g., Aron Hansen, Comment, The Aftermath of Silicon Graphics: Pleading 
Scienter in Securities Fraud Litigation, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 769, 808 (2001) (“[T]he Ninth Circuit’s 
deliberate recklessness standard is supported by case law, legislative history, and public policy 
considerations.”); Marilyn F. Johnson, Karen K. Nelson & A.C. Pritchard, In re Silicon Graphics Inc.: 
Shareholder Wealth Effects Resulting From the Interpretation of the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act’s Pleading Standard, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 773 (2000) (arguing that the Silicon Graphics interpretation 
of scienter enhances shareholder wealth). 
 
250 See In re Cabletron Systems, Inc. 311 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2002) (showing motive and opportunity does not 
suffice, but pleading combination of facts and circumstances indicating fraudulent intent does suffice); 
Aldridge v. A.T. Cross Corp., 284 F.3d 72 (1st Cir. 2002); Geffon v. Micron Corp., 249 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 
2001); and Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 
251 See Ottman v. Hanger Orthopedic Group, Inc., 353 F.3d 338, 345-46 (4th Cir. 2003) (courts should not 
restrict their scienter inquiry by focusing on specific categories of facts, such as those relating to motive 
and opportunity, but instead should examine all of the allegations in a case to determine whether they 
collectively establish a strong inference of scienter).  The Fourth Circuit had ducked prior opportunities in 
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D.  The Undecided Circuits 
 The Seventh and D.C. Circuits both failed to issue opinions on the scienter issue 
by December 2005.  While the Seventh Circuit has not yet staked out a position, a 
number of district courts in the Circuit -- primarily in the Northern District of Illinois -- 
have chosen to apply the Second Circuit standard.  These courts sometimes assert that 
while they are adopting the Second Circuit standard, they are not bound by that Circuit’s 
 
2003 and 1999 to select a test, concluding on both occasions that even under the relatively lenient Second 
Circuit standard, plaintiffs’ allegations failed to meet the PSLRA requirements.  See Svezzese v. Duratek, 
Inc., 2003 WL 21357313, *4 (4th Cir., June 12, 2003) (per curiam) and Phillips v. LCI, Int’l, Inc., 190 F.3d 
609, 621 (4th Cir. 1999).   
 
252 See Goldstein v. MCI WorldCom, 2003 WL 21738963, *6 (5th Cir., July 28, 2003) (“[A]llegations of 
motive and opportunity, without more, will not fulfill the pleading requirements of the PSLRA.”) 
(emphasis in original); Nathenson v. Zonagen Inc., 267 F.3d 400 (5th Cir. 2001).  Accord Abrams v. Baker 
Hughes, Inc., 292 F.3d 424, 430 (5th Cir. 2002) (“Allegations of motive and opportunity, standing alone, 
are no longer sufficient to plead a strong inference of scienter, although appropriate allegations of motive 
and opportunity may enhance other allegations of scienter.”). 
 
253 See In re Ford Motor Co. Sec. Litig., 2004 WL 1873808, *2 (6th Cir., Aug. 23, 2004); Helwig v. 
Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 550 (6th Cir. 2001) (while motive and opportunity are not substitutes for a 
showing of recklessness, “they can be catalysts to fraud and thus serve as external markers to the required 
state of mind.”); In re: Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 549 (6th Cir. 1999).   
 
254 See In re: Navarre Corp. Sec. Litig., 299 F.3d 735, 745 (8th Cir. 2002) (scienter standard is “not satisfied 
by any one particular method, such as the motive-and-opportunity formulation adopted by the Second 
Circuit. . . but rather through various criteria developed throughout the circuits that look for badges of 
fraud.”); Florida State Board of Administration v. Green Tree Financial Corp., 270 F.3d 645, 660 (8th Cir. 
2001) (allegations of motive and opportunity are relevant, but when they are missing, other allegations 
tending to show scienter would have to be particularly strong).  Accord Kushner v. Beverly Enterprises, 
Inc., 317 F.3d 820, 827 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 
255 See Caprin v. Simon Transp. Services, Inc., 2004 WL 326995, *8 (10th Cir., Feb. 23, 2004); City of 
Philadelphia v. Fleming Cos., 264 F.3d 1245, 1261-62 (10th Cir. 2001) (courts must look to the totality of 
the pleadings to determine whether the plaintiffs’ allegations permit a strong inference of fraudulent intent, 
and while allegations of motive and opportunity may be important to that totality, typically they are not 
sufficient in themselves to establish a strong inference of scienter).   See generally Charles F. Hart, 
Interpreting the Heightened Pleading of the Scienter Requirement in Private Securities Fraud Litigation: 
The Tenth Circuit Takes the Middle Ground, 80 DENV. U. L. REV. 577 (2003). 
 
256 See Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 1999).   The Tenth Circuit noted in City of 
Philadelphia that Bryant is internally inconsistent.  264 F.3d at 1261 n.19.  On the one hand, Bryant 
concluded that the PSLRA did not codify the motive and opportunity analysis.  On the other hand, Bryant 
asserted that such allegations may be relevant to a showing of severe recklessness, but without more are 
insufficient to demonstrate scienter.  187 F.3d at 1285-86.  The Bryant analysis, which relies heavily on the 
Sixth Circuit discussion in Comshare, was later criticized by the Sixth Circuit.  See Helwig v. Vencor, Inc. 
251 F.3d 540, 550 (6th Cir. 2001) (Eleventh Circuit reading of Comshare is unduly rigid).    
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specific interpretations.257 The D.C. Circuit also has been silent.  One district court case 
from 2000 cited Bryant, Comshare, Advanta, and Silicon Graphics, but did not choose 
between them.258 The opinion rejected the idea that general allegations of motive 
suffice.259 Subsequent opinions, in 2004 and 2005, also failed to select a standard.260 
E.  Observations About The Circuit Split 
 A number of summary observations may be made about the circuit split described 
above.  First, it is even more profound than suggested by the different formulations 
adopted by the courts of appeal.  The split is “compounded by evidence of inconsistent 
interpretations among panels within the same circuit [and] inconsistent applications of a 
common standard to a common set of facts. . . .”261 The situation is no less chaotic at the 
district court level.  A study of 167 district court rulings addressing the PSLRA’s “strong 
inference” standard, published in 2002 by law professors Joseph Grundfest and A.C. 
Pritchard, found “aggregate patterns of behavior that are, to a remarkable degree, 
statistically indistinguishable from a ‘coin-toss’ model of judicial behavior.”262 Second, 
 
257 See, e.g., Davis v. SPSS, Inc., 2005 WL 1126550, *12 (N.D. Ill., May 10, 2005); Lindelow v. Hill, 
2001 WL 830956, *6 (N.D. Ill., July 20, 2001) (“The overwhelming majority of courts, particularly in this 
District, have applied the Second Circuit’s formulation for alleging scienter.”).  But see Premier Capital 
Mgt., LLC v. Cohen, 2003 WL 21960357, *7 (N.D. Ill., Aug. 15, 2003) (agreeing with Eighth Circuit that 
“having the motive and opportunity to do wrong are certainly not the same as having the intent to do it”); 
Wafra Leasing Corp. 1999-A-1 v. Prime Capital Corp., 2002 WL 31664480, *8 (N.D. Ill., Nov. 26, 2002) 
(declining to adopt Second Circuit standard and holding that scienter can be established with evidence of 
motive and opportunity or with circumstantial evidence). 
 
258 See In re: Baan Co. Sec. Litig., 103 F. Supp.2d 1, 19-20  (D.D.C. 2000). 
 
259 Id. at 20. 
 
260 Burman v. Phoenix Worldwide Indus., Inc., 384 F. Supp.2d 316, 331-32 (D.D.C. 2005); In re Interbank 
Funding Corp. Sec. Litig., 329 F. Supp.2d 84, 90 (D.D.C. 2004); and In re U.S. Office Products Sec. Litig., 
2004 WL 1607694 (D.D.C., July 16, 2004). 
 
261 Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note 229, at 678. 
 
262 Id. 
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while the situation would appear ripe for Supreme Court review,263 such review, in 2005, 
is not imminent.  The plaintiffs’ bar has generally declined to file petitions for certiorari 
because it does not expect the Supreme Court, as currently configured, to adopt a pro-
plaintiff interpretation of the “strong inference” standard.264 A petition was filed in 
Novak, but it was denied in November 2000.265 
Third, the selection by a circuit of a particular interpretation of the scienter 
standard is not outcome-determinative.  Nationally, dismissal rates for federal securities 
class actions have almost doubled since the passage of the PSLRA.266 Dismissal rates 
vary substantially by circuit, but those circuits adopting stricter interpretations of the 
scienter standard do not invariably have higher dismissal rates.  District courts in the 
Second Circuit, which has the most lenient standard, dismissed within two years 25 
percent of cases filed between 1996 and 2002.  Ninth Circuit courts, which apply the 
strictest standard, also dismissed 25 percent.  Tenth Circuit courts, occupying the middle 
ground of the pleading spectrum, dismissed eight percent.267 The outcome is different at 
 
263 Id. at 676 (“Silicon Graphics presented a pure question of law with a clear circuit split, making it an 
ideal vehicle for Supreme Court review.”).  Accord Jonathan C. Dickey, Current Trends in Federal 
Securities Litigation, SK027 ALI-ABA 241, 246-47 (Aug. 2004) (Supreme Court has chosen not to resolve 
“clear conflict among the circuits”). 
 
264 Id. Accord Ray J. Grzebielski & Brian O. O’Mara, Whether Alleging “Motive and Opportunity” Can 
Satisfy the Heightened Pleading Standards of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Much 
Ado About Nothing, 1 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 313, 337 (2003) (concluding that a Supreme Court 
decision adopting the Silicon Graphics scienter standard would devastate the rights of shareholders and 
destroy the plaintiffs’ securities bar).  
 
265 Kasaks v. Novak, 531 U.S. 1012 (2000).  See Harold S. Bloomenthal, 2 Securities Law Handbook 1964 
(2002) (speculating that the petition may have been denied because the Supreme Court was preoccupied 
with the petition filed in the 2000 Bush-Gore presidential election). 
 
266 Elaine Buckberg, Todd Foster & Ronald I. Miller, Recent Trends in Shareholder Class Action 
Litigation: Are WorldCom and Enron the New Standard? (July 2005) at 3.  Available at 
http://www.nera.com.
267 Id. at 3.  The two highest dismissal rates for securities class actions are in the Fourth Circuit (44 
percent) and the Eighth Circuit (32 percent).  Id. But these rates are based on relatively few filings, so their 
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the appellate level.  The study by professors Grundfest and Pritchard of 33 post-PSLRA 
appellate court decisions reported that almost all plaintiff victories on appeal (nine of 
eleven) occurred in circuits applying the Second Circuit’s pro-plaintiff standard.268 
V.   
GROUP PLEADING – THE DISTRICT COURTS SPLIT 
 
The “group pleading” or “group-published” doctrine may be considered against 
the landscape of the foregoing circuit split.  Pursuant to this doctrine, a plaintiff in a 
securities fraud action treats individual defendants as part of a group for pleading 
purposes.  The identification of individual sources of allegedly fraudulent statements is 
unnecessary when group pleading is utilized.  Such statements in annual reports, 
prospectuses, registration statements, press releases, or other group-published 
information are attributable to a narrow range of individual defendants.269 Three key 
issues pertaining to group pleading are addressed in the next section of this Article.  Does 
the doctrine: (1) survive subsequent to the adoption of the PSLRA; (2) apply generally to 
the scienter of defendants; and (3) apply specifically to the conduct of auditors?  Each of 
the three issues has generated substantial disagreement. 
 
significance is debatable.  In 2004, the Ninth (64 filings), Second (45 filings), and Eleventh (20 filings) 
Circuits were the most active, in terms of traditional class action filings.  These rankings are consistent with 
historical rankings for the period 1996-2003.  2004: A Year in Review, supra note 9, at 13.  But cf. Michael 
A. Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 913, 942 (2003) 
(study of 1,449 securities class actions filed in federal court from January 1, 1996 through December 31, 
2001 finds strong correlation between adoption of stringent Silicon Graphics standard and significant 
decrease in securities litigation commenced in Ninth Circuit); Paul R. Bessette, et al., Accounting Fraud in 
2002 – Lessons Learned, 1386 PLI/Corp 153, 162 (Sept-Oct. 2003) (adoption of different pleading 
standards means that plaintiff’s decision where to file suit greatly affects whether the complaint will 
survive a motion to dismiss).   
 
268 Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note 2219 at 674.   
 
269 See, e.g., In re GlenFed Sec. Litig., 60 F.3d 591, 593 (9th Cir. 1995).   
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 The federal courts are sharply divided as to whether the group-published doctrine 
survives subsequent to the enactment of the PSLRA.  Dozens of federal district courts 
addressed this issue during the period 1997-2005, with a majority holding in favor of 
survival.  Prior to the passage of the PSLRA, the Second270 and Ninth271 Circuits were the 
only federal appellate courts to apply the doctrine.  Post-PSLRA, only one federal circuit 
court has expressly recognized group pleading in securities cases.  In Schwartz v. 
Celestial Seasonings, Inc.,272 decided in 1997, the Tenth Circuit recognized the viability 
of the doctrine, although it did not specifically address the issue of post-PSLRA survival.   
Since 1997, district courts in Colorado and Kansas have applied Celestial Seasonings on 
the assumption that the doctrine does survive in the Tenth Circuit.273 Only one other 
circuit court had addressed the issue by December 2005.   In 2004, the Fifth Circuit held 
that group pleading has not survived the PSLRA.274 
270 See Ouaknine v. MacFarlane, 897 F.2d 75, 80 (2d Cir. 1990); DiVittorio v. Equidyne Extractive Indus., 
Inc., 822 F.2d 1242, 1248-49 (2d Cir. 1987); and Luce v. Edelstein, 802 F.2d 49, 55 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 
271 See In re GlenFed Sec. Litig., 60 F.3d 591 (9th Cir. 1995) and Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 
F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1987).  
 
272 124 F.3d 1246, 1254 (10th Cir. 1997). 
 
273 See, e.g., In re Rhythms Sec. Litig., 2004 WL 180398, *3 (D. Colo., Jan. 29, 2004). 
 
274 See Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 363-65 (5th Cir. 2004).  Accord 
Barrie v. Intervoice-Brite, Inc., 409 F.3d 653, 655 (5th Cir. 2005).  The Fifth Circuit position is discussed in 
Jeremy T. Grabill, Recent Developments, Southland Securities Corp. v. INSpire Insurance Solutions: The 
Fifth Circuit Brusquely Rejects the Group Pleading Doctrine in Light of the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act, 79 TULANE L. REV. 1101 (2005).  The First Circuit ducked the issue in 2002, after noting the 
on-going “great debate.”  See In re: Cabletron Systems, Inc., 311 F.3d 11, 40 (1st Cir. 2002).  The Second 
ircuit assumed arguendo that the doctrine survived, in 2005.  See Yung v. Lee, 2005 WL 3453820, *4 (2d 
Cir. Dec. 15, 2005).  The Fourth Circuit ducked the issue in 2004.  See Dunn v. Borta, 369 F.3d 421, 434 
(4th Cir. 2004).  The Sixth Circuit ducked the issue in 2005.  See City of Monroe Employees Ret. System v. 
Bridgestone Corp., 2005 WL 264130, *31 (6th Cir., Feb. 4, 2005).  The Ninth Circuit apparently assumed 
the continued viability of the doctrine in Berry v. Valence Tech., Inc., 175 F.3d 699, 706 (9th Cir. 1999) and 
In re Stac Electronics Sec. Litig., 89 F.3d 1399, 1411 (9th Cir. 1996).  The Eleventh Circuit ducked the 
issue in 2004.  See Phillips v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 374 F.3d 1015, 1019 (11th Cir. 2004).     
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 District courts stating (usually in holdings but sometimes in dicta) that the 
doctrine does not survive the enactment of the PSLRA include courts in the Central275 
and Southern276 Districts of California; the District of Delaware;277 the Northern District 
of Georgia;278 the Northern District of Illinois;279 the Eastern District of Louisiana;280 the 
District of Maryland;281 the Eastern District of Michigan;282 the District of New Jersey;283 
the Middle284 and Western285 Districts of North Carolina; the Southern District of New 
York;286 the Eastern District of Pennsylvania;287 and the Western District of 
Washington.288 
District courts stating or assuming (usually in holdings but sometimes in dicta) 
that the doctrine does survive the enactment of the PSLRA include courts in the District 
 
275 In re Syncor Intl Corp. Sec. Litig., 327 F. Supp.2d 1149, 1171-72 (C.D. Cal. 2004). 
 
276 In re Ligand Pharm., Inc. Sec. Litig., 2005 WL 2461151, *15 (S.D. Cal., Sept. 27, 2005). 
 
277 In re Digital Island Sec. Litig., 223 F. Supp.2d 546, 553 (D. Del. 2002).   
 
278 In re Premiere Technologies, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2000 WL 33231639, *11 (N.D. Ga., Dec. 8, 2000). 
 
279 Johnson v. Tellabs, Inc., 2004 WL 324752, *9 (N.D. Ill., Feb. 19, 2004). 
 
280 Thompson v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 2000 WL 310382, *1 (E.D. La., March 24, 2000).  
 
281 In re Acterna Corp. Sec. Litig., 378 F. Supp.2d 561, 572-73 (D. Md. 2005). 
 
282 D.E. & J Limited Partnership v. Conaway, 2003 WL 22207640, *7 (E.D. Mich., Sept. 19, 2003). 
 
283 In re Cambrex Corp. Sec. Litig., 2005 WL 2840336, *15 (D.N.J., Oct. 27, 2005). 
 
284 In re Cree, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2004 WL 1950308, *9 (M.D.N.C., Aug. 27, 2004). 
 
285 In re First Union Corp. Sec. Litig., 128 F. Supp.2d 871, 888 (W.D.N.C. 2001). 
 
286 Endovasc Ltd. v. J.P. Turner & Co., LLC, 2004 WL 634171, *6 (S.D.N.Y., March 30, 2004). 
 
287 In re American Bus. Fin. Services, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2005 WL 1324880, *13 (E.D. Pa. June 2, 2005).  
 
288 South Ferry LP #2 v. Killinger, 2005 WL 3077222, *18 n.8 (W.D. Wash., Nov. 17, 2005). 
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of Arizona;289 the Central,290 Northern,291 and Southern292 Districts of California; the 
District of Colorado;293 the District of Columbia;294 the Middle295 and Southern296 
Districts of Florida; the Northern District of Georgia;297 the Northern District of 
Illinois;298 the Southern District of Iowa;299 the District of Kansas;300 the District of 
Massachusetts;301 the Western District of Michigan;302 the District of Minnesota;303 the 
Eastern District of Missouri;304 the District of Nevada;305 the Eastern306 and Southern307 
289 In re PETsMART Sec. Litig., 61 F. Supp.2d 982, 997 (D. Ariz. 1999). 
 
290 In re Real Estate Assocs. Ltd. Partnership Litig., 223 F. Supp.2d 1142, 1151 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (applying 
doctrine after stating that court need not resolve issue of continued viability). 
 
291 In re Harmonic, Inc., 2002 WL 31974384, *10 (N.D. Cal., Nov. 13, 2002). 
 
292 Stanley v. Safeskin Corp., 2000 WL 33115908, *4 (S.D. Cal., Sept. 15, 2000). 
 
293 In re Quest Comm. Int’l, Inc. Sec. Litig., 387 F. Supp.2d 1130, 1145 (D. Colo. 2005). 
 
294 In re Baan Co. Sec. Litig., 103 F. Supp.2d 1, 17 (D.D.C. 2000). 
 
295 Reina v. Tropical Sportwear Int’l, 2005 WL 846170, *4 (M.D. Fla., Apr. 4, 2005) (court assumes 
continued viability of doctrine).   
 
296 In re: Sensormatic Elec. Sec. Litig., 2002 WL 1352427, *4 (S.D. Fla., June 10, 2002). 
 
297 In re Friedman’s, Inc. Sec. Litig., 385 F. Supp.2d 1345, 1362 n.17 (N.D. Ga. 2005). 
 
298 Selbst v. McDonald’s Corp., 2005 WL 2319936, *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 2005). 
 
299 Martino-Catt v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours, 213 F.R.D. 308, 315 (S.D. Iowa 2003). 
 
300 In re Sprint Corp. Sec. Litig., 232 F. Supp.2d 1193, 1225 (D. Kan. 2002) (citing Celestial Seasonings). 
 
301 In re Allaire Corp. Sec. Litig., 224 F. Supp.2d 319, 340 (D. Mass. 2002). 
 
302 Krieger v. Gast, 2000 WL 288442, *8-9 (W.D. Mich., Jan. 21, 2000) (court assumes that doctrine has 
survived).  
 
303 In re Digi Int’l Inc. Sec. Litig., 6 F. Supp.2d 1089, 1101 (D. Minn. 1998), aff’d, 2001 WL 753869 (8th 
Cir., July 5, 2001). 
 
304 In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 78 F. Supp.2d 976, 988 (E.D. Mo. 1999). 
 
305 In re Agribiotech Sec. Litig., 2000 WL 1277603, *3 (D. Nev., March 2, 2000). 
 
306 In re KeySpan Corp. Sec. Litig., 2003 WL 21981806, *13 n.3 (E.D.N.Y., July 30, 2003). 
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Districts of New York; the Northern308 and Southern309 Districts of Ohio; the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania;310 and the Western District of Wisconsin.311 Other district 
courts have ducked the issue.312 
As indicated by the foregoing, the district court split on this issue is so sharp that 
numerous courts located in the same judicial districts in California, Georgia, Illinois, 
New York, and Pennsylvania have drawn diametrically opposite conclusions, while the 
circuit courts of appeal have provided virtually no guidance.  Which perspective is more 
defensible?   
The primary argument supporting the view that group pleading has not survived is 
that the doctrine is inconsistent with the strict pleading requirements of both the PSLRA 
and Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Inconsistency results because 
group allegations enable plaintiffs to avoid pleading fraud with the requisite 
particularity.313 A second argument is that the doctrine is inconsistent with the discovery 
stay imposed by the PSLRA at the outset of a case.314 The stay is designed to deny 
 
307 In re Van Der Moolen Holding, N.V. Sec. Litig., 2005 WL 3410763, *9 (S.D.N.Y., Dec. 13, 2005). 
 
308 In re: First Energy Corp. Sec. Litig., 2004 WL 938440, *11 (N.D. Ohio, May 3, 2004). 
 
309 In re Smartalk Teleservices, Inc. Sec. Litig., 124 F. Supp.2d 527, 545 (S.D. Ohio, Nov. 1, 2000).  
 
310 In re: U.S. Interactive, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2002 WL 1971252, *4 (E.D. Pa., Aug. 23, 2002) (court assumes 
continued viability of doctrine).   
 
311 Friedman v. Rayovac Corp., 295 F. Supp.2d 957, 991-93 (W.D. Wis. 2003). 
 
312 See, e.g., In re Trex Co. Sec. Litig., 212 F. Supp.2d 596, 604 n.3 (W.D. Va. 2002) (“The parties 
disagree as to whether the group pleading doctrine applies in the Fourth Circuit. . . . [T]he court finds it 
unnecessary to resolve the issue.”).  
 
313 See, e.g., In re PDI Sec. Litig., 2005 WL 2009892, *24 (D.N.J. Aug. 17, 2005). 
 
314 Under the PSLRA, the filing of a motion to dismiss automatically stays all discovery and other 
proceedings, unless a stay would create undue prejudice or particularized discovery is necessary to preserve 
evidence.  15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2000)  Attempts to limit the effect of the discovery stay have 
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plaintiffs the opportunity to sue when they lack a factual basis for their complaint.  Group 
pleading arguably undermines that objective because it enables plaintiffs to name 
individual defendants without knowing whether such defendants made any 
misrepresentations.315 A third argument is that group pleading is inconsistent with the 
Supreme Court’s abolition in Central Bank316 of aiding and abetting liability under 
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and companion Rule 10b-5.317 
The counter-arguments, which seem more persuasive, are at least four-fold.  First, 
no language in the PSLRA expressly abolishes group pleading.318 If Congress desired to 
abolish the doctrine, it could have used specific language in the PSLRA to do so.  
Likewise, no subsequent federal legislation is preclusive.  Second, because the doctrine 
merely sets up a rebuttable presumption, there is no inherent tension between group 
pleading and the PSLRA.319 Tension would result only if the presumption had conclusive 
effect.  Third, abolishing the doctrine sets the pleading bar too high, and thus defeats the 
remedial goals of the federal securities laws.320 Absent the availability of group pleading, 
 
generally been unsuccessful, except in egregious cases.  Sherrie R. Savett, Securities Class Actions Since 
the 1995 Reform Act: A Plaintiff’s Perspective, 1505 PLI/Corp. 17, 43 (Sept. 2005). 
 
315 William O. Fisher, Don’t Call Me a Securities Law Groupie: The Rise and Possible Demise of the 
“Group Pleading” Protocol in 10b-5 Cases, 56 BUS. LAW. 991, 1053 (2001). 
 
316 Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
 
317 Id. at 183-84.  See, e.g., D.E. & J Limited Partnership v. Conaway, 2003 WL 22207640, *6 (E.D. 
Mich., Sept. 19, 2003) (group pleading runs afoul of Central Bank). 
 
318 See In re Sunbeam Sec. Litig., 89 F. Supp.2d 1326, 1341 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (group pleading doctrine is 
consistent with language of PSLRA).  Accord In re BISYS Sec. Litig., 2005 WL 2844792, *5 (S.D.N.Y., 
Oct. 28, 2005) (nothing in statutory text or legislative history of PSLRA addresses group pleading). 
 
319 See In re El Paso Elec. Co. Sec. Litig., 2004 WL 377555, *8 (W.D. Tex., Feb. 23, 2004); In re JDN 
Realty Corp. Sec. Litig., 182 F. Supp.2d 1230, 1251 (N.D. Ga. 2002); and In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. 
Litig., 78 F. Supp.2d 976, 988 (E.D. Mo. 1999). 
 
320 See In re PETsMART, Inc. Sec. Litig., 61 F. Supp.2d 982, 988 (D. Ariz. 1999). 
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numerous meritorious securities fraud cases could be dismissed at the onset of litigation, 
before discovery is undertaken.   
Fourth, group pleading is not inconsistent with Central Bank, because attribution 
of a statement under the doctrine does not impermissibly seek to establish liability for 
aiding and abetting.  Central Bank, decided in 1994 on a 5-4 split, abrogated 25 years of 
judicial recognition of the aiding and abetting doctrine in securities cases, and overruled 
the prior holdings of all eleven federal courts of appeal that had considered the issue.321 
But even after Central Bank, secondary actors such as auditors can be primarily liable for 
violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, and such primary liability is not limited to 
those actors actually making false statements.  Pursuant to the “substantial participation” 
test adopted by a number of courts, liability can be imposed upon auditors and other 
professionals who substantially participate in the disclosure process, even if such actors 
have not made the statements at issue.322 The only requirement is that “the alleged 
violator play a significant role in, or be intricately involved with, the alleged scheme to 
 
321 In re Leslie Fay Cos. Sec. Litig., 871 F. Supp. 686, 689 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).  See generally Jill E. Fisch, 
The Scope of Private Securities Litigation: In Search of Liability Standards for Secondary Defendants, 99 
COLUM. L. REV. 1293 (1999); Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Liabilities of Lawyers and 
Accountants Under Rule 10b-5, 53 BUS. LAW. 1157, 1158 (1998); and Robert A. Prentice, Locating That 
“Indistinct” and “Virtually Nonexistent” Line Between Primary and Secondary Liability Under Section 
10(b), 75 N.C. L. REV. 691 (1997).   A number of commentators have argued for the reinstatement of 
aiding and abetting liability.  See, e.g., Assaf Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability, 77 SO. CAL. L. REV. 53, 116 
(2003). 
 
322 See, e.g., In re Software Toolworks, Inc. Sec. Litig., 50 F.3d 615, 628 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994) (accounting 
firm’s substantial participation in drafting and editing misleading letters to SEC suffices to support claim of 
primary liability); Adam v. Silicon Valley Bancshares, 884 F. Supp. 1398, 1401 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (plaintiffs 
could allege primary liability against accountant based upon various statements and reports issued by 
company); Cashman v. Coopers & Lybrand, 877 F. Supp. 425, 433 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (primary liability can 
be based on accounting firm’s central role in drafting misleading statements); and In re ZZZZ Best Sec. 
Litig., 864 F. Supp. 960, 970 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (auditor may be primarily liable for securities fraud even if 
false statements could not be reasonably attributed to it).  See also Sanford P. Dumain, Class Action Suits 
and the Effect of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, SH057 ALI-ABA 361, 366 (Feb. 
2003).   
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defraud.”323 Given the application of this test,324 the group-published doctrine is not 
inherently inconsistent with Central Bank.325 
A second major issue associated with the doctrine is whether it applies to scienter, 
or instead is limited to pleading the source of fraudulent statements.  Again, the courts are 
split.  For example, in In re JDN Realty Corp. Securities Litigation, the federal district 
court concluded that the group pleading doctrine “allows a court to presume scienter.”326 
Conversely, in Holmes v. Baker, the federal district court asserted that the group pleading 
 
323 Jay B. Kasner & Scott G. Horton, Secondary Liability After Enron, 1386 PLI/Corp 51, 62 (Sept. – Oct. 
2003). 
 
324 The “substantial participation” test has been rejected by many courts.  See, e.g., Gariety v. Grant 
Thornton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356 (4th Cir. 2004); Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1226-27 
(10th Cir. 1996).  Under the alternative “bright line” test, in order for the conduct of a secondary actor to 
constitute a primary violation of Section 10(b), the plaintiff must show that the actor: (1) made a false or 
misleading statement, (2) knew or should have known that the statement would be communicated to 
investors, and (3) was publicly identified with such statement.  See Ziemba v. Cascade Int’l, Inc., 256 F.3d 
1194, 1205 (11th Cir. 2001); Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998) (secondary 
actors such as accountants may not be held primarily liable unless they have made a material misstatement 
on which a plaintiff relies); Shapiro v. Cantor, 123 F.3d 717, 721 (2d Cir. 1997); and In re DVI, Inc. Sec. 
Litig., 2005 WL 1307959, *8 (E.D. Pa. May 31, 2005) (most courts have adopted the bright line test).  See 
also In re Ikon Office Solutions, Inc., 277 F.3d 658, 667 n.8 (3d Cir. 2002) (declining to choose a test); In 
re Lernout & Hauspie Sec. Litig., 230 F. Supp.2d 152 (D. Mass. 2002) (applying both bright line and 
substantial participation tests to determine whether various affiliates of accounting firm were primarily 
liable in securities class action).  In In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp.2d 549 
(S.D. Tex. 2002), the court criticized the two prevailing tests and then adopted an alternative test, pursuant 
to which an accounting firm could be found to be a primary violator, even if it were not publicly identified, 
if it made actionable statements with knowledge and intent, and third parties such as investors relied upon 
the statements.  Id. at 581, et seq.; Scott Siamas, Comment, Primary Securities Fraud Liability for 
Secondary Actors: Revisiting Central Bank of Denver in the Wake of Enron, WorldCom, and Arthur 
Andersen, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 895, 921 (2004).  See also In re Global Crossing, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 322 F. 
Supp.2d 319, 331 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (rejecting application of Enron test to conduct of accounting firm); 
Tricontinental Indus., Ltd. v. Anixter, 256 F. Supp.2d 806, 807 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (same).  The court in In re 
Global Crossing formulated a modified version of the bright line test.  322 F. Supp.2d at 332-34.  Accord In 
re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 383 F. Supp.2d 616, 623 n.35 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 
325 See, e.g., Schnall v. Annuity and Life Re (Holdings), Ltd., XL, 2004 WL 515150, *4 (D.D.C., March 9, 
2004) (Central Bank and its progeny do not affect vitality of group pleading doctrine). 
 
326 182 F. Supp.2d 1230, 1250 (N.D. Ga. 2002).   Accord In re Stellant, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2004 WL 
1646500, *8 (D. Minn., July 23, 2004) (under group pleading, inference of scienter is attributable to each 
defendant); Martino-Catt v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 213 F.R.D. 308, 317 n.7 (S.D. Iowa 2003) 
(“The Court notes that the group pleading doctrine is generally argued to show scienter. . . .”).  See also 
Sheehan v. Switzerland, 136 F. Supp.2d 301, 313 (D. Del. 2001) (if group pleading survives PSLRA, then 
plaintiffs need not allege scienter as to each defendant); P. Schoenfeld Asset Mgt. LLC v. Cendant Corp., 
142 F. Supp.2d 589, 620 (D.N.J. 2001) (same). 
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doctrine “does not apply to the [PSLRA’s] scienter requirement.”327 The latter view is 
the clear majority view.328 
An argument can be made that the group-published doctrine should indeed apply 
to scienter.  Such an application should be made because some information about 
operations or transactions of a corporation is so vital that it is reasonable to make a 
rebuttable presumption attributing knowledge of that information to a range of 
individuals connected with the company.329 A rebuttable presumption of this sort is not 
inherently contrary to the PSLRA’s requirement that scienter be pleaded with 
particularity.  A number of federal courts have so held.330 Another reason to apply the 
doctrine to scienter is that falsity and scienter are generally inferred from the same set of 
facts.  The Ninth Circuit, for example, has incorporated the falsity and scienter 
requirements into a single inquiry.331 Since the same set of facts serves to establish both 
 
327 166 F. Supp.2d 1362, 1376  (S.D. Fla. 2001).   
 
328 See, e.g., Phillips v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 374 F.3d 1015, 1017 (11th Cir. 2004); Reina v. Tropical 
Sportswear Int’l, 2005 WL 846170*5 (M.D. Fla., Apr. 4, 2005); DH2, Inc. v. Athanassiades, 2005 WL 
589004 (N.D. Ill., March 10, 2005); In re Lockheed Martin Corp. Sec. Litig., 2002 WL 32081398, *5 (C.D. 
Cal., July 22, 2002) (“Under no circumstances does the group-published information doctrine relieve 
plaintiffs of their burden to plead scienter. . . .”); and In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 78 F. Supp.2d 
976, 988 (E.D. Mo. 1999) (“[T]he doctrine has nothing to do with scienter.”).  See also Fisher, supra note 
315, at 1029-30 (courts applying group pleading to scienter are simply mistaken). 
 
329 See, e.g., Epstein v. Itron, Inc., 993 F. Supp. 1314, 1326 (E.D. Wash. 1998) (“[F]acts critical to a 
business’s core operations or an important transaction generally are so apparent that their knowledge may 
be attributed to the company and its key officers.”) 
 
330 See, e.g., In re Ramp Networks, Inc. Sec. Litig., 210 F. Supp.2d 1051, 1075-76 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Danis 
v. USN Communications, 73 F. Supp.2d 923, 938 (N.D. Ill. 1999); In re Peoplesoft, Inc., 2000 WL 
1737936 (N.D. Cal., May 25, 2000); Chalverus v. Pegasystems, Inc., 59 F. Supp.2d 226, 235 (D. Mass. 
1999); In re Aetna, Inc. Sec. Litig., 34 F. Supp.2d 935, 953 (E.D. Pa. 1999); Spitzer v. Abdelhak, 1999 WL 
1204352, *6 (E.D. Pa., Dec. 15, 1999); and Schlagel v. Learning Tree, Int’l 1998 WL 114581, *18 (C.D. 
Cal., Dec. 23, 1998).   
 
331 See, e.g., In re Daou Systems, Inc. Sec. Litig., 397 F.3d 704, 711 (9th Cir. 2005); Ronconi v. Larkin, 253 
F.3d 423, 429 (9th Cir. 2001).  However, the Ninth Circuit has disapproved of district court decisions 
suggesting that some form of group scienter is permissible under the PSLRA.  See In re Read-Rite Corp. 
Sec. Litig., 335 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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pleading elements, both must be pleaded with particularity, and group pleading is 
sufficiently particular to show falsity, there is no compelling reason why group pleading 
should not also suffice to establish scienter.  
 A third key issue associated with the group-published doctrine concerns the 
universe of defendants to whom it applies.  The specific question addressed herein is 
whether the doctrine applies, or should be applied, to external auditors.  Many courts 
currently limit application of the doctrine to “clearly cognizable corporate insiders with 
active daily roles in the relevant companies or transactions.”332 Other courts extend the 
doctrine to outside directors.  The Ninth Circuit extends the doctrine to outside directors 
who either participated in day-to-day corporate activities, or had a “special relationship” 
with the company.333 District courts elsewhere agree.334 At least one court has held that 
group pleading may be applied to outside directors who were members of a company’s 
audit committee.335 
The justification for requiring plaintiffs to allege more specific involvement by 
outside directors in the preparation and dissemination of allegedly fraudulent materials 
before the doctrine applies is that these individuals are less connected to the company’s 
day-to-day operations than are corporate employees, and presumably had less knowledge 
 
332 Dresner v. Utility.com, Inc., 2005 WL 1185636, *13 (S.D.N.Y., May 18, 2005).  Accord In re 
Neopharm, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2003 WL 262369, *14 (N.D. Ill., Feb. 7, 2003) (group-published doctrine 
applies to “those high-level individuals with direct involvement in the everyday business of the company.”) 
and In re Raytheon Sec. Litig., 157 F. Supp.2d 131, 152 (D. Mass. 2001). 
 
333 Berry v. Valence Tech., Inc., 173 F.3d 699, 706 (9th Cir. 1999) and GlenFed Inc. Sec. Litig., 60 F.3d 
591, 593 (9th Cir. 1995).  Participation in an audit committee does not constitute such a special 
circumstance.  In re Sensormatic Elec. Corp. Sec. Litig., 2002 WL 1352427, *5 (S.D. Fla., June 10, 2002).   
 
334 See, e.g., In re GeoPharma, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2005 WL 2431518, *7 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 30, 2005). 
 
335 Mitzner v. Hastings, 2005 WL 88966, *6 (N.D. Cal., Jan. 14, 2005).  But see Wojunik v. Kealy, 2005 
WL 2573435, *9 (D. Ariz., Sept. 26, 2005) (numerous district courts in Ninth Circuit have held that audit 
committee membership is insufficient to make an outside director liable under the group pleading doctrine). 
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of fraud that occurred.  However, the doctrine has been applied to outside directors even 
absent such allegations, in the case of a merger.  The court in this case reasoned that the 
board of directors, including outside members, was “intimately involved” in the 
merger.336 
Should external auditors, like outside directors, be subject to the group pleading 
doctrine?  To date there are divergent holdings about this issue,337 but most courts reject 
such an application. In Yadlowsky v. Grant Thornton, L.L.P. the district court rejected 
application of the doctrine to auditors because plaintiffs failed to allege facts supporting 
an inference that the auditors exercised operational involvement in the company they 
audited.338 Likewise, in In re Lernout & Hauspie Securities Litigation the district court 
rejected application of the doctrine to KPMG because plaintiffs failed to allege facts 
showing that the auditors played an active role in managing the company they audited or 
in handling the questionable transactions. 339 
While courts have been reluctant to extend the doctrine to auditors, this general 
reluctance is not always warranted.  Arguably, an external auditor does have a “special 
relationship” to the company it audits.  This is particularly true because, as shown below, 
 
336 Krieger v. Gast, 2000 WL 288442, *9 (W.D. Mich., Jan. 21, 2000). 
 
337 In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 2003 WL 230688, *6 (S.D. Tex., Jan. 28, 2003).   
See also Swanson & Roberts, supra note 5, at 422 (permissibility of group pleading under PSLRA is 
significant issue for accountants). 
 
338 120 F. Supp.2d 622, 632 (E.D. Mich. 2000). 
 
339 2002 WL 31961469, *14 (D. Mass., Nov. 18, 2002).  KPMG ultimately paid $115 million to settle the 
Lernout & Hauspie litigation.  Stephen Taub, KPMG Pays $115 Million to Settle Suit, CFO Magazine, Oct. 
12, 2004.  Available at http://www.cfo.com. See also Yung v. Lee, 2005 WL 3453820, *4 (2d Cir. Dec. 
15, 2005) (declining to apply group pleading doctrine to auditor BDO Seidman). 
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in many instances auditors are not truly independent of their corporate clients.340 The 
lack of independence is a function of several factors, including economic incentives to 
deliver favorable audit reports.  Such incentives stem in part from the desire to obtain 
lucrative non-audit work, in the form of consulting or tax services.  As demonstrated in 
Part VI of this Article, in recent years such services have out-paced audit services as 
profit centers for large accounting firms.  Other key factors include the lack of 
competition in the audit industry, the absence of auditor rotation, and the revolving-door 
phenomenon, whereby auditors ultimately work directly for their former clients.341 The 
lack of independence has resulted on many occasions in acquiescence or participation by 
auditors in aggressive and even fraudulent accounting policies devised by corporate 
management.342 
340 See generally Peter K.M. Chan, Breaking the Market’s Dependence on Independence: An Alternative to 
the “Independent” Outside Auditor, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 347, 362 (2004) (“[L]ack of 
independence is a widespread and systemic problem in the accounting industry, despite the existence of 
independence rules.”).  As one example, in April 2004 an SEC administrative law judge barred Ernst & 
Young from accepting new audit clients in the U.S. for six months, because it violated SEC rules on auditor 
independence.  Stephen Taub, More Questions on E&Y Independence, CFO Magazine, June 8, 2004.  
Available at http://www.cfo.com.
341 See Cassell Bryan-Low, Accounting Firms Seek To Dispel Cloud of Corporate Fraud, Wall St. J., May 
27, 2003, at C1 (in many of the large accounting frauds, auditors knew what was happening but were 
willing to look the other way) (statement of Charles Niemeier, former chief accountant at the SEC’s 
enforcement division); McCoy, supra note 161, at 1008 (“Any truly meaningful reform of the accounting 
industry must reverse the incentive structure that impels auditors to curry favor with company 
management.”); and Max H. Bazerman, George Loewenstein & Don A. Moore, Why Good Accountants Do 
Bad Audits, HARV. BUS. REV. 96, 99 (Nov. 2002) (“Auditors have strong business reasons to remain in 
clients’ good graces and thus are highly motivated to approve their clients’ accounts.”) 
 
342 See Called to Account – The Future of Auditing, Economist, Nov. 19, 2004 (“Auditors have been 
implicated in fraud after fraud.”). Available at http://www.economist.com. See also Kate O’Sullivan, Are 
Auditors and CFOs Growing Apart?, CFO Magazine, Oct. 8, 2004 (auditors can be involved in companies’ 
day-to-day business) (available at http://www.cfo.com).  
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VI.   
PLEADING SCIENTER OF AUDITORS – THE COURTS SET THE BAR 
UNJUSTIFIABLY HIGH 
 
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that GAAP is a poor tool for measuring 
accounting fraud, and even encourages such fraud.  Moreover, GAAS fails to deter fraud 
or significantly increase the likelihood that material fraud will be detected.  The result has 
been widespread audit failure.  This Article now considers the scienter of external 
auditors against the backdrop of the rocky GAAP/GAAS landscape.  As will be seen, as a 
general rule federal courts have been extremely demanding in terms of the pleading 
requirements applicable to auditors.  Many of the cases decided in the last decade or so 
cannot be reconciled with the reality of auditing practice or the scienter standards 
applicable to non-auditor defendants.  This section begins with an analysis of the line of 
cases that originated in DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, decided in 1990 by the Seventh 
Circuit.343 
A.  The DiLeo Line of Cases 
 In DiLeo, the Seventh Circuit upheld the dismissal of a securities fraud class 
action filed against accounting firm Ernst & Whinney (E&W).344 The dismissal was 
upheld in large part because the plaintiffs failed to adequately allege scienter, according 
to the Seventh Circuit.  The court explained that auditors, behaving as rational economic 
actors, would not sacrifice their professional reputations in order to derive additional 
audit revenue from participating in the fraud of their clients.  The court stated: “An 
accountant’s greatest asset is its reputation for honesty, followed closely by its reputation 
 
343 901 F.2d 624 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 
344 Following one of many mergers in the accounting industry, E&W became Ernst & Young. 
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for careful work.  Fees for two years’ audits could not approach the losses E&W would 
suffer from a perception that it would muffle a client’s fraud. . . . E&W’s partners shared 
none of the gain from any fraud and were exposed to a large fraction of the loss.  It would 
have been irrational for any of them to have joined cause with [their audit client].”345 
The foregoing reasoning, which focuses on the motive prong of the motive and 
opportunity test discussed in Part IV of this Article, has been endorsed by numerous 
courts in subsequent opinions, both before and after the PSLRA was enacted.  During the 
period 1990-2005, the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in DiLeo was adopted by the Fifth346 
and Ninth Circuits,347 as well as by federal district courts in California,348 Colorado,349 
Illinois,350 Indiana,351 Maryland,352 New York,353 Ohio,354 Pennsylvania,355 Virginia,356 
345 901 F.2d at 629.  Accord Robin v. Arthur Young & Co., 915 F.2d 1120, 1127 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 
346 Melder v. Morris, 27 F.3d 1097, 1103 (5th Cir. 1994).  See also Umstead v. Andersen LLP, 2003 WL 
222621, *4 (N.D. Tex., Jan. 28, 2003) (citing Melder). 
 
347 In re Worlds of Wonder Securities Litigation, 35 F.3d 1407, 1427 n.7 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 
348 In re Van Wagoner Funds, Inc., 2004 WL 2623972, *7 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2004) (“A large independent 
accountant will rarely, if ever, have any rational economic incentive to participate in its client’s fraud.”); 
Reiger v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 117 F. Supp.2d 1003, 1007-08 (S.D. Cal. 2000) (same); Reiger v. 
Altris Software, Inc., 1999 WL 540893, *3 (S.D. Cal., Apr. 30, 1999) (“[A]llegations that a large 
accounting firm such as Price Waterhouse would align itself with one of its clients to perpetuate a fraud on 
investors are irrational.”); Adam v. Silicon Valley Bancshares, 1994 WL 619300, *4 (N.D. Cal., Feb. 8, 
1994); and In re Software Toolworks Sec. Litig., 789 F. Supp. 1489, 1499 n.16 (N.D. Cal. 1992), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, 38 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir.), as amended, 50 F.3d 615 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 
349 Queen Uno Ltd. Partnership v. Coeur D’Alene Mines Corp., 2 F. Supp.2d 1345, 1360 (D. Colo.  1998) 
(citing DiLeo approvingly). 
 
350 In re Spiegel, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2004 WL 1535844, *39 (N.D. Ill. July 8, 2004); Danis v. USN 
Communications, Inc., 121 F. Supp.2d 1183, 1195-96 (N.D. Ill. 2000); In re First Merchants Acceptance 
Corp., Sec. Litig., 1998 WL 781118, *9 n.4 (N.D. Ill., Nov. 4, 1998); Retsky Family L.P. v. Price 
Waterhouse LLP, 1998 WL 774678, *9 (N.D. Ill., Oct. 21, 1998); and In re VMS Sec. Litig., 1373, 1401 
(N.D. Ill. 1990). 
 
351 Stamatio v. Hurco Cos., 885 F. Supp. 1180, 1185 (S.D. Ind. 1995).  
 
352 In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 351 F. Supp.2d 334, 390 (D. Md. 2004). 
 
353 In re Philip Services Corp. Sec. Litig., 2004 WL 1152501, *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. May 24, 2004) (auditor’s 
participation in a client’s fraud is even more economically irrational at the individual level than at the firm 
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and Wisconsin.357 Some of the district court opinions have all but foreclosed the 
possibility that plaintiffs could ever successfully plead scienter of an external auditor.  A 
post-PSLRA opinion from Illinois asserted: “In the absence of evidence that an outside 
accountant has become an insider in the subject company, e.g., by purchasing stock 
whose value is then inflated by the misstatements, it appears unlikely for any plaintiff 
ever to demonstrate sufficient motive to provide a strong inference pursuant to the motive 
and opportunity test that an outside accountant or accounting firm committed fraud.”358 
While the influence of DiLeo has been pervasive,359 both the case and its progeny 
are subject to attack on multiple fronts.  First, such cases erroneously posit that a 
fraudulent audit would almost always be irrational, because the loss to reputation caused 
by the discovery of such fraud could not be counter-balanced by the fees earned from 
audit services.  Such an assumption is invalid, because it fails to consider the substantial 
fees derived by the major accounting firms from non-audit services such as consulting 
 
level); AUSA Life Ins. Co. v. Ernst & Young, 991 F. Supp. 234, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); In re Health 
Management, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 192, 202 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); Duncan v. Pencer, 1996 WL 19043, 
*9-10 (S.D.N.Y., Jan. 18, 1996); and SEC v. Price Waterhouse, Inc., 797 F. Supp. 1217, 1242 (S.D.N.Y. 
1992).  See also In re Merrill Lynch & Co. Research Reports Sec. Litig., 272 F. Supp.2d 243, 263 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing DiLeo approvingly). 
 
354 In re SmarTalk Teleservices, Inc. Sec. Litig., 124 F. Supp.2d 505, 518 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (citing DiLeo 
approvingly). 
 
355 In re Ikon Office Solutions, Inc. Sec. Litig., 66 F. Supp.2d 622, 629 (E.D. Pa. 1999); In re Healthcare 
Serv. Group, Inc. Sec. Litig., 1993 WL 54437, *5 (E.D. Pa., Mar. 1, 1993). 
 
356 In re MicroStrategy, Inc. Sec. Litig., 115 F. Supp.2d 620, 655 & n.66 (E.D. Va. 2000). 
 
357 Grove Holding Corp. v. First Wis. Nat’l Bank, 803 F. Supp. 1486, 1502 (E.D. Wis. 1992).  
 
358 Retsky Family L.P. v. Price Waterhouse LLP, 1998 WL 774678, *9 (N.D. Ill., Oct. 21, 1998). 
 
359 See Steven O. Sidener, Partners in Crime, TRIAL 27, 27 (Apr. 2003) (“DiLeo heavily influenced 
judicial thinking throughout the 1990s, with many courts adopting its logic in dismissing accounting firms 
from securities cases, at both the pleading and summary judgment stages.”); Coffee, supra note 4, at 1406 
(during the 1990s, many courts accepted the DiLeo logic “hook, line and sinker”).  See also In re: Rural 
Cellular Corp. Sec. Litig., 2004 WL 1278725, *4 (D. Minn. 2004) (allegation that Arthur Andersen 
performed both auditing and consulting functions insufficient to support inference of scienter).  
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and tax.  The next section of this Article examines the significance of those fees and the 
likelihood that they impair auditor independence. 
(1) Non-Audit Services Expand Dramatically 
The phenomenon of accounting firms as one-stop shops providing a full range of 
services is fairly recent, dating back only a couple of decades.  Fees derived from 
consulting services by the largest accounting firms increased dramatically between 1975 
and 1998.  In 1975, on average, management consulting services comprised only 11 
percent of the Big 8’s total revenues, ranging from 5 percent to 16 percent by firm.360 By 
1990, when DiLeo was decided, Arthur Andersen derived 40 percent of its worldwide 
revenue from consulting work.  For most other large United States accounting firms, 
consulting work accounted for 15-25 percent of overall revenues in 1990.361 By 1998, 
revenues from consulting services had jumped to an average of 45 percent, ranging from 
34 to 70 percent of the Big Five’s revenues for that year.362 
By 2000, the consulting trend had reversed.  That year average revenue from 
consulting services decreased to about 30 percent of the Big Five’s total revenues.363 The 
 
360 Public Accounting Firms: Mandated Study on Consolidation and Competition, Report by U.S. General 
Accounting Office to Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and House Comm. on 
Financial Services 8 (July 2003) (GAO-03-864) (hereinafter Public Accounting Firms).  Available at 
http://www.gao.gov. See also Coffee, supra note 14, at 291 (“Prior to the mid-1990s, few auditing firms 
provided significant consulting services to audit clients.”). 
 
361 Stephen A. Zeff, How the U.S. Accounting Profession Got Where It Is Today: Part II, 17 ACCT.
HORIZONS 267, 269 (2003) (noting that Arthur Andersen was number one on the list of top U.S. consulting 
firms as early as 1983); Robin Goldwyn Blumenthal, SEC Staff Ruling Gives Accounting Firms More 
Leeway to Consult for Audit Clients, Wall St. J., July 6, 1990, at A2. 
 
362 Public Accounting Firms, supra note 360, at 8.  See also Public Oversight Board, supra note 162, at 
112 (between 1990 and 1999, the ratio of accounting and auditing revenues for the SEC clients of Big Five 
auditing firms plunged from 6 to 1 to 1.5 to 1); Jonathan Weil, Behind Wave of Corporate Fraud: A 
Change in How Auditors Work, Wall St. J., March 25, 2004, at A1 (by 1990s, audit had become mere foot 
in the door for consultants). 
 
363 Weil, supra note 362. 
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downward trend accelerated after 2000 as the large accounting firms began to sell or 
divest portions of their consulting practices.  In May 2000 Cap Gemini Group S.A. 
acquired Ernst & Young Consulting.  In February 2001 KPMG Consulting split from its 
former parent KPMG LLP and subsequently renamed itself BearingPoint, Inc.  In August 
2002 IBM acquired PricewaterhouseCoopers Consulting.364 Deloitte & Touche LLP, the 
remaining member of the Big Four,365 broke from the auditing pack and voted in March 
2003 to retain its consulting arm, after initially deciding to divest.366 But while fees from 
 
364 Deals and Deal  Makers: Mergers Snapshot/Big-Five Consulting Firms, Wall St. J., Aug. 7, 2002, at 
C5.  Ernst & Young was reported to be returning to the consulting business in 2005.  See Stephen Taub, 
More Consulting for Ernst & Young?, CFO Magazine, June 21, 2004.  Available at http://www.cfo.com.
365 Arthur Andersen, the former fifth member of the Big Five, ceased to exist as a U.S. accounting firm in 
the fall of 2002, having surrendered all of its state licenses after the firm was found guilty of obstruction of 
justice in connection with the Enron accounting scandal.  See generally Stephan Landsman, Death of an 
Accountant: The Jury Convicts Arthur Andersen of Obstruction of Justice, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1203 
(2003).  Earlier, Andersen Consulting (renamed Accenture) had split from Arthur Andersen, after 
arbitration of a bitter dispute.  Arthur Andersen, once the world’s largest professional services firm, had 
85,000 worldwide employees and generated $9.3 billion in revenues in 2001.  Following the criminal 
conviction, some of Andersen’s operations were purchased by competitors, while many of its overseas 
partnerships spun off and continue to operate.   By 2005, the company was a mere shell with fewer than 
200 employees, mostly administrative staff and attorneys.  Stephen Taub, Arthur Andersen Settles 
WorldCom Suit, CFO Magazine, Apr. 26, 2005 (available at http://www.cfo.com); Jeffrey Zaslow, How the 
Former Staff of Arthur Andersen Is Faring Two Years After Its Collapse, Wall St. J., Apr. 8, 2004, at D1; 
Ken Brown & Ianthe Jeanne Dugan, Sad Account: Andersen’s Fall from Grace Is a Tale of Greed and 
Miscues, Wall St. J., June 7, 2002, at A1; and Andersen’s Android Wars, Economist, Aug. 10, 2000 
(available at http://www.economist.com).  See also Cassell Bryan-Low, Who Are Winners at Andersen’s 
Yard Sale?, Wall St. J., May 30, 2002, at C1 (Arthur Andersen could not be sold intact, so up for grabs in 
mid-2002 were roughly 2,300 public U.S. auditing clients, 32,000 smaller private ones, 1,750 partners in 
the U.S., and more than 80 overseas affiliates with their own partners).  In May 2005 the United States 
Supreme Court reversed Andersen’s conviction (which had been upheld by the Fifth Circuit), on the basis 
that the trial judge gave incorrect jury instructions, but the reversal did nothing to restore the firm.  See 
Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 2129 (2005); Bruce D. Fisher, Andersen v. U.S.: A Shift 
in the Legal Winds for Public Auditors?, 41 TENN. B.J. 22 (2005); Stephen Taub, Supreme Court Reverses 
Andersen Verdict, CFO Magazine, June 1, 2005 (available at http://www.cfo.com); and Linda Greenhouse, 
The Andersen Decision: The Overview, Justices Reject Auditor Verdict in Enron Scandal, N.Y. Times, June 
1, 2005, at A1. 
 
366 Cassell Bryan-Low, Deloitte Yearly Revenue Rose 21% Even with Consulting Issues, Wall St. J., Oct. 1, 
2003, at A8 (Deloitte derives two-thirds of its revenue from consulting and tax services); Cassell Bryan-
Low, Deloitte Chief Wrestles To Get Consultants Back in Firm, Wall St. J., Aug. 15, 2003, at C1; and 
Robert Frank & Deborah Solomon, Deloitte Touche Cancels Plan To Split Off Its Consulting Arm, Wall St. 
J., March 31, 2003, at C10.  In 2003, Deloitte spun off its tax and consulting businesses in France, in 
response to a new French financial security law banning accounting firms from providing consulting 
services to their audit clients.  Andrew Parker, Deloitte Plans To Spin Off French Consulting, Financial 
Times, Oct. 21, 2003.  Available at http://www.FT.com
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consulting began to slide for most large accounting firms, total fees from non-audit 
services remained substantial.367 In 2002, accounting firms still obtained more than 50 
percent of their revenues from non-audit services,368 which included both consulting and 
tax work.  Non-audit fees paid by large corporations to audit firms often outweighed 
audit fees by a ratio of nearly 3 to 1.369 In many cases auditing firms low-balled the 
prices on their audits (even to the point of taking a loss), in order to obtain lucrative 
consulting work.370 
The landscape changed in January 2003, when the SEC adopted final rules to 
implement Title II of Sarbanes-Oxley, which pertains to auditor independence.  The new 
rules, effective in May 2003, implement Section 201, which specifies nine non-audit 
services that a public accounting firm, serving as an auditor of a client, cannot 
simultaneously provide to that client.  Those services are: bookkeeping, financial 
information system design or implementation, appraisal and valuation, actuarial, internal 
 
367 War of Independence: Auditors Should be Auditors, Not the Advance-Guard of an Army of Consultants,
Economist, Aug. 10, 2000 (all five members of the Big Five make most of their money from non-audit 
services).  Available at http://www.economist.com. See also Arthur R. Wyatt, Accountants’ 
Responsibilities and Morality, CPA J., March 2004 (accounting firms that have divested their consulting 
practices continue to expand range of services offered within their auditing and tax divisions) (available at 
http://www.cpajournal.com); Laura J. Kornish & Carolyn B. Levine, Discipline with Common Agency: The 
Case of Audit and Nonaudit Services, 79 ACCT. REV. 173, 195 (2004) (Arthur Andersen “regrew” nonaudit 
services after it split with Andersen Consulting). 
 
368 Cassell-Bryan Low, Accounting Firms Are Still Consulting, Wall St. J., Sept. 23, 2002, at C1.  See also 
Cassell Bryan-Low, Accounting Firms Earn More from Consulting, Wall St. J., Apr. 16, 2003, at C9 (62.2 
percent of the $811.8 million of fees paid to auditors in 2002 by most of the 30 companies in the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average was for services other than auditing). 
 
369 Jonathan Weil & Michael Rapoport, New SEC Definition May Cloud ‘Audit Fees,’ Wall St. J., Jan. 22, 
2003, at C1.  
 
370 Janice Revell, The Fires That Won’t Go Out, Fortune, Oct. 13, 2003, at 139.  Accord Frieswick, supra 
note 188 (“The audit function became a commodity service -- a loss leader accounting firms offered in 
conjunction with vastly more lucrative consulting fees.”); Coffee, supra note 4, at 1411 (during the 1990s, 
auditing firms began to compete based on a strategy of low-balling, in which auditing services were offered 
at rates that were marginal to arguably below cost). 
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audit outsourcing, management and human resources functions, investment advising, 
legal, and expert.371 
While the foregoing list might appear to be comprehensive, it is not.  The most 
significant omission is the provision of tax services.  Section 201 of Sarbanes-Oxley 
specifically provides that a registered public accounting firm may engage in any non-
audit service, including tax, that is not expressly prohibited, after audit committee pre-
approval.  Accordingly, accountants remain free to give tax advice to their audit clients, 
and provide tax compliance and planning services, subject to audit committee pre-
approval requirements.372 This freedom resulted from successful lobbying of Congress 
by the accounting industry when Sarbanes-Oxley was under consideration.373 
371 See Press Release -- Commission Adopts Rules Strengthening Auditor Independence, Securities and 
Exchange Commission, Jan. 22, 2003.  Available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-9.htm. Sarbanes-
Oxley has impacted the provision of legal services by the major accounting firms.  By 2001, the Big Five 
accounting firms had more lawyers than the five largest law firms in the world.  Subsequently, the 
environment changed.  In November 2003 KPMG International announced that it would sever ties with 
KLegal International, its network of 3,000 lawyers in 60 countries that, during its three years of operation, 
often catered to companies listed on U.S. stock exchanges. Sarbanes-Oxley and similar legislation passed 
by France in 2003 were factors offered by KPMG to explain its decision.  The other Big Four accounting 
firms have denied plans to follow KPMG’s lead, but those plans may change.  PricewaterhouseCoopers has 
a network of 2,850 lawyers that operates in more than 40 countries through Landwell, its legal affiliate.  
Ernst & Young offers legal services through EY Law, a network that includes 2,000 lawyers in 30 
countries.  Deloitte & Touche also has a global law network.  Geanne Rosenberg, Big Changes in Offing 
for Big Four, National L.J., Dec. 22, 2003, at 8; Back To Basics: The Aspirations of Accountancy Firms in 
the Law Are Faltering, Economist, Nov. 13, 2003 (available at http://www.economist.com); and KPMG To 
End Legal Services, Wall St. J., Nov. 7, 2003, at B6.   
 
372 Sanford P. Dumain, Class Action Suits, Auditor Liability, and the Effect of the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, SK086 ALI-ABA 501, 512 (Feb. 2005) (“Tax services and some other non-
audit services may be provided if preapproved by the audit committee.”); Weil & Rapoport, supra note 
369. 
 
373 Michael Schroeder, SEC Clears Rules Limiting Auditors from Offering Consulting Services, Wall St. J., 
Jan. 23, 2003, at C9.  See also Thomas J. Purcell III & David Lifson, Tax Services After Sarbanes-Oxley, J. 
ACCT. 32, 35 (Nov. 2003) (SEC rules implementing Sarbanes-Oxley substantially adopted AICPA 
recommendation concerning provision of tax shelter services, pursuant to which such services could still be 
rendered).  New accounting rules adopted by the European Commission in March 2004 similarly do not bar 
European auditors from providing tax services.  Stephen Taub, Tough New Accounting Rules for Europe,
CFO Magazine, March 15, 2004.  Available at http://www.cfo.com.
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The requirement that audit committees approve all assignments given to external 
auditors is unlikely to significantly curtail the assignment of tax work. Many publicly 
traded companies began to create audit committees in the 1970s.  The objective was to 
assure the integrity of external audits by requiring auditors to report to independent 
committees, rather than to management.  But the expected independence rarely 
materialized.374 Indeed, the general abdication of responsibility by audit committees was 
a contributing factor in a number of the recent accounting scandals.375 SEC rules enacted 
pursuant to Sarbanes-Oxley376 are supposed to ensure audit committee independence, but 
the requirement that committees pre-approve assignments to external auditors is unlikely 
to have a correlative effect on auditor independence.  The SEC rules specifically allow 
committees to pre-approve such work in their written policies, as opposed to making 
 
374 Corporate Governance (A Special Report) -- The Hot Seat: These Days, All Eyes Are on the Chairman 
of the Audit Committee, Wall St. J., Feb. 24, 2003, at R4; An Analysis of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s Implementation of Key Audit Reform Provisions of Recently Enacted Corporate Reform 
Legislation 4-5, Consumer Federation of America, Jan. 29, 2003 (“Audit committees have time and again 
demonstrated their reluctance to accept responsibility for protecting the independence of the audit.”) 
(available at http://www.consumerfed.org/auditreformeval.pdf).  See also Stephen Taub, Best Practices 
Elude Most Audit Committees, CFO Magazine, Apr. 2, 2004 (survey of 758 audit committee chairs and 900 
CFOs finds that just 20 percent of audit committees have adopted best practices for financial audit process).  
Available at http://www.cfo.com.
375 See Jonathan Weil & Dennis Berman, Auditing the Audit Committee, Wall St. J., Dec. 9, 2002, at C1.  
But cf. Stephen Taub, More Board Independence, Less Fraud?, CFO Magazine, June 29, 2004 (study of 
133 companies accused of fraud between 1978 and 2001 finds that boards of companies accused of fraud 
were less likely to have an audit committee).  Available at http://www.cfo.com.
376 See Press Release -- SEC Requires Exchange Listing Standards for Audit Committees, Securities and 
Exchange Commission, Apr. 1, 2003.  Available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-43.htm. The new 
rules implement the requirements of Section 10(A)(m)(1) of the Exchange Act, as added by Section 301 of 
Sarbanes-Oxley, by creating new Exchange Act Rule 240.10A-3.  The rules require that each member of an 
audit committee be independent according to criteria specified in Section 10(A)(m).  Two specific criteria 
must be met.  One, the audit committee member may not accept directly or indirectly any consulting, 
advisory or other compensatory fee from the listed issuer or any subsidiary of the issuer, other than in the 
member’s capacity as a member of the board of directors or any board committee.  Two, the audit 
committee member may not, other than in his or her capacity as a member of the board of directors or any 
board committee, be affiliated with the listed issuer or any subsidiary of the issuer.  Steve Bochner, Audit 
Committee Responsibilities, 1395 PLI/Corp 611, 615-26 (Nov. 2003).   
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fresh determinations.377 The result is that tax work continues to be performed for audit 
clients by their external auditors.378 
The SEC rules also expand the definition of an audit service.  Services that 
previously had been regarded as non-audit are now classified as audit and therefore are 
permissible.  These include statutory audits, reviews of documents filed with the SEC, 
and tax and accounting consultations to the extent that such services are necessary to 
comply with GAAS.379 This expansive definition of audit services also was the result of 
 
377 Tim Reason, Did the SEC Gut Sarbanes-Oxley?, CFO Magazine, March 1, 2003 (SEC rules permit 
audit committees to pre-approve, in their written policies, certain non-audit services) (available at 
http://www.cfo.com). 
 
378 Cassell-Bryan-Low, Questioning the Books: Keeping the Accountants from Flying High, Wall St. J., 
May 6, 2003, at C1 (statement of Barbara Roper, director of investor protection at Consumer Federation of 
America).  See also Press Release -- Consumer Groups Charge Audit Firm with Undermining Key Auditor 
Independence Reform, Urge SEC To Investigate, Consumer Federation of America, June 11, 2003 (Ernst & 
Young is advising audit clients on how to undermine audit committee pre-approval requirement)  (available 
at http://www.consumerfed.org/E&Yletter_release.html).  More recently, in December 2004, the PCAOB 
proposed new rules designed to strengthen the pre-approval requirement.   See Stephen Taub, Audit Board 
Proposes New Ethics Rules, CFO Magazine, Dec. 15, 2004 (available at http://www.cfo.com).  
 
379 Cassell Bryan-Low, Accounting Firms Earn More from Consulting, Wall St. J., Apr. 16, 2003, at C9. 
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industry lobbying,380 and the effect has been to re-characterize many millions of dollars 
worth of services to make them permissible under Sarbanes-Oxley.381 
The exclusion of tax from the list of non-audit services prohibited by Sarbanes-
Oxley is especially significant, because tax work comprises such a high percentage of 
total revenues for the Big Four.  In 2002, tax revenue (much of it from audit clients)382 
accounted for 21%, 38%, 23%, and 37%, respectively, of the total revenues derived by 
Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, PricewaterhouseCoopers, and KPMG.383 More 
recently, a 2004 survey of 1,652 companies, including most of the S&P 500, found that 
 
380 Weil & Rapoport, supra note 369.  Apart from its highly effective lobbying, the auditing industry exerts 
political clout by making significant campaign contributions.  The Big Five and the AICPA donated nearly 
$39 million through individuals, political action committees, and soft-money contributions from 1989 to 
2001.  Ianthe Jeanne Dugan, Depreciated: Did You Hear the One About the Accountant? It’s Not Very 
Funny, Wall St. J., March 14, 2002, at A1.  In 1996, the year after the PSLRA was enacted, a grateful 
accounting industry donated more than $1 million to Congressional members responsible for the new law.  
Elizabeth McDonald, Auditors Are Ending Up Between a Rock and a Hard Place Over Securities Law,
Wall St. J., Dec. 24, 1996, at C1.  See also Johan von Brachel, CPAs on Capitol Hill: A Behind-the-Scenes 
Look at the Passage of Securities Litigation Reform, J. ACCT. 15 (June 1996).  Each of the Big Five 
accounting firms was among the top 20 contributors to George W. Bush’s 2000 presidential campaign.  
And 212 of the 248 Senate and House members who sat on congressional committees involved in the 
investigations prompted by the financial scandals of 2002 received campaign contributions from one or 
more of the Big Five accounting firms.  James D. Cox, Reforming the Culture of Financial Reporting: The 
PCAOB and the Metrics for Accounting Measurements, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 301, 316 (2003); R.W. Roberts, 
P.D. Dwyer & J.T. Sweeney, Political Strategies Used by the U.S. Public Accounting Profession During 
Auditor Liability Reform: The Case of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 22 J. ACCT. &
PUB. POLICY 433, 434 n.2 (2003). 
 
381 While audit fees rose by 40 percent in 2004 for 23 of the 30 companies in the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average, much of this increase was attributable to a recharacterization of fees.  Stephen Taub, Audit Fees 
Surged in 2004, CFO Magazine, March 28, 2005.  Available at http://www.cfo.com.
382 Revell, supra note 370, at 139 (“The mother lode of these ‘other’ fees comes from tax consulting, 
which observers estimate accounts for anywhere between 30% and 40% of the Big Four’s overall revenue 
in the United States -- much of that from audit clients.”). 
 
383 Public Accounting Firms, supra note 360, at 17.  See also Phyllis Plitch, Tracking the Numbers/Outside 
Audit: Auditor Independence Gets Focus, Wall St. J., July 14, 2004, at C3 (tax work remains major revenue 
source for accounting firms); McCoy, supra note 161, at 1007 (exclusion by Sarbanes-Oxley of tax services 
from list of prohibited services is gigantic loophole).   
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42% of the total fees paid by the companies to their auditors went toward non-audit 
services.  The biggest chunk of the non-audit fees (23 percent) was spent on tax work.384 
Much of this lucrative tax work concerns tax shelters,385 which are widely used 
and annually result in the loss of billions of dollars of revenue.  Hundreds of thousands of 
United States taxpayers have utilized tax shelters in the last decade,386 many of them to 
avoid paying taxes on stock options,387 and in recent years the practice has spread from 
larger corporations to smaller businesses.388 Tax shelters cost the United States Treasury 
 
384 Phyllis Plitch & Michael Rapoport, Moving the Market: Nonaudit Fees Fell Below Half of Auditor 
Payment, Wall St. J., July 8, 2004, at C3.  See also Diya Gullapalli, After the Scandals: More Work, More 
Money, Wall St. J., Jan. 31, 2005, at R6 (survey of S&P companies in December 2004 finds that 2004 non-
audit fees have increased 28 percent over 2003); Stephen Taub, Audit Firms Focusing on Audit Fees, CFO 
Magazine, July 7, 2004.  Available at http://www.cfo.com.
385 See generally Ben Wang, Note, Supplying the Tax Shelter Industry: Contingent Fee Compensation for 
Accountants Spurs Production, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1237 (2003).   
 
386 John D. McKinnon & John Harwood, Tax Shelters Come Under Fire, Wall St. J., June 6, 2003, at A4.  
See also Internal Revenue Service: Challenges Remain in Combating Abusive Tax Schemes, Report by U.S. 
General Accounting Office to Senate Comm. on Finance 2, 6 (Nov. 2003) (GAO-04-50) (131,000 
participants were linked to abusive tax schemes, including tax shelters, during the period October 2001 - 
August 2003) (available at http://www.gao.gov); John D. McKinnon & Cassell Bryan-Low, Tax Shelters of 
‘90s May Have Returned, Wall St. J., Oct. 21, 2003, at A2. 
 
387 John D. McKinnon & Cassell Bryan-Low, Leading the News: IRS Targets Shelters for Stock Options,
Wall St. J., July 2, 2003, at A3.  In 2003, Sprint Corp. replaced Ernst & Young, its auditor since 1966, 
following a scandal concerning tax shelters devised by the auditor.  The tax shelters protected more than 
$100 million in stock option gains realized by Sprint’s CEO and President, both of whom were forced out 
of the company.  Shawn Young, Sprint Replaces Ernst & Young As Its Auditor, Wall St. J., Oct. 15, 2003, 
at B9. 
 
388 Tax Shelters Target Small Businesses, Wall St. J., Sept. 17, 2003. 
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an estimated $10-20 billion in annual revenue389 and state governments an additional $8-
12 billion.390 
Many accounting firms are deeply involved in creating these tax shelters and 
aggressively marketing them to audit clients.391 One such client of Arthur Andersen was 
Enron.  Enron’s extensive use of tax shelters enabled the company to report no taxable 
income during the period 1996-99, while it was claiming $2.3 billion in book profits.392 
These shelters were facilitated by Enron’s creation, with Andersen’s assistance, of 881 
offshore subsidiaries.393 KPMG and Ernst & Young also heavily promoted tax shelters 
during the late 1990s.394 A Senate report released in 2003 concluded that KPMG had 
devoted substantial resources to, and obtained significant fees from, developing, 
marketing, and implementing potentially illegal and abusive tax shelters that had cost the 
 
389 Don Durfee, Shelter Fallout, CFO Magazine, Nov. 1, 2004 (available at http://www.cfo.com); Raquel 
Meyer Alexander, et al., Tax Shelters Under Attack, CPA J., Aug. 2003.  Available at 
http://www.cpajournal.com. Cf. Internal Revenue Service: Challenges Remain in Combating Abusive Tax 
Shelters, Testimony of Michael Brostek (Director, Tax Issues, U.S. General Accounting Office) Before 
Senate Comm. on Finance, Oct. 21, 2003 (GAO-04-104T) (abusive tax shelters totaled tens of billions of 
dollars over the last decade).  Available at http://www.gao.gov.
390 Glenn R. Simpson, The Economy: California, Other States to Join IRS in Tax-Shelter Crackdown, Wall 
St. J., July 16, 2003, at A2.   
 
391 Cassell Bryan-Low, Senate Panel Seeks Accounting Firms’ Tax Shelter Data, Wall St. J., Apr. 22, 
2003, at A2 (statement of Sen. Carl Levin).  See also Developments in the Law – Governmental Attempts to 
Stem the Rising Tide of Corporate Tax Shelters, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2249, 2253 (2004) (accounting firms 
command the lion’s share of the tax shelter market and produce the most aggressive shelters). 
 
392 Many Happy Returns?: Why a Low Corporate Tax Bill Is Often Not the Good News It Seems to Be,
Economist, May 8, 2003.  Available at http://www.economist.com.
393 Alexander, et al., supra note 389.  Andersen was not the only member of the Big Five whose work 
facilitated the Enron accounting scandal.  The work of PricewaterhouseCoopers and KPMG was described 
as grossly negligent and negligent, respectively, by Enron examiner Harrison Goldin.  See Stephen Taub, 
Enron Examiner Cites Auditors, Banks, CFO Magazine, Dec. 8, 2003.  Available at http://www.cfo.com.
394 See Cassell Bryan-Low, KPMG Insiders Questioned Shelter, Wall St. J., Nov. 19, 2003, at A2; Cassell 
Bryan-Low, KPMG Didn’t Register Strategy, Wall St. J., Nov. 17, 2003, at C1 (during 1990s, sales of tax 
shelters boomed as large accounting firms stepped up their marketing efforts). 
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United States Treasury billions of dollars in lost tax revenues.395 Many of these tax 
shelters were marketed to KPMG’s audit clients, creating inherent conflicts of interest.  
Conflicts arose when KPMG auditors were required to examine their clients’ tax returns 
and use of shelters.  In these situations, KPMG was, in effect, auditing its own work.396 
In 2005 KPMG agreed to pay $456 million in fines and accepted a list of other conditions 
to settle a criminal action initiated by the Department of Justice in connection with the 
creation and sale of these abusive tax shelters.397 
But KPMG is not alone.  The 2003 Senate report concluded that accounting firms 
in general have become key participants in the thriving tax shelter industry.398 A
subsequent GAO report, released in 2005, concluded that more than 12 percent of the 
Fortune 500 – 61 companies in all – obtained tax shelter services from their external 
auditors during the period 1998 – 2003.399 
395 U.S. Tax Shelter Industry: The Role of Accountants, Lawyers, and Financial Professionals -- Report by 
Minority Staff of Senate Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations 4 (Nov. 2003) (herafter U.S. Tax Shelter 
Industry ).  KPMG reaped $128 million in fees for tax shelters that permitted clients to evade $2.5 billion in 
taxes by claiming false losses of $11 billion.  See Floyd Norris, When Auditors Go Astray, What Director 
Dares Say So?, N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 2005. 
 
396 U.S. Tax Shelter Industry, supra note 395, at 15-16. 
 
397 Stephen Taub, Ex-CFO of KPMG Among 10 Newly Indicted, CFO Magazine, Oct. 18, 2005.  Available 
at http://www.cfo.com.
398 U.S. Tax Shelter Industry, supra note 395, at 22. 
 
399 Tax Shelters: Services Provided by External Auditors, Report by General Accounting Office to Ranking 
Minority Member, Permanent Senate Subcomm. on Investigations, Comm. on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs (Feb. 2005) (GAO-05-171); Stephen Taub, Tapping the Auditor to Avoid Taxes,
CFO Magazine, March 2, 2005.  Available at http://www.cfo.com. The PCAOB has recognized the tax 
shelter problem.  In December 2004, the board proposed rules that would treat a registered public 
accounting firm as not independent of an audit client, if, inter alia, the firm provided tax advice on certain 
types of potentially abusive tax transactions.  See Proposed Ethics and Independence Rules Concerning 
Independence, Tax Services, and Contingent Fees, Release No. 2004-015, 1482 PLI/Corp 143, 143 (May 
2005).  Those rules were finally adopted in July 2005.  Craig Schneider, PCAOB Toughens Independence 
Rules, CFO Magazine, July 26, 2005.  Available at http://www.cfo.com.
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The provision by auditing firms of numerous non-auditing services directly 
undercuts the assumption of DiLeo and its progeny that accountants have no economic 
incentive to engage in fraudulent audits.  In fact, they have a powerful incentive, which is 
to encourage their audit clients to generate additional tax and consulting work.400 While 
the empirical evidence is mixed, a fair amount of research does support the hypothesis 
that the provision of non-audit services impairs audit quality. 
In 1996, the United States General Accounting Office reported findings of the 
accounting profession and the SEC that “there is no conclusive evidence that providing 
traditional management consulting services compromises auditor independence.”401 Four 
years later, in 2000, the POB echoed the GAO: “The Panel is not aware of any instances 
of non-audit services having caused or contributed to an audit failure or the actual loss of 
auditor independence.”402 
One likely reason why such evidence did not surface is that prior to 2000 the 
SEC did not require companies to disaggregate fees they paid for audit and non-audit 
services.  Hence, researchers were handicapped by a lack of usable data.403 In November 
2000 the SEC imposed such a reporting requirement, applicable to proxy statements and 
annual reports of all public companies.404 Corporations were required to disclose fees 
 
400 See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Market v. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 30 (2002) (“[A]uditing firms have proven willing to cast 
aside valuable reputations for short-term profits.”). 
 
401 Accounting Profession, supra note 21, at 8. 
 
402 Public Oversight Board, supra note 162, at 110. 
 
403 Keeping Auditors Independent: The SEC’s Deal with the Big Accountancy Firms May Not Restrain 
Them Enough, Economist, Nov. 16, 2000 (“[A]lthough the firms publish aggregate revenues, they do not 
break them down by clients.  So it has been hard even to see where conflicts might lie.”).  Available at 
http://www.economist.com.
404 Regulation S-X, Rule 2-01, 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01. 
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paid and services performed during the two most recent fiscal years, split into four fee 
categories: audit, audit-related, tax, and all other.405 This mandate was the result of a 
compromise, brokered after the auditing industry staged a massive public relations and 
lobbying campaign against an SEC proposal to prohibit auditors from providing 
consulting services.406 Thereafter, empirical research began to proliferate. 
A study released in 2002 by accounting professors at Stanford, MIT, and 
Michigan State concerning 4,200 SEC filings found that corporations with the least 
independent auditors (those which paid the most in consulting fees, as a percentage of the 
total fee paid to the audit firm) were the most likely to meet or surpass earnings 
benchmarks such as analysts’ forecasts.407 The authors concluded: “Taken together, our 
results suggest that the provision of non-audit services impairs independence and reduces 
the quality of earnings.”408 Another study of 2,295 firms, released in 2003 by researchers 
at the Wharton School, found that the provision of non-audit services was associated with 
 
405 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 -- Understanding the Independent Auditor’s Role in Building Public 
Trust: A White Paper 13, PricewaterhouseCoopers (2003).  Available at 
http://www.pwcglobal.com/extweb/NewCoAtWork.nsf.
406 Arthur Levitt, Jr., the former head of the SEC, later described this campaign as a total war.  See Arthur 
Levitt, Jr. & Paula Dwyer, Take on the Street 133-39 (2002).  See also McCoy, supra note 161, at 1000 
(accountants battled to the death efforts to curb their consulting powers); Ceasefire, Economist, Nov. 16, 
2000 (after heavy lobbying, the Big Five firms foiled an effort by the SEC to prohibit consulting and 
auditing services from operating under the same roof); The Ties That Bind Auditors, Economist, Aug. 10, 
2000 (major accounting firms, lobbying against the SEC, cited failure of POB to offer examples of audit 
failures that resulted from the sale of non-audit services) (available at http://ww.economist.com).  The SEC 
has described its resolution of the dispute as “a pragmatic approach to a difficult issue.”  See William T. 
Allen & Arthur Siegel, Threats and Safeguards in the Determination of Auditor Independence, 80 WASH.
U. L.Q. 519, 534 (2002).  
 
407 Richard M. Frankel, Marilyn F. Johnson & Karen K. Nelson, The Relation Between Auditors’ Fees for 
Non-Audit Services and Earnings Quality, 77 ACCT. REV. 71 (2002). 
 
408 This conclusion is reported at http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/news/reasearch/acctg_auditconflict.shtml.
See also Aaron Elstein, Deals & Deal Makers: Study Faults Work of Auditors Who Consult, Wall St. J., 
Aug. 1, 2001, at C18. 
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earnings deterioration for a sub-group of firms with weak corporate governance.409 A
third study, also released in 2003, found that audit partners’ going-concern judgments 
were influenced by whether the client offered significant future opportunities for non-
audit fees.410 
While other studies are to the contrary,411 a fair amount of empirical evidence 
supports the hypothesis that the provision of non-auditing services impairs audit quality.  
Such evidence tends to confirm the common perception, set forth in media reports, that 
consulting fees can and do skew audit results.412 The Enron example also supports the 
hypothesis.  In 2000, Arthur Andersen earned $25 million in auditing fees and $27 
million for consulting and tax work performed for the energy trader.413 Much of the 
consulting work was performed in connection with structuring Enron’s thousands of off-
 
409 David F. Larcker & Scott Richardson, Corporate Governance, Fees for Non-Audit Services and Accrual 
Choices (Apr. 2003).  Available at http://accounting.wharton.penn.edu/faculty/richardson/NAS.pdf.
410 The results are reported in Mark W. Nelson, A Review of Empirical Conflicts-of-Interest Research in 
Auditing 16 (Sept. 2003).  Available at http://conflictofinterest.info/papers/Nelson.pdf.
411 See, e.g., William R. Kinney, Jr., Zoe-Vonna Palmrose & Susan Scholz, Auditor Independence and 
Non-audit Services: What Do Restatements Suggest? (Apr. 2003) (finding a consistent negative association 
between tax service fees and earnings restatements).  Available at 
http://www.thecorporatelibrary.com/special/misc/KPS_04-17-03.pdf. See also Roberta Romano, The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1535-36 (2005) 
(19 of 25 studies find no connection between the provision of non-audit services and audit quality); K. 
Raghunandan, et al., Initial Evidence on the Association Between Nonaudit Fees and Restated Financial 
Statements, 17 ACCT. HORIZONS 223 (2003) (study of 110 firms restating earnings finds no link between 
non-audit fees and incidence of restatement); and Mark L. DeFond, et al., Do Non-Audit Service Fees 
Impair Auditor Independence? Evidence from Going Concern Audit Opinions, 40 J. ACCT. RES. 1247 
(2002) (study of 1,158 firms finds (a) no significant association between non-audit service fees and 
impaired auditor independence, and (b) no association between going concern opinions and either total fees 
or audit fees). 
 
412 See, e.g., Cassell Bryan-Low, More Ernst Nonaudit Services Under Fire, Wall St J., March 10, 2003, at 
C1 (accounting firms that sell millions of dollars of consulting and other services to their auditing clients 
could be compromised and cave on tough auditing calls for fear of losing non-audit business).  
 
413 Cassell Bryan-Low, Accounting Firms Are Still Consulting, Wall St. J., Sept. 23, 2002, at C1.  This fee 
distribution generally characterized Arthur Andersen during the late 1990s.  Consultants generated 58 
percent of Andersen’s overall revenues during this period.  Ken Brown & Ianthe Jeanne Dugan, Sad 
Account: Andersen’s Fall from Grace Is A Tale of Greed and Miscues, Wall St. J., June 7, 2002, at A1. 
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balance sheet transactions.  A year later, Enron collapsed when its complex accounting 
fraud was uncovered.  The lesson, according to many commentators, was clear.  One 
wrote: “The Enron disaster, with its combination of sham transactions and antecedent 
(and lucrative) auditor consultation in the sham transactions’ structure, demonstrated that 
consulting relationships can indeed contribute to catastrophic audit failures.”414 This 
conclusion is reinforced by Arthur Andersen’s participation in an extended sequence of 
accounting scandals prior to its demise.415 
In sum, the DiLeo analysis is flawed because it fails to consider that the lure of 
significant non-audit fees can provide the necessary economic motive for an external 
auditor to engage in fraudulent conduct.416 Sarbanes-Oxley has not fundamentally 
 
414 Bratton, supra note 122, at 1030.  Accord McCoy, supra note 161, at 992, 1000 (“All too often, 
accounting firms felt compelled to pay the piper by signing off on doctored financial statements. . . . As 
consulting revenues skyrocketed and surpassed fees from audits, retaining consulting business became the 
overriding goal, even at the risk of compromising audits.”).  See also Why Good Accountants Do Bad 
Audits, supra note 341, at 102 (“True auditor independence requires, as a start, full divestiture of consulting 
and tax services.”). 
 
415 See Christine E. Early, Kate Odabashian & Michael Willenborg, Some Thoughts on the Audit Failure at 
Enron, the Demise of Andersen, and the Ethical Climate of Public Accounting Firms, 35 CONN. L. REV.
1013, 1024 (2003) (“At the end of the day, the spate of audit failures that consumed Andersen (Sunbeam, 
Waste Management, Baptist Foundation of Arizona, Enron, Worldcom, Global Crossing, and Qwest) seem 
inextricably linked to the audit firm’s longstanding cohabitation with a highly profitable consulting 
culture.”); Ken Brown & Jonathan Weil, Questioning the Books: How Andersen’s Embrace of Consulting 
Altered the Culture of the Auditing Firm, Wall St. J., March 12, 2002, at C1. 
 
416 See, e.g., In re Global Crossing, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 322 F. Supp.2d 319, 345-46 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 
(allegation that Arthur Andersen had dual role as auditor and consultant sufficient to survive motion to 
dismiss); In re Complete Mgt. Inc. Sec. Litig., 153 F. Supp.2d 314, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (Arthur 
Andersen’s receipt of consulting fees from audit client, in combination with other factors, supported 
inference that Andersen had motive to engage in fraudulent audit); and In re Microstrategy, Inc. Sec. Litig., 
115 F. Supp.2d 620, 654-56 (E.D. Va. 2000).  See also Stephen Taub, PwC Probed on Auditor 
Independence, CFO Magazine, June 2, 2004 (PricewaterhouseCoopers pays $50 million to settle class 
action alleging that its independence was compromised by lucrative contract for non-audit consulting work 
that it was seeking from client Raytheon Co. shortly before issuance of clean audit opinion).  Available at 
http://www.cfo.com. But see In re Stone & Webster, Inc. Sec. Litig., 414 F.3d 187, 215 (1st Cir. 2005) 
(auditor’s motivation to continue a profitable business relationship insufficient by itself to support a strong 
inference of scienter); In re Royal Dutch/Shell Transport Sec. Litig., 380 F. Supp.2d 509, 568-69 (D.N.J. 
2005) (auditor’s motivation to increase fees from non-auditing services insufficient to constitute evidence 
of scienter). 
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changed the equation.417 The analysis is infirm for a number of additional reasons, which 
are discussed below. 
(2) The Auditing Industry Operates As An Oligopoly 
 DilLeo and similar cases are wrongly decided for a second reason.  The absence 
of effective competition in the accounting industry means that auditors are not 
constrained by the possible loss of market share if their fraudulent audits are uncovered.  
The non-competitive nature of the auditing industry was underscored in a comprehensive 
report mandated by Sarbanes-Oxley and released in 2003 by the United States General 
Accounting Office.  The GAO report noted that the number of firms capable of providing 
audit services to large national and multinational companies decreased from eight in the 
1980s to four in 2003.418 The reduction was the result of mergers involving six of the top 
 
417 See, e.g., Joseph Nocera, Auditors: Too Few to Fail, N.Y. Times, June 25, 2005, at C1 (“Accounting 
firms are no longrt allowed to sell consulting services to companies they audit, but all still do lots of 
consulting., and that is still an important revenue generator for them.”). 
 
418 Public Accounting Firms, supra note 360, at 1-2.  The Big Eight were Arthur Andersen LLP, Arthur 
Young LLP, Coopers & Lybrand LLP, Deloitte Haskins & Sells LLP, Ernst & Whinney LLP, Peat 
Marwick Mitchell LLP, Price Waterhouse LLP, and Touche Ross LLP.  The Big Four are Deloitte & 
Touche LLP (the U.S. national practice of Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu), Ernst & Young LLP, KPMG LLP, 
and PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP.  Id. at 1 n.2.  The Big Four are structured as loose alliances of 
independent partnerships that belong to global membership organizations.  Jonathan Weil, KPMG Opens 
Its Books (a Bit), Offering Glimpse of U.S. Results, Wall St. J., Jan. 26, 2005, at C4.  The alliances are not 
so loose that affiliates of one organization can never be held liable for misconduct of other affiliates.  See In 
re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 377 F. Supp.2d 390, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 375 F. 
Supp.2d 278, 294-96 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); and Stephen Taub, One Lawsuit, One Deloitte, CFO Magazine, 
June 30, 2005 (available at http://www.cfo.com).   But more frequently courts have rejected application of 
“one-firm” theories and dismissed claims against international accounting enterprises absent specific 
allegations that the international auditor controlled the activities of the member firm.  See, e.g., Newby v. 
Enron Corp., 394 F.3d 296, 308-09 (5th Cir. 2004) (fact that Andersen Worldwide SC promulgated and 
enforced professional standards insufficient to hold it liable for actions of U.S. member firm Arthur 
Andersen); In re Royal Dutch/Shell Transport Sec. Litig., 380 F. Supp.2d 509, 571-72 (D.N.J. 2005) 
(dismissing claims against KPMG International and PricewaterhouseCoopers International); Rocker Mgt. 
v. Lernout & Hauspie Speech Prods., 2005 WL 1365772 (D.N.J. June 8, 2005 ) (rejecting application of 
one-firm theory to accounting firms); In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 351 F. Supp.2d 334, 
385 n.41 (D. Md. 2004) (“Deloitte U.S. and Deloitte Netherlands are legally distinct, autonomous firms and 
will be treated as such.”); Skidmore v. KPMG, 2004 WL 3019097, *4 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 28, 2004) 
(allegation that KPMG acted as worldwide organization insufficient to state claim against KPMG LLP for 
acts of KPMG member firm in Morocco); Nuevo Mundo Holdings v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 2004 
WL 112948, *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2004) (member firms in an international accounting association are not 
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eight firms since the late 1980s419 and the dissolution of Arthur Andersen in 2002.  Some 
of these mega-mergers were specifically designed to boost the auditors’ consulting 
practices.420 In 2002, the Big Four audited over 78 percent of all U.S. public companies, 
97 percent of all public companies with sales over $250 million, and 99 percent of all 
public company annual sales.421 Moreover, these concentration ratios have continuously 
increased.  In 1988 the top four firms audited 63 percent of total public company sales.  
By 1997 that number had increased to 71 percent, and by 2002 it was 99 percent.422 
Of course, the Big Four firms do not operate alone.  By 2000 there were 
approximately 45,000 local and regional accounting firms in this country, generally 
organized as partnerships or sole proprietorships.423 A tier of firms below the Big Four, 
 
part of a single firm and are neither agents nor partners of other member firms simply by virtue of using the 
same brand name); and In re Worldcom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2003 WL 21488087 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2003) 
(dismissing securities claims against Andersen Worldwide SC, the umbrella organization for the former 
Arthur Andersen firms).  Cf. In re Lernout & Hauspie Sec. Litig., 230 F. Supp.2d 152, 173 (D.  Mass. 
2002) (court finds that each member firm of KPMG International is a separate and independent legal entity, 
but refuses to dismiss certain claims). 
 
419 See Too Few Accountants: Two Proposed Mergers Among Accountancy Firms Add Up to Serious 
Restraints on Competition, Economist, Jan. 29, 1998; Bean-Counters Unite, Economist, Oct. 23, 1997 
(available at http://www.economist.com); Elizabeth MacDonald, Levitt Says Wave of Accounting Mergers 
Could Affect Independence of Auditors, Wall St. J., Oct. 21, 1997, at A2; and Elizabeth MacDonald, Ernst 
& Young to Merge with KPMG, Wall St. J., Oct. 20, 1997, at A3. 
 
420 Double Entries, Economist, Dec. 11, 1997.  Available at http://www.economist.com. See also Ford 
Harding, Manager’s Journal: Cross-Selling Will Outlast Enron and Andersen, Wall St. J., Aug. 13, 2002, 
at B2 (“The big accounting firms grew to prominence by cross-selling services to their clients.”). 
 
421 Public Accounting Firms, supra note 360, at 1-2, 16.  The Big Four also audit more than 80% of public 
companies in Japan, two-thirds of those in Canada, and all of Britain’s 100 largest public companies.  They 
also hold over 70 percent of the European market as measured by fee income.  Called to Account – The 
Future of Auditing, Economist, Nov. 19, 2004.  Available at http://www.economist.com.
422 Public Accounting Firms, supra note 360, at 20-21. 
 
423 Public Oversight Board, supra note 162, at 184.  Cf. Louis Grumet, State Legislative Power Supercedes 
Federal Laws in Accounting Reform, 76 N.Y. ST. B.J. 54, 54 (2004) (of the nearly 30,000 members of the 
New York State Society of CPAs, merely 6 percent are affiliated with Big Four accounting firms).   
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known in the industry as Group B, has hundreds of members.424 But these firms are 
much smaller than the Big Four.  Grant Thornton, ranked fifth on the list of top 100 
accounting firms in the United States, had annual revenues of $400 million in 2002, and 
its professional staff numbered about 2,100.  By comparison, with respect to their United 
States operations, each member of the Big Four has annual revenues exceeding $3 billion 
and a professional staff that exceeds 10,000.425 Even a merger of the five largest 
members of Group B might not create a firm capable of competing with the Big Four.426 
Moreover, hundreds of the smaller accounting firms have been predicted to fold before 
2010.  The predicted result would be a contraction from 1,200 to around 400 of the 
AICPA’s SECPS, which generally consists of accounting firms that collectively audit the 
financial statements of more than 99 percent of the approximately 18,000 public 
corporations that file reports with the SEC.427 
424 Joseph Radigan, Sussing Out the Second Six, CFO Magazine, Oct. 2, 2002.  Available at 
http://www.cfo.com. Sarbanes-Oxley requires the registration of all public accounting firms (including 
foreign auditors) that issue or prepare audit reports on U.S. public companies, or that play a substantial role 
in the preparation of such audit reports.  By November 23, 2005, 1,580 accounting firms had registered 
with the PCAOB.  See http://www.pcaobus.org/Registration/index.asp.
425 Public Accounting Firms, supra note 360, at 17.  The gap is likewise huge if global operations are 
considered.  In 2003, each member of the Big Four had global revenues that exceeded $10 billion and a 
professional staff that exceeded 60,000.  But BDO Seidman, ranked fifth on the list of U.S.-based firms 
with global operations, lagged with global revenues of approximately $2.4 billion and a professional staff 
of less than 20,000.  Grant Thornton ranked sixth.  Joseph McCafferty, Break Up the Big Four?, CFO 
Magazine, June 2, 2004.  Available at http://www.cfo.com.
426 Still Counting the Cost: The Auditing Profession Has Not Yet Put Its Problems Behind It, Economist, 
Oct. 16, 2003.  Available at http://www.economist.com. Accord Crime and Punishment, Economist, June 
23, 2005 (mergers among second-tier firms would make little difference, given vast gap in size between 
KPMG, the smallest of the Big Four, and those companies below it).  Available at 
http://www.economist.com.
427 Joseph Radigan, Coming: Auditor Cataclysm? CFO Magazine, Oct. 2, 2002.  Available at 
http://www.cfo.com. Since 1990, AICPA member firms auditing one or more companies registered with 
the SEC have been required to join the SECPS.  Sally S. Spielvogel, Note, Exploring the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act: Will Government Intervention in the Public Accounting Profession Prevent Another Enron?, 92 KY.
L.J. 339, 351 (2003-04); Paul R. Brown, Jeanne A. Calderon & Baruch Lev, Administrative and Judicial 
Approaches to Auditor Independence, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 443, 449 (2000). 
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 Because Group B firms are so much smaller than the Big Four, and thus often 
lack (or are perceived to lack) technical skills and relevant knowledge of the industry, a 
reputation for quality work, capacity, and global offices,428 major corporations generally 
shun them.429 The GAO found that 88 percent of public companies responding to its 
survey would not consider using a non-Big Four firm for audit and attest services.  The 
GAO concluded: “For most large public companies, the maximum number of choices has 
gone from eight in 1988 to four in 2003.”430 
But the maximum number of choices is even more limited.  Additional 
constraints are imposed by industry specialization, potential conflicts of interest, and new 
SEC independence rules.  The GAO found that specialization often limits the number of 
audit choices to two.  For example, in 2002, 94.6 percent of assets in the petroleum and 
coal products industry were audited by two companies (Ernst & Young and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers).  Similarly, in 2002, 86.1 percent of assets in the air 
 
428 See Accounting Firm Consolidation: Selected Large Public Company Views on Audit Fees, Quality, 
Independence, and Choice, Report by U.S. General Accounting Office to Senate Comm. on Banking, 
Housing and Urban Affairs and House Comm. on Financial Services 14-15 (Sept. 2003) (GAO-03-1158) 
(hereafter Selected Large Public Company Views) (available at http://www.gao.gov).  An SEC study 
suggests that the reputation of the larger firms for higher quality work is not necessarily warranted.  The 
SEC reviewed all 227 of the enforcement matters it pursued during the period July 31, 1997 to July 30, 
2002, and determined that in 140 of those cases, the issuer was audited by a Big Five firm.  Section 704 
Report, supra note 14, at 39. 
 
429 Second-tier accounting firms gained 193 new clients from Big Four firms in 2004, but many of these 
were small clients cut loose by the Big Four.  John Goff, Fractured Fraternity, CFO Magazine, Sept. 1, 
2005.  Available at http://www.cfo.com.
430 Public Accounting Firms, supra note 360, at 26.  Accord Lingling Wei, Alliances Among Accounting 
Firms in Popularity Due to Necessity, Wall St. J., Feb. 11, 2004 (Big Four firms have a virtual lock on 
market for auditing large public companies) (available at 2004 WL-WSJ 56919825); Jonathan Weil, 
Tracking the Numbers/Outside Audit: Fannie Dismissal of KPMG Shows Dwindling Choices Among Big 
Four, Wall St. J., Dec. 23, 2004, at C1.  See also Alix Nyberg, Audit Fees on the Rise, CFO Magazine, Oct. 
1, 2002 (during the period 1999-2002, only two to four percent of companies changing auditors switched 
from a Big Five firm to a smaller firm).  Available at http://www.cfo.com. This outcome is not entirely a 
function of client choice.  Many smaller accounting firms have no interest in competing for the audit work 
of multinationals, given the downside of possible securities litigation, high insurance costs, and the 
incumbent advantage enjoyed by the Big Four. Still Counting the Cost: The Auditing Profession Has Not 
Yet Put Its Problems Behind It, Economist, Oct. 16, 2003.  Available at http://www.economist.com.
98
transportation industry were audited by two companies (Ernst & Young and Deloitte & 
Touche).  These ratios became much more pronounced from 1997 to 2002, following the 
demise of Arthur Andersen and the merger of Price Waterhouse with Coopers & 
Lybrand.  As a result of specialization it has become increasingly difficult for a large 
company to find an auditing firm with the requisite industry-specific expertise and staff 
capacity.431 
The problem is exacerbated by the requirement, imposed by Sarbanes-Oxley and 
SEC rules adopted in 2003, that a company’s auditor refrain from providing various non-
audit services.  The GAO concluded that, as a consequence of the foregoing factors, there 
are scenarios in which a company “would have no viable alternatives for its global audit 
and attest needs.”432 Another adverse consequence is that corporations selecting new 
auditors sometimes hire an accounting firm that has been fired from another major 
account on the ground of impropriety.433 
The absence of effective competition in the auditing industry further undercuts the 
assumption of DiLeo and similar cases that auditors would never engage in fraud, 
 
431 Public Accounting Firms, supra note 360, at 26-30.  See also Called to Account – The Future of 
Auditing, Economist, Nov. 19, 2004 (just two firms audited 88.2% of the casino industry in 2004, and 
similar concentrations exist in other industries) (available at http://www.economist.com); Cassell Bryan-
Low & Jonathan Weil, GAO Warns on Future Problems from Audit-Industry Mergers, Wall St. J., July 31, 
2003, at C11; and Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation, supra note 181, at 41 (auditor choices are restricted 
because accounting profession has become segmented by industry and firms lack industry-specific 
knowledge).   
 
432 Public Accounting Firms, supra note 360, at 30.  See also The Future of the Accounting Profession,
American Assembly Report (Feb. 2004) at 15 (as result of Sarbanes-Oxley, multinational companies 
typically engage two of the Big Four, and thus have only two choices if they wish to change auditors).  
Available at http://www.hypermediative-dev1.net/programs.dir/prog_display_ind_pdf; Half Measures: The 
Auditing Industry Still Needs More Reform, Economist, Nov. 18, 2004 (“Each of the Big Four accountancy 
firms and many of the second-tier ones have been sullied by accounting scandals, and yet they continue to 
attract business because there are no other options, particularly for large, international companies.”).  
Available at http://www.economist.com.
433 Scot J. Paltrow, Companies Swap Fired Auditors, Wall St. J., July 1, 2002, at C1. 
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because the financial consequences would be devastating.  In this industry, which 
effectively operates as an oligopoly, the constraints on fraudulent activity are thinner than 
might otherwise be expected.434 Moreover, because a Big Three would certainly be too 
few to provide a sufficient degree of competition in Fortune 500 audits, the Department 
of Justice is constrained to act as aggressively now in cases of auditor fraud as it did in 
the case of Arthur Andersen.  The industry cannot tolerate the demise of another huge 
auditor.435 It is widely assumed that the Justice Department’s 2005 deferred prosecution 
agreement with KPMG in connection with the firm’s marketing of illegal tax shelters was 
prompted by concerns that an indictment would cause the Big Four to shrink to the Big 
Three.436 
(3) Audit Firm Rotation and Accountants Who Switch Sides 
 The DiLeo analysis also should be rejected because it fails to consider that (a) 
major corporations have no obligation to rotate their audit firms (and therefore rarely do 
so), and (b) many corporations hire their former auditors to work in-house at the 
 
434 See Coffee, supra note 4, at 1414-15 (in a concentrated market of four auditing firms, it becomes less 
likely that one of the firms will market itself as distinctive for its integrity); McCoy, supra note 161, at 
1003 (oligopoly power permits major accounting firms to sustain repeated payouts in litigation with their 
reputations unscathed). 
 
435 See, e.g., Called to Account – The Future of Auditing, Economist, Nov. 19, 2004.  Available at 
http://www.economist.com.
436 See, e.g., Stephen Taub, Regulators Clueless on Big Four Failure, CFO Magazine, Sept. 28, 2005 
(available at http://www.cfo.com); Taxed, Economist, Sept. 1, 2005 (“Had the Big Four become a Big 
Three, there would have been one firm fewer in an industry that is already highly concentrated.”) (available 
at http://www.cfo.com); and Joseph Nocera, Auditors: Too Few to Fail, N.Y. Times, June 25, 2005, at C1 
(Justice Department failed to indict KPMG in connection with its sales of illegal tax shelters in part because 
government feared indictment would cause KPMG to fold).  This concern was shared by European 
regulators.  See Craig Schneider, Concern for KPMG Extends to Europe, CFO Magazine, July 11, 2005.  
Available at http://www.cfo.com. See also Robert Bloom & David C. Schirm, Consolidation and 
Competition in Public Accounting: An Analysis of the GAO Report, CPA J., June 2005 (speculating that 
SEC gave Ernst & Young a mere six-month suspension from accepting new public company audit 
engagements in 2004 -- due to violations of auditor independence rules -- because of limited competition in 
audit industry) (available at http://www.nysscpa.org).   
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management level.  The absence of rotation and the phenomenon of revolving door hiring 
have impaired the independence that auditors are required to exhibit, because auditors in 
these situations are motivated to curry favor with management.  
 In a study mandated by Sarbanes-Oxley and released in 2003, the GAO estimated 
that 99 percent of Fortune 1000 public companies and their audit committees have no 
audit firm rotation policy.437 Because mandatory rotation has not been imposed by the 
SEC or PCAOB,438 and it is so rarely implemented on a voluntary basis, auditing 
relationships typically last a long time.  The relationships between Fortune 1000 
companies and their auditors average 22 years.439 The absence of rotation has potentially 
serious detrimental effects.  If an auditing firm knows that it can remain employed by its 
client indefinitely, as long as it remains in management’s good graces, it has a powerful 
incentive to approve the client’s accounting decisions, even if that accounting is 
fraudulent.  Thus, almost all of the largest accounting scandals in recent years, including 
those at Enron, WorldCom, and HealthSouth, occurred on the watch of auditors who had 
been on the job for at least a decade.440 
437 Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation, supra note 181. 
 
438 Neither body has taken a position on the merits of mandatory audit firm rotation.  Id. at 40 n.45. 
 
439 Id. at 16-17.  This statistic is shaped by two contrasting factors.  First, there was a substantially 
increased rate of auditor change during the period 2001-03, attributable to the collapse of Arthur Andersen.  
More than 80% of Fortune 1000 companies that changed auditors during this period did so to replace 
Andersen.  Second, approximately 10% of Fortune 1000 companies have had the same auditor for more 
than 75 years.   Exclusion of this latter group of companies reduces the average auditor tenure to 19 years.  
Id. Audit relationships are shorter in other countries that impose mandatory rotation.  Since 1975 Italy has 
required audit firm rotation for listed companies every nine years.  Since 1999 Brazil has required financial 
institutions to change auditors every four years and all other listed companies to change every five years.  
Silvia Ascarelli, One Size Doesn’t Fit All: In Europe, Corporate Governance Rules Are Not in the Details,
Wall St. J., Feb. 24, 2003, at R6; Mandatory Audit Reform Rotation, supra note 181, at 83-84.   
 
440 Still Counting the Cost: The Auditing Profession Has Yet To Put Its Problems Behind It, Economist, 
Oct. 16, 2003.  Available at http://www.economist.com).  Accord Floyd Norris, The Auditors Never 
Noticed, N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 2003 (“On all the major debacles, including Tyco, Ahold, Enron, Rite Aid, 
Xerox, Cendent, HealthSouth, WorldCom, Microstrategy, W.R. Grace, Sunbeam, Lucent, Oxford Health, 
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Likewise, an individual auditor who knows that ultimately he is likely to be 
offered a top management position with his client may be motivated to approve improper 
accounting.441 Enron is a classic example.  A revolving door connected Enron and Arthur 
Andersen, its external auditor since 1985.442 The door revolved for numerous 
individuals, including the former chief accounting officer of Enron’s North American 
operations, who joined the company after managing Enron’s account at Arthur Andersen 
in Houston.443 In 2003 this officer settled accounting fraud charges filed against him by 
the SEC, by agreeing to pay $500,000 in penalties, and he was later indicted on six felony 
counts.444 But he was not alone. As many as three hundred accounting and finance 
positions at Enron, many in mid-level and senior management, may have been filled by 
former Andersen personnel.445 
and Adelphia, the auditor had a longtime relationship and should have had boat loads of knowledge.”) 
(statement of Lynn Turner, former SEC chief accountant).  Available at http://www.nytimes.com. See also 
Thomas C. Wooten, Research About Audit Quality, CPA J., Jan. 2003 (audit failure is more common in 
very long audit relationships, as well as in short tenures).  Available at http://www.cpajournal.com.
441 Jonathan Macey & Hillary A. Sale, Observations on the Role of Commodification, Independence, and 
Governance in the Accounting Industry, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1167, 1178 (2003). 
 
442 Why Good Accountants Do Bad Audits, supra note 341, at 102; Charles M. Elson & Christopher J. 
Gyves, The Enron Failure and Corporate Governance Reform, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 855, 867 (2003).  
Andersen also served as Enron’s internal auditor. 
 
443 Craig Schneider, When Accountants Switch Sides: Is it Time for the SEC To Prohibit Corporations  
from Offering Jobs To Their External Auditors?, CFO Magazine, Apr. 3, 2002.  Available at 
http://www.cfo.com.
444 Kurt Eichenwald, Ex-Accounting Chief at Enron Is Indicted on 6 Felony Charges, N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 
2004 (available at http://www.nytimes.com); Dan Ackman, Causey May Put GAAP on Trial, forbes.com, 
Jan. 23, 2004 (available at http://www.forbes.com); and John R. Emshwiller, U.S. Investigators Open New 
Front in Enron Case, Wall St. J., Oct. 10, 2003, at A3.   
 
445 See In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp.2d 549, 674 (S.D. Tex. 2002).  Cf. 
Landsman, supra note 365, at 1209 (“Enron hired away no fewer than 125 Andersen accountants. . . . The 
steady stream of hirings. . . appeared to hold out the promise of lucrative future employment to those 
Andersen accountants who could ingratiate themselves to Enron officials.”). 
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Waste Management, Inc. is another classic example.  From 1971 until 1997, every 
CFO and chief accounting officer hired by Waste Management previously worked for 
Arthur Andersen, its external auditor.446 A total of 14 former Andersen employees 
ultimately worked for Waste Management during the 1990s, most of whom took jobs in 
key financial and accounting positions.447 Each time the door revolved, Waste 
Management’s fraud multiplied.448 In 1997, the company had the largest earnings 
restatement to that date in United States history, wiping out $1.7 billion in profits that had 
been generated in the 1990s.449 Subsequently, Waste Management settled class action 
litigation arising from this accounting fraud for $457 million and Andersen settled a 
related suit for $20 million.450 Andersen also entered into a consent decree with the SEC 
regarding charges that the auditor failed to maintain its independence and issued 
 
446 Roper, supra note 33, at 4. 
 
447 Schneider, supra note 443. 
 
448 See Roper, supra note 33, at 9 (“The revolving door that existed between Andersen and Enron, and 
between Andersen and Waste Management, clearly helped to create the environment in which external 
auditors were viewed as just another part of the corporate family.”). 
 
449 Ken Brown & Ianthe Jeanne Dugan, Sad Account: Andersen’s Fall From Grace Is a Tale of Greed and 
Miscues, Wall St. J., June 7, 2002, at A1.  The case of Waste Management also underscores the hazard of  
auditors consulting for their audit clients.  The lead auditor for the company was known inside Arthur 
Andersen as “The Rainmaker” for his success in cross-selling non-audit services to audit clients.  Between 
1991 and 1997, Waste Management paid audit fees to Andersen of $7.5 million and non-audit fees of $17.8 
million, while The Rainmaker was signing off on drastically inaccurate books.  Id.   
 
450 Mark Allan Worden, Note, Securities Regulation: Protecting Auditor Independence from Non-Audit 
Services – An Evolving Standard, 55 OKLA. L. REV. 513, 520 (2002).  The SEC fined Arthur Andersen $7 
million in 2001 in connection with the firm’s botched audits of Waste Management.  This was touted by the 
SEC as the largest fine imposed against an accounting firm in U.S. history, but it represented less than 10% 
of the $79 million that Waste Management paid Andersen in 2000 for audit and other services.  Steve 
Liesman, Jonathan Weil & Michael Schroeder, Dirty Books?  Accounting Debacles Spark Calls for 
Change: Here’s the Rundown, Wall St. J., Feb. 6, 2002, at A1.   In 2005, Waste Management agreed to pay 
$26.8 million to settle an action filed by the SEC against four former top executives of the company.  Craig 
Schneider, Waste Management Ex-CFO to Fight Charges, CFO Magazine, Aug. 30, 2005.  Avaialble at 
http://www.cfo.com.
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materially false and misleading audit reports.451 But Andersen and its former clients 
Enron and Waste Management are not unique.  Audit firms have been generally 
described as farm systems for major corporations.452 A review of 200 accounting fraud 
cases arising between 1987 and 1997 found that in 11 percent of the cases, the Chief 
Financial Officer had previously been employed by the corporation’s current auditor.453 
Sarbanes-Oxley does not solve either of the foregoing problems.  It makes only a 
token effort to shut the revolving door.  Under the statute, a company may not retain an 
accounting firm as its auditor if any of the company’s top officers had been an employee 
of the auditor in the previous year.454 This provision permits most audit firm employees 
to take jobs with their former clients.455 Sarbanes-Oxley also provides for a five-year 
rotation, but only of the lead and concurring review partners within a particular auditing 
firm.456 Such minimal rotation is likely to have little or no effect, because it will not 
reduce the financial incentive for auditors to compromise their judgment on accounting 
 
451 Landsman, supra note 365, at 1206. 
 
452 Schneider, supra note 443.   
 
453 Stephen Barr, Breaking Up the Big 5, CFO Magazine, May 1, 2000.  Available at http://www.cfo.com.
See also Stephen Taub, PwC Settles Raytheon Case for $50 Million, CFO Magazine, June 1, 2004 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers settles accounting fraud case involving its client Raytheon for $50 million, where 
Raytheon’s CFO had previously been auditor’s lead partner on its work for the company).  Available at 
http://www.cfo.com.
454 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(l). 
 
455 Don A. Moore, An Honest Account, Wall St. J., Nov. 13, 2002, at A24.  See also The Lessons from 
Enron: After the Energy Firm’s Collapse, the Entire Auditing Regime Needs Radical Change, Economist, 
Feb. 7, 2002 (SEC should ban the practice of companies hiring managers and internal auditors from their 
external audit firms).  Available at http://www.economist.com.
456 Sarbanes-Oxley provides for the lead audit partner to rotate after five years, effective for the fiscal year 
beginning after May 6, 2003.  The concurring review partner also must rotate after five years, and certain 
other audit partners on the engagement must rotate after seven years.   15 U.S.C. § 78(j)-1(j). 
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issues.457 Indeed, it has been suggested that the rotation provision in Sarbanes-Oxley will 
exacerbate the current problem, to the extent that partners in major accounting firms 
compete against one another for promotion and bonuses.458 
A number of commentators have concluded that mandatory rotation of auditing 
firms could help cure the problem,459 and the limited experience of foreign countries 
tends to support this conclusion.  Italy, which has had mandatory rotation for listed 
companies since 1975, has had generally positive results.460 Other countries with 
 
457 See Thomas J. Healey & Yu-Jin Kim, The Benefits of Mandatory Auditor Rotation, REGULATION 10, 11 
(Fall 2003) (“[N]othing in the current Sarbanes-Oxley Act could have prevented debacles like Enron; 
mandatory audit firm rotation is the only practical, preventive mechanism.”).  Available at 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv26n3-noted.pdf.
458 Macey & Sale, supra note 441, at 1168. 
 
459 See Conference Board Commission -- Parts 2 and 3, supra note 22, at 34 (“Rotation of auditors would 
also reduce any financial incentives for external auditors to compromise their judgment on borderline 
accounting issues.”).  Accord Unresolved Conflicts: Reforms of the Auditing Industry Do Not Go Far 
Enough, Economist, Oct. 16, 2003 (to break cycle of accounting scandals, U.S. should make auditor firm 
rotation mandatory) and Accounting for Change: The Need for Radical Audit Reform in America Grows 
Ever More Pressing, Economist, June 27, 2002 (“There is also a strong case for compulsory rotation of 
auditors. . . . Experience shows that the best form of peer review is a frequent change of reviewer.”).    
Available at http://www.economist.com).   But see Nashwa George, Auditor Rotation and the Quality of 
Audits, CPA J., Dec. 2004 (study of audit failure at 90 companies finds no credible evidence that 
mandatory auditor rotation will improve audit quality or reduce audit fees).  Available at 
http://www.nysscpa.org.
460 Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation, supra note 181, at 83.  One study from Italy, which reported negative 
results, is often cited by critics of rotation.  See, e.g., Rebuilding Public Confidence in Financial Reporting: 
An International Perspective, International Federation of Accountants Task Force on Rebuilding Public 
Confidence in Financial Reporting 33 (July 2003) (“The evidence from the only country which has had 
compulsory rotation of auditors for long enough to be able to evaluate its effects provides no evidence that 
compulsory rotation of firms increases audit quality.”) (available at http://www.ifac.org.); Adrian Zea, 
Study Backs Fears Over Auditor Rotation, AccountancyAge.com, June 8, 2002.  Available at 
http://AccountancyAge.com/News/1130223. However, the methodology and accuracy of this study have 
been criticized by both the GAO and the Commissione Nazionale per le Societa e la Borsa, the Italian 
securities regulator.   Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation, supra note 181, at 83.  The huge accounting scandal 
uncovered in December 2003 at Parmalat SpA, Italy’s largest food company, does not prove that auditor 
rotation does not work.  The $15-20 billion fraud (modern Europe’s most significant white-collar crime) 
took place over a decade or more, and continued for years after the company rotated auditors in 1999.  
However, there was no rotation with regard to Parmalat’s Cayman Islands-based subsidiary (Bonlat 
Financing Corp.) at the center of the scandal.   At Parmalat’s request, the Italian affiliate of Grant Thornton 
International continued to audit Bonlat even after Deloitte Touche & Tohmatsu became Parmalat’s primary 
auditor.  See David Reilly, Alessandra Galloni & Carrick Mollenkamp, Parmalat Sues Bank of America 
Corp., Wall St. J., Oct. 8, 2004, at A3; Eric Silvers, New Report Widens Parmalat’s Debt, N.Y. Times, Jan. 
27, 2004 (available at http://www.nytimes.com).  The Parmalat example may merely demonstrate that Italy 
105
mandatory rotation include Brazil (since May 1999), Singapore (since 2002, but only 
with regard to banks incorporated locally), and Austria (beginning in 2004).461 
While mandatory audit firm rotation could be an effective solution to the problem 
of impaired auditor independence, the auditing industry has successfully lobbied to 
prevent such reform in the United States.462 The industry has publicly opposed 
mandatory rotation for more than a decade.  The AICPA’s SECPS Executive Committee 
adopted a position paper rejecting rotation in 1992,463 and the AICPA reaffirmed that 
 
should have closed the loophole in its law that permitted foreign subsidiaries to be exempt from mandatory 
rotation.   See Floyd Norris, The Auditors Never Noticed, N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 2003.  Available at 
http://www.nytimes.com. But cf. Christopher Wiggan, Parmalat: Where Were the Auditors?, Jan. 23, 2004 
(jury is out on whether Parmalat scandal proves auditor rotation works) (available at 
http://www.issproxy.com/articles/008.asp); Joseph Weber & Gail Edmondson, Auditors Asleep at the 
Wheel.  Sound Familiar?, BusinessWeek, Jan. 12, 2004, at 47 (Parmalat scandal shows that auditor rotation 
in Italy does not work).  The Parmalat scandal has sparked renewed calls for auditor rotation in Europe.   
See Stephen Taub, Auditor Rotation Gets A Fresh Start in Europe, CFO Magazine, Feb. 4, 2004 (available 
at http://www.cfo.com); Daniel Dombey & Andrew Parker, EU May Force Audit Firm Rotation After 
Scandals, FT.com, Feb. 2, 2004 (available at http://www.financialtimes.com).   
 
461 Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation, supra note 181, at 84-85.  See also Juan Pajuelo, Brazil Reaffirms 
Tougher Auditor Rule Than in U.S., Nov. 21, 2003 (Brazilian securities regulator -- CVM -- determined 
that audit firm rotation would provide better safeguard against improper accounting than mere rotation of 
engagement partners).  Available at http://www.issproxy.com/articles/archived115.asp. Spain imposed 
mandatory audit firm rotation during the period 1989 to 1995, and Canada imposed mandatory rotation for 
banks during the period 1923 to 1991.   Spain abandoned the practice not because it was ineffective, but 
primarily because the main objective of increasing competition among audit firms had been achieved.  
Canada abandoned the practice due to cost considerations.  Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation, supra note 
181, at 86-89.  Audit rules proposed by the European Commission in 2004 require rotation of audit firms 
every seven years or rotation of audit partners every five years.  More Rules, Economist, March 18, 2004 
(available at http://www.economist.com); Stephen Taub, Europe’s Tough New Auditing Standards, CFO 
Magazine, March 18, 2004 (available at http://www.cfo.com). 
 
462 Floyd Norris, The Auditors Never Noticed, N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 2003 (accounting industry bitterly and 
successfully opposed inclusion of mandatory rotation provision in Sarbanes-Oxley) (available at 
http://www.nytimes.com); Michael Schroeder, CPA Trade Group Urges Caution in Rush to Regulate 
Industry in Wake of Enron, Wall St. J., March 14, 2002, at A20. 
 
463 See Statement of Position Regarding Mandatory Rotation of Audit Firms of Publicly Held Companies,
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (March 24, 1992).  Available at 
http://www.aicpa.org/members/div/secps/lit/sops/1900.htm.
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position in a White Paper issued in 2003.464 Earlier, the accounting industry opposed 
mandatory rotation of auditors for the 50 largest U.S. banks.465 
One of the primary arguments raised by the industry is that auditing costs would 
multiply if corporations were forced to periodically change auditors.466 This argument 
has some validity.  The GAO estimated that, in the first year following a change in 
auditor under mandatory audit firm rotation, audit-related costs could be 43 percent to 
128 percent higher than the likely recurring audit costs had there been no change in 
auditor.467 However, audit costs for public companies currently comprise a very small 
percentage of total operating costs,468 and increased costs could be minimized if the 
outgoing audit firms were required to retain and transfer their working papers to the 
incoming firms.  In any event, the increased costs are likely to be marginal in comparison 
to the costs incurred from the loss of investor confidence in response to inaccurate 
financial statements.469 
In sum, the DiLeo reasoning is defective because it fails to consider a major cause 
of audit failure from the late 1990s onward -- the incentive structure that impels auditors 
 
464 Audit Partner Rotation – Issue Brief, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Oct. 2003.  
Available at http://www.aicpa.org./statelegis/index.asp.
465 Lee Barton, GAO Weighs Auditing Plan for Big Banks: Accounting Firms Express Concern About 
Proposal to Require Rotations, Wall St. J., March 27, 1991, at A3. 
 
466 See, e.g., Mandatory Rotation of Audit Firms – Will It Improve Audit Quality?, PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(2002).  Available at http://www.pwcglobal.com.
467 Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation, supra note 181, at 33. 
 
468 In 2002/03, audit fees for public companies with annual revenues in excess of $5 billion averaged .04 
percent of total operating costs.  They averaged 0.08 percent of total operating costs for public companies 
with annual revenues of less than $1 billion.  Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation, supra note 181, at 32-33. 
 
469 Conference Board Commission -- Parts 2 and 3, supra note 22, at 34.  Accord C. Richard Baker, The 
Varying Concept of Auditor Independence, CPA J. (Aug. 2005) (benefits of regular audit rotation to 
investing public would outweigh added initial start-up costs).  (Available at www.nysscpa.org.)  
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to curry favor with company management.470 Sarbanes-Oxley provides no effective 
cure.471 
(4) Auditors Are Often Irrational 
 A fourth reason to reject the DiLeo analysis is that it fails to address the 
phenomenon of the irrational auditor and auditor firm.  DiLeo and its progeny assume 
that individual auditors and their audit firms, confronted with choices in the face of 
uncertainty, will rationally select options that maximize their subjective expected utility.  
But this perception of auditors as fully rational actors, while commonplace,472 is not 
particularly accurate.  A comprehensive analysis of the topic by Prof. Robert Prentice 
concludes that “[a]uditors’ rationality, like that of the rest of the population, is highly 
suspect. . . .”473 Prof. Prentice, relying upon a substantial body of interdisciplinary 
behavioral research, persuasively argues that DiLeo and its progeny are misguided, 
insofar as such cases assume the rationality of auditors and audit firms, and further 
 
470 McCoy, supra note 161, at 1008.  Prof. McCoy argues that even mandatory rotation would not solve the 
problem, because audit firms would continue to work for their audit clients and would retain an inside track 
and a cost advantage in competitive bidding.  Id. at 1009. 
 
471 The PCAOB has vowed to scrutinize situations where corporations fire their external auditors, but it is 
not clear that this will have an impact on the entrenched system of incentives.  See Accounting Regulator 
Vows to Scrutinize Firings of Auditors, Wall St. J., Sept. 23, 2003.  Available at 2003 WL-WSJ 3980397.  
In the aftermath of Sarbanes-Oxley, auditor firings have increased.  More than 1,600 companies changed 
auditors in 2004, a 78% jump from 2003.  The total of 2,514 for the two years represents more than one-
fourth of publicly listed companies in the United States.  But most of the switching companies are small.  
Of those companies switching auditors in 2004, 85% posted $100 million or less in revenues that year.  
Stephen Taub, Auditors Rotating at Dizzying Pace, CFO Magazine, Feb. 18, 2005 (available at 
http://www.cfo.com); Diya Gullapalli, Moving the Market: Number of Firms That Switched Auditors 
Jumped 78% in 2004, Wall St. J., Feb. 17, 2005, at C3. 
 
472 See, e.g., Stanley Baiman, et al., Optimal Contracts with a Utility-Maximizing Auditor, 25 J. ACCT.
RES. 217 (1987); Rick Antle, The Auditor as an Economic Agent, 20 J. ACCT. RES. 503 (1982). 
 
473 Robert A. Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor: A Behavioral Insight into Securities Fraud 
Litigation, 95 NW. U. L. Rev. 133, 142 (2000).  For a general rebuttal to Prof. Prentice, see Mark Klock, 
Are Wastefulness and Flamboyance Really Virtues? Use and Abuse of Economic Analysis, 71 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 181 (2002). 
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assume that it is always irrational for auditors and audit firms to act recklessly or 
fraudulently. 
 Prof. Prentice first demonstrates that individual auditors are subject to many of 
the same behavioral limitations that prevent the general population from functioning as 
fully rational actors.  Specifically, auditors lack perfect information, suffer from a range 
of well-documented heuristics and biases474 (e.g., confirmation bias, hindsight bias, and 
cognitive dissonance), and tend to fall into various behavioral traps.  These traps include 
the honoring of sunk costs.  In the audit context, the manifestation stems from the not 
infrequent practice of low-balling, in which auditors bid at or below cost on an account in 
order to secure new business.475 Low-balling has significant potential to impair auditor 
independence,476 as auditors attempt to honor the sunk cost of low-balled audit 
business.477 
Auditing firms also tend to function as less than fully rational actors, primarily 
because their employees suffer from the frailties described above.  In a huge audit firm, 
these infirmities are multiplied and complicated by such organizational pitfalls as 
corporate culture, heuristics, groupthink, and authority leakage.478 This last point 
 
474 Prentice, supra note 473, at 144-81.  Accord Why Good Accountants Do Bad Audits, supra note 341. 
 
475 See Steve Bergman, Loss-Leader or Client-Feeder?, CFO Magazine, Sept. 28, 2000 (“Accounting 
firms themselves often slash prices to win contracts, as if their services were blue-light specials.”)  
Available at http://www.cfo.com.
476 Prentice, supra note 473, at 173 (citing study by AICPA).  Accord Ronald A. Dye, Informationally 
Motivated Auditor Replacement, 14 J. ACCT. & ECON. 347, 363 (1991) (low-balling encourages auditors to 
attest to more favorable financial reports than they otherwise would).  But see Ch-Wen Jevons Lee & 
Zhaoyang Gu, Low Balling, Legal Liability, and Auditor Independence, 73 ACCT. REV. 533 (1998) 
(concluding, contrary to weight of evidence, that low-balling increases auditor independence). 
 
477 Prentice, supra note 473, at 171-74. 
 
478 Id. at 182-85. 
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pertains to the difficulty of maintaining control of individual behavior in organizations 
that have tens of thousands of employees.  The problem is endemic in the Big 4, where 
each member had a professional staff in 2002 that exceeded 10,000 individuals.479 
Moreover, it is not always irrational for individual auditors or their audit firms to 
audit recklessly or fraudulently.  With regard to individual auditors, the revolving door 
described above provides substantial incentives to approve a client’s improper 
accounting.  This was certainly true in the case of Arthur Andersen and its clients Enron 
and Waste Management.  Many other factors also come into play.  These factors include 
observability (auditors take shortcuts, assuming their improprieties will not be detected or 
blame will be diffused among the audit team members),480 stress, and the reward system 
utilized by audit firms.481 Similarly, it is not always irrational for accounting firms to 
audit recklessly or fraudulently.  Audit firms, like other organizations, often risk their 
reputations in order to generate short-term profits.  The lobbying that the audit industry 
has historically engaged in to defeat the adoption of strong accounting standards is 
evidence of this proposition.  Examples described above include industry lobbying to 
defeat the expensing of stock options and reform of SPE accounting.   
Any damage to auditor reputation that does occur is mitigated by positive cash 
flow.  Mitigation often occurs in the form of revenue from non-audit services, such as 
consulting and tax.  Finally, empirical studies show that damage to auditor reputation 
 
479 In 2002, the professional staffs of the Big 4 were: Deloitte & Touche -- 19,835; 
PricewaterhouseCoopers -- 16,774; Ernst & Young -- 15,078; and KPMG -- 10,967.  Public Accounting 
Firms, supra note 360, at 17. 
 
480 See Coffee, supra note 4, at 1415. 
 
481 Prentice, supra note 473, at 188-95.  Accord Benston, supra note 42, at 1345 (individual partners in 
charge of specific audits have incentives to take auditing risks, because their compensation is based on the 
audit fees they generate). 
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caused by audit failure is generally inconsequential.  Auditors who err do not lose market 
share or pricing power.482 Indeed, the Big 4 accounting firms are largely immune from 
reputational damage because of their market power.483 The 2003 GAO study of 
consolidation and competition in the audit industry484 tends to support this argument. 
Prof. Prentice concludes that “the simplifying assumptions of the law and 
economics approach embodied in the DiLeo line of cases are clearly unreliable.”485 This 
unreliability, while manifest, has not yet been recognized by the judiciary.  The deeply 
flawed DiLeo reasoning continues to be widely accepted by federal district and appellate 
courts, much to the detriment of shareholders who have been victimized by external 
auditors who have engaged in fraudulent conduct.     
B.  Recklessness, GAAP/GAAS Violations, and Red Flags 
 Plaintiffs who are unable to meet the pleading burden established by the motive 
and opportunity standard486, or who have filed in courts not embracing that standard at 
all, can seek to plead scienter of external auditors on the basis of recklessness.  But courts 
have set the pleading bar in this area unjustifiably high.  While the PSLRA does not 
 
482 Prentice, supra note 473, at 215.  See also Joshua Ronen, Post-Enron Reform: Financial Statement 
Insurance, and GAAP Revisited, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 39, 47 (2002) (“[T]he expected cost of litigation 
and other penalties is recouped on the average from the auditees. . . .”). 
 
483 Prentice, supra note 473, at 215. 
 
484 Public Accounting Firms, supra note 360. 
 
485 Prentice, supra note 473, at 219.  Prof. Prentice has applied behavioral analysis to Enron.  See Robert 
Prentice, Enron: A Brief Behavioral Autopsy, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 417 (2003).  
 
486 See, e.g., In re Stone & Webster, Inc. Sec. Litig., 414 F.3d 187, 215 (1st Cir. 2005) (auditor’s motivation 
to continue a profitable business relationship insufficient by itself to support a strong inference of scienter); 
In re Royal Dutch/Shell Transport Sec. Litig., 380 F. Supp.2d 509, 568-69 (D.N.J. 2005) (auditor’s 
motivation to increase fees from non-auditing services insufficient to constitute evidence of scienter). 
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distinguish between external auditors and other defendants,487 numerous courts have 
determined, with little or no analysis, that the bar for pleading scienter should be set 
higher for auditors.488 The final section of this Article considers this issue. 
 With the exception of the Seventh Circuit, the First through Eleventh Circuits all 
have held that GAAP violations, without more, do not establish scienter in securities 
fraud cases.489 The Seventh Circuit did not appear to have addressed the issue in a 
published opinion by December 2005, but numerous district courts in that circuit -- 
 
487 See In re Microstrategy, Inc. Sec. Litig., 115 F. Supp.2d 620, 650 (E.D. Va. 2000). 
 
488 See, e.g., Fidel v. Farley, 392 F.3d 220, 227 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[W[hen the claim is brought against an 
outside auditor, we have concluded that the ‘meaning of recklessness in securities fraud cases is especially 
stringent.’”); In re Learnout & Hauspie Sec. Litig., 230 F. Supp.2d 152, 160 (D. Mass. 2002) (“Courts 
assessing claims against independent auditors and accountants under the PSLRA have set a high bar. . . .”); 
In re Raytheon Sec. Litig., 157 F. Supp.2d 131, 154 (D. Mass. 2001) (same); In re Smartalk Teleservices, 
Inc. Sec. Litig., 124 F. Supp.2d 505, 514 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (“The standard for recklessness in securities 
fraud cases is more onerous when the claim is brought against an outside auditor.”); and Reiger v. Altris 
Software, Inc., 1999 WL 540893, *4 (S.D. Cal., Apr. 30, 1999) (“The recklessness standard imposes an 
even heavier burden on plaintiffs seeking to add outside auditors and accountants as defendants in a 
securities fraud action.”).  See also Savett, supra note 305, at 1369 (“Courts have set the bar for pleading 
accountants’ recklessness exceptionally high. . . .”). 
 
489 See, e.g., Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 203-04 (1st Cir. 1999); Novak v. Kasaks, 216 
F.3d 300, 309 (2d Cir. 2000); Stevelman v. Alias Research, Inc., 174 F.3d 79, 84-85 (2d Cir. 1999); Chill v. 
General Elec. Co., 101 F.3d 263, 270 (2d Cir. 1996); In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 712 (3d 
Cir. 1996); Malone v. Microdyne Corp., 26 F.3d 471, 479 (4th Cir. 1994); Abrams v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 
292 F.3d 424, 432 (5th Cir. 2002); Fine v. American Solar King Corp., 919 F.2d 290, 297 (5th Cir. 1990); 
Wyser-Pratte Mgt. Co. v. Telxon Corp., 413 F.3d 553, 563 (6th Cir. 2005); PR Diamonds, Inc. v. Chandler, 
364 F.3d 671, 694 (6th Cir. 2004); In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 553 (6th Cir. 1999); 
Ferris, Baker Watts, Inc. v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 395 F.3d 851, 855 (8th Cir. 2005); Kushner v. Beverly 
Enterprises, Inc., 317 F.3d 820, 831 (8th Cir. 2003); In re Navarre Corp. Sec. Litig., 299 F.3d 735, 745 (8th 
Cir. 2002); In re Saxton, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2005 WL 3271342, *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 2, 2005); DSAM Global 
Value Fund. v. Altris Software, Inc., 288 F.3d 385, 390 (9th Cir. 2002); In re Software Toolworks, Inc., 50 
F.3d 615, 627 (9th Cir. 1994); In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407, 1426 (9th Cir. 1994); 
Pirraglia v. Novell, Inc., 2003 WL 21907612, *7 (10th Cir., Aug. 11, 2003); City of Philadelphia v. Fleming 
Cos., 264 F.3d 1245, 1261 (10th Cir. 2001); and Ziemba v. Cascade Int’l, Inc., 256 F.3d 1194, 1208 (11th 
Cir. 2001).  The persistence of GAAP violations for an extended period of time has not generally altered 
the universal holding.  See, e.g., In re: Telxon Corp. Sec. Litig., 133 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1029 (N.D. Ohio 
2000).  While GAAP violations do not establish scienter, significant or egregious violations described with 
particularity can provide evidence of scienter.   See, e.g., In re PEC Solutions, Inc. Sec. Litig., 418 F.3d 
379, 389 (4th Cir. 2005); Greebel, 194 F.3d at 203; and Blatt v. Muse Tech., Inc., 2002 WL 311075537, *9 
(D. Mass., Aug. 27, 2002). 
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primarily in the Northern District of Illinois -- have reached the same conclusion.490 A
number of courts have similarly held that GAAS violations, without more, do not 
establish scienter.491 Such holdings are appropriate, especially given the infirmities of 
GAAP and GAAS discussed in Section III of this Article.  GAAP is not a particularly 
accurate yardstick against which securities fraud violations can be measured. 
 The tests for auditor recklessness that have been formulated by federal courts in 
lieu of accepting GAAP or GAAS violations are less appropriate.  One common test 
equates recklessness with intent.  Courts in this camp hold that plaintiffs must allege that 
the audit was conducted so recklessly that the auditor must have intended to engage in 
fraud (or, according to some versions, must have been aware of its client’s fraud).  The 
Second492 and Sixth493 Circuits have accepted this test, and district courts in California,494 
Massachusetts,495 Michigan,496 New Jersey,497 and Virginia498 have done so as well.  
 
490 See, e.g., Davis v. SPSS, Inc., 2005 WL 1126550, *18 (N.D. Ill. May 10, 2005); In re Spiegel, Inc. Sec. 
Litig., 2004 Wl 1535844, *39 (N.D. Ill. July 8, 2004); and Stavros v. Exelon Corp., 2003 WL 21372468, 
*15 (N.D. Ill., June 13, 2003). 
 
491 See, e.g., PR Diamonds, Inc. v. Chandler, 364 F.3d 671, 694  (6th Cir. 2004); In re Spear & Jackson 
Sec. Litig., 2005 WL 3032509, **10-11 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 19, 2005); D.E. & J Ltd. Partnership v. Conway, 
284 F. Supp.2d 719, 745 (E.D. Mich. 2003); Riggs Partners, LLC v. Hub Group, Inc., 2002 WL 31415721, 
*9 (N.D. Ill., Oct. 25, 2002); and Cronau v. Asche, 2002 WL 832569, *2 (N.D. Ill., May 1, 2002). 
 
492 See Rothman v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81, 98 (2d Cir. 2000); Decker v. Massey-Ferguson, Ltd., 681 F.2d 
111, 121 (2d Cir. 1982).  Accord In re Priceline.com Inc. Sec. Litig., 342 F. Supp.2d 33, 57 (D. Conn. 
2004); In re Complete Mgt. Inc. Sec. Litig., 153 F. Supp.2d 314, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); and In re Wellcare 
Mgt. Group, Inc. Sec. Litig., 964 F. Supp. 632, 640 (N.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 
493 See Wyser-Pratte Mgt. Co. v. Telxon Corp., 413 F.3d 553, 563 (6th Cir. 2005); PR Diamonds, Inc. v. 
Chandler, 364 F.3d 671, 693 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 
494 Reiger v. Altris Software, Inc., 1999 WL 540893, *5 (S.D. Cal., Apr. 30, 1999). 
 
495 In re Learnout & Hauspie Sec. Litig., 230 F. Supp.2d 152, 160 (D. Mass. 2002). 
 
496 D.E. & J Ltd. Partnership v. Conway, 284 F. Supp.2d 719, 745 (E.D. Mich. 2003). 
 
497 See, e.g., Key Equity Investors, Inc. v. Sel-Leb Mktg., Inc., 2005 WL 3263865, *6 (D.N.J. Nov. 30, 
2005) (with respect to auditor defendant, conduct must approximate actual intent to aid in fraud being 
perpetrated by audited company); In re Royal Dutch/Shell Transport Sec. Litig.,, 380 F. Supp.2d 509, 566 
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Many other courts have framed the scienter standard in negative terms -- plaintiffs must 
plead (and prove) that the auditor’s conduct was so deficient that the audit amounted to 
no audit at all.  The Sixth499 and Ninth500 Circuits and district courts in those circuits501 
and elsewhere502 have utilized this latter test on numerous occasions.503 
The adoption of an elevated standard for pleading scienter of auditors is 
unjustified.  The express language of the PSLRA does not provide for such a standard,504 
and no compelling policy justification has been advanced by those courts that have, in 
effect, rewritten the statute.  The widespread use of a standard that equates recklessness 
with intent is particularly suspect.  Many courts adopting this standard cite Second 
Circuit precedent, but the relevant line of cases is weak.  A careful parsing of the original 
 
(D.N.J. 2005) (same); In re Suprema Specialties, Inc. Sec. Litig., 334 F. Supp.2d 637, 657 (D.N.J. 2004) 
(same); and Nappier v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 227 F. Supp.2d 263, 275 (D.N.J. 2002). 
 
498 In re Microstrategy, Inc. Sec. Litig., 115 F. Supp.2d 620, 651 (E.D. Va. 2000). 
 
499 Fidel v. Farley, 392 F.3d 220, 227 (6th Cir. 2004); PR Diamonds, Inc. v. Chandler, 364 F.3d 671, 693 
(6th Cir. 2004).   
 
500 See In re Saxton, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2005 WL 3271342, *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 2, 2005); DSAM Global Value 
Fund v. Altris Software, Inc., 288 F.3d 385, 390 (9th Cir. 2002); and In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 
F.3d 1407, 1426 (9th Cir. 1994).  
 
501 See, e.g., In re ICN Pharm., Inc. Sec. Litig., 2004 WL 42583, *11 (C.D. Cal., Jan. 5, 2004); In re 
Homestore.com, Inc. Sec. Litig., 252 F. Supp.2d 1018, 1042 (C.D. Cal. 2003); Mittman v. Rally’s 
Hamburger’s, Inc., 2003 WL 22017505, *5 (W.D. Ky., Aug. 25, 2003). 
 
502 See, e.g., In re Freidman’s Inc. Sec. Litig., 385 F. Supp.2d 1345, 1365 (N.D. Ga. 2005); McKowan 
Lowe & Co. v. Jasmine, Ltd., 2005 WL 1541062, *13 (D.N.J. June 30, 2005); Davis v. SPSS, Inc., 2005 
WL 1126550, *17 (N.D. Ill., May 10, 2005); In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 351 F. Supp.2d 
334, 385 (D. Md. 2004); and RZ Investments v. Phillips, 2003 WL 22862738, *5 (N.D. Tex., March 26, 
2003).   
 
503 A variation of this test is that the accounting judgments that were made were such that no reasonable 
accountant would have made the same decisions if confronted with the same facts.   See, e.g., In re Ikon 
Office Solutions, Inc. Sec. Litig., 277 F.3d 658, 669 (3d Cir. 2002); Julie A. Boncarosky, Accounting Firm 
or Guarantor?  The Third Circuit’s Answer to Rule 10b-5’s Scienter Requirement in Accountant Liability 
Cases, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1329 (2003). 
 
504 Sherrie R. Savett, Securities Class Actions Since the 1995 Reform Act: A Plaintiff’s Perspective,
1505/Corp 17, 62 (Sept. 2005) (“The PSLRA’s pleading requirements do not distinguish between corporate 
defendants and accountants.”). 
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source of the line discloses only weak support for the holding that is so often cited.505 
Even the parallel standard -- that the audit amounted to no audit at all -- is unjustified.  In 
the absence of sound policy reasons to the contrary, external auditors should be held to 
the same recklessness standard that other defendants are held to.  That standard, as 
applied to auditors, should not require that plaintiffs allege and prove that, in effect, no 
audit was conducted.  Such a requirement subverts the meaning of recklessness.  
 Plaintiffs asserting auditor liability often allege that the auditors ignored “red 
flags” that signal accounting misconduct.  Red flags have been judicially defined as facts 
that would place a reasonable auditor, to whose attention they have come, on notice that 
the audited company was engaged in wrongdoing to the detriment of its investors.506 As 
a general rule, GAAP and/or GAAS violations, coupled with sufficient disregarded red 
flags, can suffice to support an inference of scienter.507 But some courts have held that 
the auditor must have intentionally or deliberately disregarded the flags, in order for the 
allegation to suffice.508 Such a requirement once again subverts the meaning of 
 
505 A fairly recent Second Circuit statement of the standard appears in Rothman v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81, 98 
(2d Cir. 2000).  Rothman cites Decker v. Massey-Ferguson, Ltd., 681 F.2d 111, 121 (2d Cir. 1982), which 
in turn cites IIT, an Int’l Inv. Trust v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 927 (2d Cir. 1980).  But Cornfeld, decided 
long before the PSLRA was enacted, only weakly supports the proposition that plaintiffs must plead actual 
intent when alleging scienter of external auditors.    
 
506 In re Recoton Corp. Sec. Litig., 358 F. Supp.2d 1130, 1147 (M.D. Fla. 2005). 
 
507 See, e.g., In re Royal Dutch/Shell Transport Sec. Litig., 380 F. Supp.2d 509, 570 (D.N.J. 2005); In re 
AOL Time Warner, Inc. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 2004 WL 992991, *34 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2004); Teachers’ 
Retirement System v. A.C.L.N., Ltd., 2003 WL 21058090, *11 (S.D.N.Y., May 15, 2003); and In re 
Hamilton Bankcorp, Inc. Sec. Litig., 194 F. Supp.2d 1353, 1359 (S.D. Fla. 2002).  The red flag must be 
something more than the GAAP violation itself, in order for the allegation to suffice.  In re: Stone & 
Webster, Inc. Sec. Litig., 253 F. Supp.2d 102, 133 (D. Mass. 2003). 
 
508 See, e.g., Great Neck Capital Apprec. Inv. Partnership v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, L.L.P., 137 F. 
Supp.2d 1114, 1124 (E.D. Wis. 2001) (deliberately ignoring red flags can constitute the recklessness 
necessary to support a § 10(b) violation).  
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recklessness.  Numerous other courts have rejected arguments that the specific red flags 
alleged by plaintiffs support an inference of scienter against the auditor defendants.509 
One red flag that is commonly alleged is the sheer magnitude of the accounting 
fraud at issue.  Some courts have held that this flag can suffice to allege,510 or is probative 
of,511 scienter. But other courts have determined that magnitude is a mere manifestation 
of the accounting violation itself, and thus cannot create an inference of scienter.512 
Another approach taken by courts seeking to limit the exposure of auditors is to hold that 
the magnitude of the accounting fraud, even if substantial, is insufficient to constitute 
evidence of scienter.513 Auditing cases that do find magnitude of the fraud to be a 
sufficient red flag to be probative of scienter have not infrequently involved 
 
509 See, e.g., Fidel v. Farley, 392 F.3d 220, 229-30 (6th Cir. 2004); PR Diamonds, Inc. v. Chandler, 364 
F.3d 671, 695 (6th Cir. 2004); Ziemba v. Cascade Int’l, Inc., 256 F.3d 1194, 1120 (11th Cir. 2001); Umsted 
v. Andersen LLP, 2003 WL 222621, *4 (N.D. Tex., Jan. 28, 2003); Yadlosky v. Grant Thornton, L.L.P., 
120 F. Supp.2d 622, 631 (E.D. Mich. 2000); and Reiger v. Price Waterhouse Coopers LLP, 117 F. Supp.2d 
1003, 1009 n.5  (S.D. Cal. 2000). 
 
510 See, e.g., In re Leslie Fay Cos. Sec. Litig., 835 F. Supp. 167, 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
 
511 See, e.g., Lewin v. Lipper Convertibles, L.P., 2004 WL 1077930, *2 (S.D.N.Y., May 13, 2004) 
(accounting violations on repeated and pervasive scale could provide evidence of recklessness on part of 
Pricewaterhouse Coopers); In re Microstrategy, Inc. Sec. Litig., 115 F. Supp.2d 620, 651 (E.D. Va. 2000); 
In re Livent, Inc. Sec. Litig., 78 F. Supp.2d 194, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); In re Baan Co. Sec. Litig., 103 F. 
Supp.2d 1, 21 (D.D.C. 2000); and Carley Capital Group v. Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P., 27 F. Supp.2d 1324, 
1339 (N.D. Ga. 1998). 
 
512 See, e.g., Fidel v. Farley, 392 F.3d 220, 231 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Allowing an inference of scienter based on 
the magnitude of fraud ‘would eviscerate the principle that accounting errors alone cannot justify a finding 
of scienter.’”); In re Raytheon Sec. Litig., 157 F. Supp.2d 131, 155 (D. Mass. 2001) (issuance by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers of clean audit letter when write-downs of $300 million should have been made 
does not support inference of scienter).  See also In re SCB Computer Tech., Inc. Sec. Litig., 149 F. 
Supp.2d 334, 357 (W.D. Tenn. 2001) (magnitude of fraud, without more, cannot sustain finding that 
auditor acted with scienter).  Cf. In re Van Wagoner Funds, Inc., 2004 WL 2623972, *9 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 
2004) (“A court should not infer an independent acocuntant’s scienter based solely on the magnitude of his 
client’s fraud.”).  
 
513 See, e.g., Geinko v. Padda, 2001 WL 1163728, *9 & n.12 (N.D. Ill., Sept. 28, 2001) (court 
acknowledges that $39 million fraud is huge, but still dismisses complaint against KPMG). 
 
116
overstatements of revenue, income, or earnings per share in excess of 100 percent.514 In 
general, the examination of red flags by federal district courts has resulted in the exercise 
of a significant amount of discretion, “often creating unpredictable and arguably 
inconsistent results.”515 
VII. 
CONCLUSION 
 
Accounting fraud has been widespread in the United States in recent years.  This 
fraud has been facilitated by GAAP and GAAS, and driven to a certain extent by the 
active participation of external auditors.  Investors seeking redress against auditors under 
the federal securities laws have been unfairly thwarted in many cases by courts 
defectively analyzing scienter.  The federal judiciary’s current approach to analyzing the 
adequacy of scienter allegations against external auditors seems designed to artificially 
minimize the exposure of auditors to liability under the securities laws.  With regard to 
pleading motive and opportunity to commit fraud, a number of courts apply DiLeo to 
effectively insulate auditors from liability, notwithstanding the untenable logic of that 
 
514 See, e.g., In re Rent-Way Sec. Litig., 209 F. Supp.2d 493, 507 (W.D. Pa. 2002) (restatement of 
earnings resulting in reduction of earnings per share from $0.66 to $.04 is probative of 
PricewaterhouseCooper’s scienter); In re Learnout & Hauspie Sec. Litig., 2002 WL 31961469, *9-10 (D. 
Mass., Nov. 18, 2002) (overstatement of reported earnings by 103 percent is probative of KPMG’s 
scienter); Kinney v. Metro Global Media, Inc., 170 F. Supp.2d 173, 180 (D.R.I. 2001) (overstatement of net 
income for two fiscal years by 240 percent and 306 percent is probative of auditor’s scienter); and In re 
Cendant Corp. Litig., 60 F. Supp.2d 354, 372-73  (D.N.J. 1999) (court denies Ernst & Young’s motion to 
dismiss where earnings per share were overstated by 130 percent over a period of three years).  See also In 
re BISYS Sec. Litig., 2005 WL 2844792, *11-13 (S.D.N.Y., Oct. 28, 2005) (size of fraud may contribute to 
inference of scienter if, for example, fraud actually bankrupts company); In re Tyco Int’l, Ltd., 2004 WL 
2348315, *13 (D.N.H. Oct. 14, 2004) (overstatement of earnings by $5.6 billion sufficient to plead scienter 
against Pricewaterhouse Coopers only in combination with other factors); In re Spiegel, Inc. Sec. Litig., 
2004 WL 1535844, *40 (N.D. Ill. July 8, 2004) (understatement of debt by $3 billion, in combination with 
other factors, sufficient to plead scienter of KPMG); Carley Capital Group v. Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P., 27 
F. Supp.2d 1324, 1339 (N.D. Ga. 1998) (overstatement of financial results must be “drastic”). 
 
515 Sanford P. Dumain, Class Action Suits, Auditor Liability, and the Effect of the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, SK086 ALI-ABA 501, 585 (Feb. 2005).  Accord In re Spear & Jackson Sec. 
Litig., 2005 WL 3032509, *10 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 19, 2005) (some courts have accepted a type of red flag as 
evidence of scienter, while other courts have rejected the same type of allegation). 
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case.  DiLeo’s reasoning is open to challenge on numerous grounds.  The case 
erroneously posits that auditors have no economic incentive to engage in fraudulent 
audits, it ignores the oligopolistic nature of the accounting industry, it fails to consider the 
revolving door phenomenon and the absence of auditor rotation, and it wrongly assumes 
that auditors and auditing firms conduct themselves as rational actors.  Similarly, courts 
finding insufficient allegations of motive and opportunity often apply an elevated 
recklessness standard to auditors that cannot be justified.  These courts require plaintiffs 
to plead and prove that external auditors intended to commit fraud, or conducted no audit 
at all.   
 The foregoing approaches cannot be reconciled with the judicial treatment of non-
auditor defendants.  The PSLRA does not distinguish between auditors and non-auditors 
with regard to scienter, and courts have no basis for doing so.  The same tests should be 
applied uniformly to both categories of defendants.  Uniform application of the tests for 
assessing scienter across different categories of defendants will more effectively 
accomplish the goals of the federal securities laws. 
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